APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Decatur County jury convicted Jason David Baine, Defendant, of two counts of assault and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. He received an effective sentence of two years of incarceration to be served at a rate of at least thirty percent. On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her four minor children. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of the mother’s rights based on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The majority thoughtfully addresses the present appeal. I agree with the majority that the record establishes that Mother committed severe child abuse and that the termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. I respectfully diverge from the majority insofar as the majority opinion suggests that the termination petition’s notice — which specifically alleges severe abuse against the children that are named in the petition (which does not include Ervin Leonard) — extends to a finding of severe abuse by Mother of another child, Ervin Leonard. I concur in the majority’s conclusion affirming the termination of Mother’s parental rights based on harmless error.

The Petitioner, Morris Jason Pepper, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder in 2000 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2022, the Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that new scientific evidence established his actual innocence, referencing issues of inconsistent testimony, chain of custody, and the existence of alibi witnesses. He simultaneously filed a petition requesting touch DNA analysis of the several shotgun shells found at the murder scene and in the front yard of his home for the possible presence of either canine DNA or his codefendant’s DNA, contending that analysis was pertinent to answer the question of who or what might have touched the shells. A hearing was held on the Petitioner’s motion to reopen and his DNA petition, following which the post-conviction court denied relief in a single order. The Petitioner now appeals that decision, and he also requests relief via the doctrine of plain error due to the possible existence of a recording of his police interview and due to the destruction of evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this action to terminate parental rights, Mother appeals the trial court’s findings by clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned her child and that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

James Lee Simmons, Jr., Defendant, pleaded guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of the registration law, and resisting arrest. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the manner of service of Defendant’s nine-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered the sentence to be served in confinement. Defendant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Eric Martell Small, appeals as of right from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was coerced, involuntary, and unknowing. Following our review, we affirm.

Came the Defendant, Richard P. Nielsen, Jr., pro se, and also came the Attorney General on behalf of the State of Tennessee, and this case was heard on the record on appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County, and up0on consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is no error in the judgment of the trial court.

Homeowners removed underground storage tanks found on their property. After finding evidence of petroleum contamination where the tanks had been located, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation began an extensive cleanup process. The Department subsequently issued a cost-recovery order against the homeowners to recoup its expenditures. The homeowners petitioned for review of the cost-recovery order to the Underground Storage Tanks and Solid Waste Disposal Control Board, which upheld the order. The homeowners appealed this initial ruling to the Board and the order was again upheld. The homeowners then appealed the Board’s final ruling to the trial court, which reversed the Board’s judgment. The Department and the Board now appeal. Because we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter for transfer to the proper court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Elijah Ogburn, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction, forty years for each attempted murder conviction, and ten years for each employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively to one another for an effective sentence of life plus 100 years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court’s sentence was excessive; (3) the trial court erred by not granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by issuing a material witness bond for Devion Lisenby. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

After two sets of relatives filed competing petitions for the appointment of a conservator over the respondent, the parties entered into an agreed order and settlement agreement that provided that the respondent was not in need of conservator, but that the parties had certain obligations that were subject to review by the court and guardian ad litem going forward. Months later, appellants filed a petition to set aside the agreed order on the basis that appellees had not complied with its terms; appellees responded with a motion to dismiss appellants’ petition on the basis that they had not alleged proper grounds to set aside the parties’ agreement. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order stating that “[a]ll outstanding orders should be set aside and all petitions and the case dismissed” without explanation. Because we cannot review the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal without an adequate explanation, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Defendants, Ashley Ledford and Brandon Stepp, were convicted by a Campbell County jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse and neglect of a child under the age of eight resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court imposed effective twenty-one-year sentences for each Defendant. On appeal, Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements and by consolidating Defendants’ cases, and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendants. Defendants also assert that they are entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A husband never answered his wife’s complaint for divorce, and the trial court entered a default against him. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and divided the marital estate. Within thirty days of entry of the final decree, the husband moved for relief from the judgment. On appeal, the husband faults the court for denying his motion. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Jamie P. Dennis, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for attempted rape of a child and attempted incest. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Petitioner’s trial counsel and appellate counsel provided him with effective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner bases his ineffectiveness claims on trial counsel’s failure to present a specific defense related to criminal attempt as a lesser included offense, failure to request reclassification of his prior conviction offenses to establish the appropriate sentencing range, and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the same issues on direct appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, James Allen Worley, challenges his convictions and sentences for four counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted rape of a child on multiple statutory and constitutional grounds. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by 1) admitting the forensic interview of the child victim on the grounds of the forensic interviewer’s lack of requisite experience and improper authentication by the victim, 2) denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement on the ground that they occurred during an impermissibly lengthy warrantless detainment, and 3) excessively sentencing the Defendant to consecutive terms on all counts. After a thorough review of the record and consideration of the parties’ arguments, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms in counts 1 through 5. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Dior Armonte Issac, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense and driving under the influence, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years' incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we conclude that a new sentencing hearing is necessary because the trial court failed to place the appropriate findings on the record.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court.

The defendant, Russell Lenard, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in confinement.  Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the revocation and the disposition of the defendant's probation.

The appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute. Because the appellant’s brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal.

Anthony M. Standifer (“Defendant”) filed an application for judicial diversion and entered a guilty plea to Class C felony2 possession of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. On December 10, 2015, the trial court entered a probation order deferring entry of judgment pending Defendant’s successful completion of one year of supervised probation and three years of unsupervised probation. Following a June 28, 2023 probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of probation. The trial court revoked probation, terminated judicial diversion, and without a sentencing hearing sentenced Defendant. The court then entered a judgment of conviction finding Defendant guilty of Class C felony “attempt poss. Sch. I controlled with intent to” and sentenced Defendant to serve three years in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the termination of judicial diversion but reverse the judgment finding Defendant guilty of attempted possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell; an offense to which Defendant did not plead guilty. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment finding Defendant guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of controlled substance and for sentencing of Defendant for that offense.

A Campbell County jury convicted Defendant, Anthony Wayne Foust, of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of incarceration to be served as a career offender at 60 percent service. On appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the State failed to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the State failed to preserve evidence in violation State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); and (3) the trial court erred in limiting Defendant’s closing argument. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Christopher Hinson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement. Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence because it failed to consider any consequences other than a full revocation and placed no findings or reasons for its decision on the record. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, George Cleave, was convicted by a jury of theft over $1,000, but less than $2,500, a Class E felony. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I offender to two years, suspended to supervised probation with credit for time served and ordered Defendant to pay $2,500 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his theft conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the restitution amount because it was unsupported by any proof. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm Defendant’s conviction but reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand for a new restitution hearing consistent with this opinion.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, William Darnell Britton, for one count of first-degree premeditated murder. Thereafter, a jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years at one hundred percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error (1) in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his inflammatory rap lyrics and videos and (2) in its jury instructions. After review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s rap lyrics/videos and that this error was not harmless. We also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on “first aggressor proof” in conjunction with the self-defense instruction and that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

Defendant, Timothy Ronald Cunningham, appeals his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault while under an order of protection, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and domestic assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years of confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A father filed a petition to establish parentage of the parties’ child. At the trial on the petition, the trial court limited the evidence to events since a hearing on pendente lite parenting time that took place 47 days before the final hearing. We have determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited the evidence in this way. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order in its entirety and remand for a new trial.