APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Appellees, finding that Appellant’s own inattention was the cause of her accident and that she was more than 50% at fault for her injuries.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2016, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Earnest Costosteno Woodley, of four counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to four concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Nine years later, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his criminal history did not qualify him as a repeat violent offender. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, William Lloyd Smith, III, pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and received an agreed sentence of eight years as a Range I offender, to be served on probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probation rather than allowing him furlough to a residential treatment facility previously approved by his probation officer. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Michael Fiedler, appeals his Henry County Circuit Court conviction of driving ona suspended license, for which he received a sentence of 180 days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred by finding that heknowingly and voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel. He also argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing or to make the requisite findingspursuant to State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2000),insupportofits determination that confinement was particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses. The State responds that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a within range sentence. Following our review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

In January 2023, the Montgomery County Grand Jury issued a four-count indictment charging Miracle A’sha Bailey (“Defendant Bailey”) and Robert Jaylen Holland (“Defendant Holland”) with first degree premeditated murder (Count 1), evading arrest in an automobile causing a risk of death or serious bodily injury (Count 2), and theft of property valued at more than $10,000 (Count 3).  Defendant Holland was also charged with evading arrest (Count 4).  Following a joint trial, the jury convicted Defendant Bailey of first degree premeditated murder and the lesser-included offenses of evading arrest in an automobile in Count 2 and joyriding in Count 3, for which the trial court imposed an effective life sentence.  The jury convicted Defendant Holland of first degree premeditated murder, evading arrest in an automobile causing a risk of death or serious bodily injury, the lesser-included offense of joyriding in Count 3, and evading arrest, for which the trial court imposed an effective life sentence.

On appeal, Defendant Bailey contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting a detective’s body camera recording of a doorbell camera video; (2) the chain of custody for her cell phone and the victim’s cell phone was insufficiently established; (3) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs; (4) the trial court erred by finding that the automobile’s owner was not a material witness; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity; and (6) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight.  For his part, Defendant Holland contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity and by issuing an “inaccurate” instruction on flight; (3) his right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court allowed an expert witness to testify who did not perform the gunshot residue (“GSR”) testing; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs.  After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable case law, we affirm.  We also determine that there is a clerical error in Defendant Holland’s judgment form in Count 2 and remand for entry of a corrected judgment. 

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a defective petition for writ of certiorari for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the Appellee’s motion to dismiss after Appellant failed to verify and notarize the petition under the requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Barry J. Zbleski, Jr., of second degree murder by the unlawful distribution of fentanyl or carfentanil and of the knowing sale and distribution of fentanyl resulting in death or bodily injury. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by admitting testimony from a substitute medical examiner. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal, which was brought pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02.  Because Appellant’s petition fails to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B§ 1.01, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s modification of a residential schedule in which the
trial court awarded the parents equal co-parenting time. We now affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found clear and convincing
evidence to terminate father’s parental rights to the minor child on three statutory
grounds: abandonment by failure to support, father’s confinement as the result of a criminal
sentence of ten or more years when the child was under eight years old, and father’s failure
to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of
the child. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest.
We vacate the trial court’s finding as to father’s failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all
other respects.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action concerning the rezoning of property
by the Jefferson City Council. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. We now affirm the
ruling of the trial court.

The appeal concerns the scope and enforceability of a liability waiver.  The trial court determined the liability waiver applied to the plaintiff’s claims of personal injury and granted the defendant summary judgment.  We agree and affirm

The mother appeals the juvenile court’s decision to impose sanctions against her for failing
to produce documents in response to the father’s repeated discovery requests. She also
challenges the amount of the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce.  The parties were married over twenty years and had three children.  The mother was a stay-at-home parent while Father was employed. At trial, they stipulated to separate parenting schedules for their two teenagers but could not agree on a parenting schedule for their youngest daughter, a former foster child they had adopted years earlier.  The trial court designated the father primary residential parent of the youngest daughter and adopted a parenting schedule with equal parenting time on an alternating weekly basis.  The trial court denied the mother’s request for alimony in futuro and awarded her transitional alimony for a period of five months.  The trial court ordered the father to pay $6,000 of the mother’s attorney fees, but each party was deemed responsible for the remainder of his or her own attorney fees.  The mother appeals.  We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Worker employed by a temporary staffing agency was assigned to one of the agency’s clients and then injured while working. In suing the client for negligence, the worker relied on the contract between agency and client that provided that such assignees would not be considered employees of the client. The trial court granted summary judgment for the client, finding that the worker was a co-employee of the client and thus subject to the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law. Because the worker admitted all of the facts establishing his status as an employee of the client by failing to dispute them, we affirm.

This case involves a petition for rescission of a mortgage loan based on fraud in the
inducement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on two separate
grounds. The first basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was that the
plaintiff sought rescission of the loan transaction but admitted that he could not repay the
amount he received in the transaction and also admitted that he could not restore the status
quo if the note and deed of trust were rescinded. Because the plaintiff was unable to place
the parties in their prior status, the trial court found that he was not entitled to rescission.
Next, the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to identify any misrepresentation made
by the original lender and only alleged misrepresentation by the mortgage broker, who was
not a party to this lawsuit. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to present any
evidence or legal theory showing that the mortgage broker was acting as an agent of the
original lender, so his statements were not attributable to the defendants. The plaintiff
appeals. We affirm.

The plaintiffs sued various state officials to enjoin the deployment of Tennessee National Guard troops in support of the President’s Memphis Safe Task Force. The trial court granted a temporary injunction, and the state defendants filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 motion seeking permission to appeal, which the Court of Appeals granted. Finding that the plaintiffs lack standing, we reverse the issuance of the injunction.

A Hancock County jury convicted the Defendant, Shoshanna Cabanting, of vandalism as a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with thirty days to be served in confinement and the remainder suspended to probation. In a prior appeal, this court reversed and remanded the case for a limited resentencing hearing. On remand, the trial court made additional findings and reimposed the same sentence. The Defendant again challenges the split-confinement portion of her sentence and requests that this court impose full probation instead. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Carrington Owens, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief from  Petitioner’s convictions for four counts of rape of a child, twenty-three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and twelve counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age and his effective thirty-seven-year sentence.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Bradley J. Cooper, was indicted for one count of aggravated stalking and one count of harassment. The case went to trial, and the jury found Defendant guilty as charged.  The trial court merged Defendant’s harassment conviction into his aggravated stalking conviction and sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of two years’ incarceration.  On appeal, Defendant argues (1) his conviction for aggravated stalking violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 8; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated stalking; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to take judicial notice, admit testimony regarding, or allow him to otherwise argue that orders of protection generally expire after one year; and (4) his conviction for aggravated stalking and harassment violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. After review, we find that Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, and we vacate Defendant’s aggravated stalking conviction.  We affirm Defendant’s conviction for harassment in Count 2 but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment form, removing the condition that Count 2 is merged with Count 1. 

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the ground of persistent conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3).  Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support this ground and the trial court’s determination that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests, we affirm.

A Macon County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jeffery D. Strong, of selling dihydrocodeinone, a Schedule III controlled substance. The Petitioner later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to object to the admission of the audio recording of the drug transaction; and (2) failing to raise the recording’s admission as an error in the motion for a new trial. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. In addition to his ineffective assistance claim, the Petitioner also contends on appeal that the post-conviction court erred by failing to resolve the question of pretrial jail credits owed to him. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Arvel Joshua Terry, of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced him to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended after service of 120 days in custody. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support his conviction for domestic assault; and (2) whether the trial court improperly denied defense counsel the opportunity to refresh a witness’s recollection. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jay Junior Heifner, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of the three-year term of probation imposed for his 2021 guilty-pleaded conviction of theft, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the violation warrant was void and that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We conclude that because the affidavit in support of the violation warrant failed to comply with the statutory and rule-based requirements, the affidavit was void, the violation warrant was void, and the ensuing revocation proceeding was void. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court to determine whether, in the absence of a validly issued probation violation warrant, Defendant’s term of probation has expired.

The Petitioner, Christopher Thomas Thompson, appeals from the Weakley County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to develop a
defense strategy or otherwise investigate possible defenses and that his guilty plea was
involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.