APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Kwame D. Chihombori-Quao, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of statutory rape, for which he was sentenced to two years in confinement and six years on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to register as a sex offender. Following our review, we affirm.

Defendant, William Roger Campbell, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive life sentences. In his direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but reversed the imposition of consecutive sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing, during which the trial court was to address the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). State v. Campbell, No. M2023-00779-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3888342, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2024). Following a hearing in which no new proof was presented, the court again aligned the sentences consecutively. Defendant now asserts that the trial court erred in doing so. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action involves the proper use and zoning of a parcel of real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, determining that the owner’s use of the property as a quarry was not prohibited because the subject property was unzoned. The trial court based its ruling on the municipality’s inability to produce a validly enacted zoning ordinance that applied to the specific parcel. The municipality and its planning commission have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We also find that the property owner’s motions to consider post-judgment facts and to dismiss the appeal are not well taken, and we deny those motions.

The petitioner, Marcus Willingham, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee’s petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of a petition to extend an order of protection for ten years after finding that the respondent violated the original order of protection multiple times and failed to appear for hearings throughout the litigation. Because none of the issues the appellant raises were raised in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-617(a)(1), we award the appellee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal and remand for calculation of the amount.

A Williamson County jury convicted Jeremy Michael Fowler (“Defendant”) in Case No. W-CR22-213-A (“the Waffle House Case”) of seven counts of Class A misdemeanor reckless endangerment (Counts 1-7), two counts Class C felony aggravated assault (Counts 8 and 9), and one count of Class A misdemeanor unlawful possession of a weapon after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (Count 11). At the outset of the sentencing hearing in the Waffle House Case, Defendant entered guilty pleas in Case No. W-CR230286 (“the Jail Case”) to two counts of Class A misdemeanor assault, which stemmed from incidents that occurred while Defendant was incarcerated awaiting trial in the Waffle House Case. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant in the Waffle House Case to two consecutive terms of six years on the aggravated assault convictions, six consecutive terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the reckless endangerment convictions, and a consecutive term of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the weapons charge. The court merged the reckless endangerment conviction in Count 7 with Count 6. Additionally, pursuant to his plea agreement in the Jail Case, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the assault convictions and ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the sentence in the Waffle House Case. On appeal, Defendant claims the court erred by (1) failing to merge all the reckless endangerment convictions in the Waffle House Case, (2) misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors resulting in an excessive sentence, and (3) imposing consecutive sentences. Based upon the proof presented at trial, the indictment, and the jury verdicts in the reckless endangerment offenses, we reverse the court’s merger of Count 7 into Count 6 and remand for the trial court to enter an amended judgment omitting the merger language in Count 7 and aligning the sentence in Count 7 concurrently with Count 6. In all other regards, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an action for breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). The defendants, who are Minnesota residents and who have no business activities in Tennessee except for this one transaction with the plaintiff, responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to the mother. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

Petitioner seeks to appeal a denial of her motion to recuse. Because she did not include her trial court motion and supporting documents, the record is insufficient to determine this appeal. We affirm.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., concurring. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority’s thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

The petitioner, Michael Eugene St. Clair, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Williamson County, arguing the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition due to improper venue and failure to include the necessary transcript. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

A Giles County jury convicted the defendant, Jake Christopher Reynolds, of criminal trespass, preventing or obstructing service of legal process, and resisting arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of ten days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions and in incorrectly charging the jury on the statutory defense to criminal trespass. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Finding good cause, a trial court issued an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that extension of the ex parte order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. We agree with the petitioner that the statute mandates extending an existing ex parte order of protection upon finding that a predicate act was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we vacate and remand.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., dissenting.  The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority's thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

A trial court declined to grant an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing over whether to issue an order of protection, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that issuance of an order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. While our understanding of the statutory scheme diverges from that set forth in Dulaney v. Chico, we affirm the trial court’s decision. We do so because we conclude that the absence of existing ongoing danger is a proper consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b) when no ex parte order has been issued and because the trial court properly understood its discretion in this case.

This appeal concerns jail behavior credits. Dickson County Jail inmate Brandon Shane Wooley (“Plaintiff”) sued Dickson County and several officials (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he was wrongfully denied credits for good behavior. When Defendants failed to respond within 30 days, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. In addition, the Trial Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Trial Court stated, therefore, that it was unnecessary to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the Trial Court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remand for the Trial Court to determine whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and what those remedies were.

The Defendant, William Couch, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property. The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence and placed the Defendant on supervised probation. While on probation, the Defendant absconded from supervision and committed new misdemeanor offenses. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentences and ordered him to serve the balance of those sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to impose a lesser sanction, such as reinstatement to probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Lorenza Zackery, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

The Defendant, Rex A. Moore, pleaded guilty to theft of property and two counts of violating the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (“Sexual Offender Registry”). The trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence and suspended the sentences, placing the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by misrepresenting his residence in violation of the Sexual Offender Registry requirements and by assaulting a corrections officer while incarcerated. After a hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentences and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his suspended sentences and by failing to consider lesser sanctions. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A jury convicted Defendant, Stanley William Havens, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08% or higher (DUI per se), and it found that this was Defendant’s third DUI offense for enhanced sentencing. The offenses were merged, and Defendant was assessed a fine and sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement, with a release eligibility of 75%. Defendant appeals, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the redacted video of the traffic stop; (3) the trial court’s failure to excuse a juror for cause; (4) a statement during voir dire that he asserts constitutes prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) his sentence. We affirm and remand for entry of a corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3.

Defendant, Rikiya Joy Parks, appeals her Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convictions for aggravated child neglect, making a false report, and child abuse, challenging the admission of photographs of the minor victim, the admission of what she claims was improper character evidence, the exclusion of printed screenshots of Facebook messages, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm.

The parties obtained a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). On appeal, the wife disputes the Trial Court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement pay. Upon our review, we determine that the Trial Court miscalculated the wife’s portion given that it calculated her portion based on the parties’ date of informal separation, rather than the date of the husband’s retirement from the military. In doing so, the Trial Court misclassified marital property as separate property. We, accordingly, vacate the Trial Court’s classification of the husband’s military retirement pay as partially separate property acquired during the marriage and the Trial Court’s division of the entire marital estate, insofar as the Trial Court’s improper classification of this marital asset affects the equitable division of the marital estate as a whole. We remand this cause to the Trial Court for it to properly classify the husband’s military retirement pay as marital property acquired during the months of the marriage, recalculate its division of this marital asset, and re-access its division of the entire marital estate in light of its reclassification and recalculation of its division of this marital asset.

A Knox County Jury convicted Defendant, Tyler Christian, of two counts of carjacking and one count of driving on a revoked license. The trial court merged the carjacking convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years’ confinement as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court’s decision to supplement the pattern jury instructions with definitions of “force” and “violence,” and the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial. After review, we affirm.