APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Charlie Richard Martinez, of first degree
felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective
sentence of life imprisonment plus four years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting three different writings attributed to the Defendant as autobiographical rap lyrics;
(3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to amend the especially
aggravated robbery count the morning of trial; (4) the trial court erred in allowing Kendra
Ivey to testify to double hearsay; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Specific Discovery Request No. 1, which requested materials necessary for his state-funded
expert; and (6) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. After
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of rape of a child. By consent of the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to twenty-five years’ incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, appeals the denial of his pro se “Petition For a Writ of Habeas Corpus[,] Rule 36.1 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence[,] Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Lee Potts, claims the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for relief from his conviction for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Petitioner claims (1) that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-110(f), which requires that petitioners prove “allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence,” is inconsistent with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and “erects an unconstitutional barrier to relief” and (2) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain and call a use-of-force expert witness at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Randall Lee Neece, of first degree premeditated murder. On the first day of trial, the Defendant moved for a change of venue, asserting that a newly installed “Victims of Violent Crime” monument outside the courthouse prejudiced prospective jurors. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant was convicted as charged. On appeal, the Defendant does not challenge the denial of a venue change or the adequacy of voir dire but instead contends that the sworn jurors were exposed to extraneous prejudicial information through the monument. Upon our review, we conclude that this claim was not preserved for plenary review and does not warrant plain error relief. We therefore respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This election contest action is before this Court for the second time on appeal. The plaintiff, Robin M. McNabb, initially sought a judgment declaring the August 2022 election for Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge void because the defendant, Gregory H. Harrison, who had received the greatest number of votes, did not meet the one-year “district” residency requirement set forth in Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution. After the trial court dismissed Ms. McNabb’s complaint and this Court affirmed the dismissal, our Supreme Court reversed those decisions upon holding that Article VI, Section 4 required a candidate to have been a resident of the municipality for at least one year prior to the election. McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2025) (“McNabb I”). On remand, the trial court declared the election void. Mr. Harrison subsequently filed a motion to set aside that order predicated on a newly enacted statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 16- 18-206, which provides that the McNabb I decision “shall apply prospectively and shall be enforced beginning with the next regularly scheduled election for any affected municipal judgeship after May 21, 2025.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-206(c). Ms. McNabb filed a response opposing Mr. Harrison’s motion, and she filed a motion to amend her complaint wherein she requested that she be declared the “winner” of the August 2022 election. The trial court granted Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside the order and denied Ms. McNabb’s motion to amend her complaint. The trial court found, inter alia, that Ms. McNabb had failed to properly raise a constitutional challenge to § 16-18-206. Ms. McNabb has appealed. Upon thorough review, we determine that Ms. McNabb sufficiently raised a constitutional challenge to § 16-18-206. We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding that Ms. McNabb did not raise a constitutional challenge, vacate the trial court’s grant of Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside, and remand for the trial court to consider the constitutionality of § 16-18-206 and to reconsider Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside. However, we affirm the trial court’s finding that under the precepts of § 16-18-206, Mr. Harrison was the de facto Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge.

The Defendant, Marion Brock Foreman, was convicted at a bench trial by the Henderson County Circuit Court of twenty counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-1307 (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (unlawful possession of a firearm); § 39- 17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia). He was found not guilty of ten counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous offense involving the felony sale or delivery of a controlled substance and two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. After merger, he received an effective sentence of eight years with a 35% release eligibility for five counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence derived from the search of his property and home. We conclude that the trial court erred, reverse the judgments of the court, vacate the convictions, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Lamonte Cole, appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a final judgment in a divorce action without children. The wife appeals contending the trial judge was biased against her, the judge erred by denying her petition for divorce while granting the husband’s counterpetition for divorce, and the judge erred in allocating marital assets and debts. Finding no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We reverse, holding that the record does not support the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence in support of the alleged statutory grounds of termination.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final decree as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher Nicol Cox, appeals from the Scott County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues the postconviction
court erred in denying his petition in that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) failure to object, move for a mistrial, or request a curative
instruction after a prospective juror stated she had previously “dealt with” the Petitioner
through her work with child protective services, (2) releasing an alibi witness from his
subpoena when he failed to appear at trial, and (3) failure to adequately advise the Petitioner
regarding his right to testify. The Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative effect of trial
counsel’s errors entitles him to post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a second jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court, the Defendant, Alan Johnson, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. The trial court sentenced him to life for each murder conviction and merged those convictions. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years each for the aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect convictions, Class A felonies, and ordered that he serve all of the sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) his second trial violated double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (4) the trial court committed plain error by allowing a medical examiner to testify about the victim’s autopsy report when the witness did not prepare the report; (5) the State’s prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination of the defense’s expert witness constituted plain error; (6) the trial court erred by not admitting his entire 911 call into evidence; (7) the trial court’s denial of his request to have retained counsel represent him on his motion for new trial violated his constitutional right to counsel of choice; (8) his effective sentence is excessive; and (9) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error.1 Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and that the trial court incorrectly ordered the Defendant to serve one hundred percent of his sentence for aggravated child neglect. Therefore, the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect in count four is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment for aggravated child neglect in count three. The Defendant’s remaining convictions and effective sentence of life plus fifty years are affirmed.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court allowed the mother’s counsel to withdraw from representation at the beginning of trial when the mother did not appear. On appeal, the mother asserts that she did not have prior notice of the trial date and that her attorney did not provide her with notice of an intent to withdraw from representation. Based on the circumstances presented and applicable law, we vacate the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights and remand for a new trial.

Marina Kotova (“Plaintiff”) and Thomas Kevin True (“Defendant”), who were formerly married, entered into an agreement whereby Defendant would purchase certain real property owned by Plaintiff pursuant to an installment purchase agreement. The agreement provided that, in the event of a default by Defendant, Plaintiff could sue for monetary damages, specific performance, or both. Additionally, an addendum to the agreement allowed Plaintiff to evict Defendant from the property if he was in default for more than thirty days. Defendant defaulted, and Plaintiff sued him seeking possession of the property and monetary damages. The trial court instead awarded Plaintiff specific performance, which required Plaintiff to sell the property to Defendant upon Defendant curing his default. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s award of specific performance. We find that the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiff a remedy other than what she requested, and we reverse the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Dexter Parker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Sedrick Clayton, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Urshawn Miller, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This consolidated appeal is before this court on the Petitioner, Jason Lee Fisher’s, application for permission to appeal the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and the denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The Petitioner argues that the circuit court1 erred in denying both his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings based upon a claim of juror bias during his trial. He also raises constitutional challenges to the error coram nobis and motion to reopen post-conviction statutes. Finally, he contends that the circuit court erred by finding that he failed to establish prejudice on his juror bias claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and we deny the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

A plaintiff sued his son and daughter-in-law over, among other things, a warranty deed to disputed real property. The plaintiff later filed an amended complaint alleging several claims against the daughter-in-law’s attorney. The attorney filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the litigation privilege bars the plaintiff’s claims against her. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court found a father guilty of nine counts of criminal contempt based on his alleged violation of the trial court’s previous order addressing child support arrearage and the current child support arrangement for the father’s minor child. Because the order appealed from contains no findings on the essential elements of criminal contempt, on what evidence supports the judgment, or on whether the criminal contempt was initiated on proper notice, we vacate and remand to the trial court.

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision that clear and convincing evidence established the existence of two statutory grounds for termination. Because the juvenile court’s order failed to make sufficient factual findings to support its best interest analysis, we vacate that portion of the court’s decision and remand for entry of an order making sufficient factual findings

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.