APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a legal malpractice action that arises from alleged acts or omissions committed by attorney Steven L. Lefkovitz of Lefkovitz & Lefkovitz, PLLC, (“Defendant”) while representing Julie Buhler in a real estate dispute with Richard and Ellen Davis (“Sellers”) under an installment sales contract. The trial court summarily dismissed the legal malpractice action on the ground that two essential elements of a legal malpractice claim were not proven, specifically that “Plaintiff has failed to prove that Mr. Lefkovitz’s conduct was the cause-in-fact of her damages,” and “Plaintiff has not shown that Mr. Lefkovitz’s conduct was the proximate cause of her damages.” This appeal followed. We affirm.

Before the court is the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. The State argues that the trial court properly denied the Appellant’s motion for plain error review of his sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36, because no such pleading is contemplated by the rules of criminal procedure. The pro se Appellant has filed a response in opposition to the State’s motion.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child, the Loudon
County Circuit Court (“trial court”) determined that clear and convincing evidence
supported termination as to three statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to support,
failure to establish paternity, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court
further determined that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interest. The father has appealed. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s
determination that the ground of abandonment by failure to visit had not been established
by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we find that ground also supports
termination of the father’s parental rights. In all other respects, we affirm.

The parties sought a divorce from one another and specifically contested who should be
their child’s primary residential parent. After a three-day trial, the General Sessions
Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) entered a final decree of divorce and
designated the mother as the child’s primary residential parent. The father appealed.
Finding that the Trial Court’s judgment lacked sufficient findings of fact and
consideration of the best interest factors codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106, we
vacate the Trial Court’s custody determination and remand this cause for the Trial Court
to provide written findings of facts and conclusions of law, demonstrating its
consideration of the best interest factors.

Billy J. Hancock, Defendant, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. State v. Hancock, No. M0212-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 on January 30, 2025, in which he argued that the trial court committed a clerical error by checking the “T.D.O.C.” box on the judgment form and by ordering his sentence to be served as a “100 percent violent offender.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim. Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join in the majority’s insightful analysis of Tennessee’s constitutional standing doctrine building upon the principles articulated in Case v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 703 S.W.3d 274, 286–92 (Tenn. 2024). I quite agree with the majority that the claims we decide today are “quintessential” public rights cases and the three-part test of City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. 2013), applies to the standing issues in both cases. I agree that Ms. Hunt does not meet this test and has no constitutional standing to pursue her claims. I also agree that Mr. Wygant’s challenge to the House map does not present a nonjusticiable political question and that he has no standing to challenge the entire House map.

Defendant, Jonathan Hall, pled guilty in two separate cases to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in exchange for dismissal of a related domestic violence charge and an effective eight-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of confinement, four years for the aggravated assault charge to be served at 100% and eight years for the possession of a firearm charge to be served at 85%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for a suspended sentence. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with most of the majority’s excellent opinion, including its conclusions concerning Mr. Wygant’s claim. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion on Ms. Hunt’s standing.

This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Pejhman Ehsani,
for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State has filed
a response in opposition. The Defendant seeks review of the criminal court’s order denying
his motion to dismiss the charges against him in this case. Upon full consideration, the
application is denied for the reasons stated below.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted Defendant, Justin David Whaley, of
vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless driving, driving under the influence of an
intoxicant (“DUI”), reckless vehicular homicide, and multiple driving-related
misdemeanor offenses, and the trial court merged the convictions into one conviction for
vehicular homicide by intoxication and sentenced Defendant to nine years’ incarceration.
Defendant appealed, and while his direct appeal was pending, he filed a petition for writ of
error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted coram nobis relief in part, vacating Defendant’s convictions for vehicular homicide
by intoxication and DUI but denying relief as to Defendant’s remaining convictions. Both
Defendant and the State appealed the trial court’s coram nobis order, and this court
consolidated Defendant’s direct appeal with both parties’ appeals of the trial court’s coram
nobis order. On appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for his
convictions for vehicular homicide and DUI; (2) the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained by a search warrant for a blood draw; (3) the admission of the results of
the analysis of his blood sample and the retrograde extrapolation as unreliable; (4) the
admission of testimony of a Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) employee
as improper lay opinion; (5) the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to visit the scene;
and (6) the jury instructions on mistake of fact and reckless vehicular homicide. Defendant
also contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants relief and that the
trial court erred in failing to grant coram nobis relief for all his convictions. In its crossappeal,
the State asserts that the trial court erred by granting partial coram nobis relief.
Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting coram nobis relief for Defendant’s
convictions of vehicular homicide by intoxication and DUI, and we reinstate those
convictions. Because the trial court only imposed sentences for the vehicular homicide by
intoxication conviction, we remand for a sentencing hearing for the remaining convictions and the entry of corrected judgments reflecting separate sentences for each conviction. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kentavis Antwon Jones, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed the petition for not being in the proper form without giving him reasonable opportunity to correct the petition with the assistance of counsel. He also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to the negligence of his trial counsel. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition as untimely and that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2021, the Defendant, Richard Kinsinger, Jr., pleaded guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve six months in confinement and five years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a divorce case following a long-term marriage. Wife appeals the trial court’s: 1) valuation and distribution of marital property and allocation of debt; 2) award of transitional alimony; 3) downward deviation of Husband’s child support obligation; and 4) denial of her request for her attorney’s fees to be paid from the marital estate. We affirm the trial court’s valuation of property; vacate the trial court’s division of marital debt, in part; vacate the alimony award; and reverse the court’s downward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In this case, two Tennessee voters challenge the state House and Senate redistricting maps the General Assembly passed after the 2020 census. Gary Wygant, a Gibson County voter, alleges that the House redistricting map violates Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution because it splits more counties than needed to comply with federal law. Francie Hunt, a Davidson County voter, alleges that the Senate redistricting map violates Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution because it fails to consecutively number one of the four Senate districts in Davidson County. We hold that Wygant has standing to challenge only the split of Gibson County, not the entire House map. But his challenge fails on the merits: Wygant did not prove—as he must to establish a violation of Article II, Section 5—that the split was unnecessary to comply with federal law and lacked a rational or legitimate basis. We further hold that Hunt lacks standing to challenge the Senate map because she did not suffer an injury in fact from the misnumbering of Davidson County’s Senate districts. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment rejecting Wygant’s district-specific challenge on the merits, reverse the judgment concluding that Hunt has standing, and vacate the judgment holding the Senate map unconstitutional.

Under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, a party may seek dismissal of a lawsuit that was filed “in response to that party’s exercise of the right to free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105(a) (2021). In this case, two lawyers sought to dismiss a tort action brought by the sister and brother-in-law of a former client. The lawyers had represented the former client in a series of unsuccessful lawsuits against the sister and brother-in-law related to their administration of a family trust. Dissatisfied with their representation, the former client sued the lawyers for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment. Based on that alleged conduct, the sister and brother-in-law also sued the lawyers under the tort-of-another doctrine. The lawyers sought to dismiss the tort action on the theory that it was filed in response to the lawyers’ exercise of the right to petition in the underlying trust litigation. We hold that the lawyers failed to show that the tort action was filed in response to their exercise of the right to petition. Assuming that filing a lawsuit is an “exercise of the right to petition” within the meaning of the statute, a lawyer who files a lawsuit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise that right. Instead, a lawyer at most facilitates his client’s exercise of the right. Because the lawyers here cannot show that the action was filed in response to their exercise of the right to petition, the action should not be dismissed under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case focuses on the termination of parental rights of Violet B. (“Mother”) and Coy B.
(“Father”) to their Child, Kaylee B. Mother gave birth to Kaylee in June 2022, and the
parents had a second child, Madison B., in December 2023.1 The Tennessee Department
of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
to each child in two separate petitions filed in the Sevier County Juvenile Court (“trial
court”).2 The trial court conducted a joint hearing on both petitions and entered two
separate orders terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to each child. The trial
court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Kaylee based
upon two statutory grounds. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in Kaylee’s best
interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This case focuses on the termination of parental rights of Violet B. (“Mother”) and Coy B. (“Father”) to their Child, Madison B. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Madison and Madison’s older sister, Kaylee B., in two separate petitions filed in the Sevier County Juvenile Court (“trial court”).1 The trial court conducted a joint hearing on both petitions and entered two separate orders terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to each child.2 The trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Madison after finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based upon the ground of mental incompetence. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in Madison’s best interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Darrell Peterson, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a life sentence plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In 2022, the Petitioner, Keshon Ford, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of ten years of incarceration. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his plea was not entered voluntarily. The habeas court entered an order dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the habeas corpus court erred when it denied his request for appointment of counsel and when it summarily dismissed his petition. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by a mother, individually and on behalf of her daughter, against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and the State of Tennessee after her daughter sustained paralyzing injuries while attending a public school. After a four-day bench trial, the trial court found that both defendants were negligent and that each was fifty percent at fault for the child’s injuries. The trial court found that the plaintiffs should be awarded total compensatory damages of $10,902,348.02, but it reduced the judgment to $600,000 ($300,000 against each defendant) in accordance with the applicable statutory caps. Metro has appealed, while the State has not. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

Under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, a party may seek dismissal of a lawsuit that was filed “in response to that party’s exercise of the right to free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105(a) (2021). In this appeal, we consider whether lawyers sued by their former client for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment may seek dismissal of the lawsuit on the theory that it was filed in response to the lawyers’ exercise of the right to petition—namely, the filing of a lawsuit on behalf of their client. We hold they may not. Assuming that filing a lawsuit is an “exercise of the right to petition” within the meaning of the statute, a lawyer who files a lawsuit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise that right. Instead, the lawyer at most facilitates his client’s exercise of the right. Because the lawyers here cannot show that their former client filed the malpractice and fraudulent concealment action in response to the lawyers’ exercise of the right to petition, the action should not be dismissed under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

A Gibson County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Damone Pewitte, of three counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant broadly challenges whether the election process was sufficient to protect against the risk of a non-unanimous verdict. Specifically, the Defendant raises three inter-related issues regarding the election process on plain error review: (1) the State made its initial election outside the presence of the jury and did not mention its election to the jury until its rebuttal closing argument; (2) the State referenced examples of uncharged conduct during its closing argument; and (3) the language from the trial court’s unanimity instruction was different from the State’s election and closing argument. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Thomas Hunter, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony, at a bench trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve ten years at 100% for each offense, with five of the six sentences to be served consecutively. The court also ordered community supervision for life and placement on the sexual offender registry. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (4) the court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for the correction of a clerical error in the offense date on the judgment for Count 6.

The Defendant, Lucian A. Clemmons, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he asserts constitutional and evidentiary claims related to the trial court’s exclusion of prior statements he made to the lead detective following his arrest. Additionally, as to the murder conviction, the Defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the State failed to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.