APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the plaintiffs properly served the corporate defendant with process. The trial court determined that plaintiffs did so because the employee who signed for the documents was an appointed subagent of the defendant’s registered agent. Having reviewed the record and relevant authorities, we reverse.

On August 27, 2025, Defendant Timothy Laquan Davis, Jr. filed an application seeking an extraordinary appeal of the trial court’s order, filed on July 24, 2025, denying his motion to strike the State’s notice to seek enhanced punishment in this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Pursuant to prior order, the State filed its response on September 8, 2025. In the meantime, on September 2, 2025, Defendant Braze Roland Rucker filed an almost identical application for permission to appeal. Given the fact Mr. Davis and Mr. Rucker are co-defendants, and considering the identical issue being raised, the court hereby consolidates the two applications for purposes of its review. Tenn. R. App. P. 16(b). Upon full consideration, the applications are denied for the reasons stated below.

An extraordinary appeal may be granted from an interlocutory order of a trial court if this Court determines the trial court “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review” or “if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). A party must obtain permission from this Court for an extraordinary appeal; it is not a matter of right. Id. To that end, an application for permission to appeal must contain a statement of the question(s) presented for review, a statement of the facts, a statement of the reason(s) supporting an extraordinary appeal, and the relief sought. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(c). Furthermore, the application must contain a copy of the trial court order from which an appeal is being sought, as well as copies of other parts of the record necessary for determination of the application, such as the transcript of any hearing held on the motion at issue. Id. Because, generally, there is no record on appeal when a party seeks an extraordinary appeal, it is the party’s responsibility to provide this Court with an ad hoc 09/12/2025 2 record of the proceeding below. The Defendants’ applications are adequate for this Court’s review.

The Defendant, John Wendell Lewis, appeals from his guilty-pleaded conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant, a Range I offender, contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lionel Vashon Champion, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; use or unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, Class C felonies; unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence, a Class C felony; and eight counts of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony having previously been convicted of a felony drug offense, Class D felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia); 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2024) (armed dangerous felonies); 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (carrying or possession of weapons). The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a career offender, to serve an effective sentence of forty-two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s incoming and outgoing text messages, (2) the court erred in permitting a witness to read one of the text messages to the jury, and (3) the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Keenan Alexander, appeals from the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from the Petitioner’s jury-trial convictions for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, speeding, and failing to maintain financial responsibility and his effective two-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Brian Michael Jarrett, pleaded guilty to two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, two counts of incest, and one count of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Leon Brazelton, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, maintaining that his attorney at trial was ineffective. Following our
review of the record, we remand the judgment of the post-conviction court for further
findings concerning the timeliness of the petition.

Serena N. Hammond, Defendant, was indicted by a Knox County Grand Jury for one count
of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Count 1, one count of aggravated burglary
acting in concert with two or more other persons in Count 2, and one count of attempted
second degree murder in Count 3. Defendant was convicted as charged in Counts 1 and 2
and convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 3. Defendant was sentenced
to an effective sentence of ten years in incarceration as a standard offender. Defendant
appealed, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for
aggravated burglary acting in concert; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting photographs of a gun and magazine recovered from a car in which she was pulled
over fifteen days after the incident; (3) the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting recordings of Defendant’s phone call made from jail to a co-defendant; (4) the
trial court improperly considered Defendant’s false testimony at trial and the location of
the offense in enhancing her sentence for aggravated burglary acting in concert; and (5) the
cumulative effect of these errors deprived her of the right to a fair trial. After review, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lauren Taylor ("Employee") sustained a compensable injury on May 12, 2019, while
working for John and Stephanie Ingram, LLC ("Employer"). The Court of Workers'
Compensation Claims ("trial court") entered an order approving a settlement agreement on
August 24, 2021. Giving rise to the instant appeal, Employee filed a motion to set aside the
settlement agreement on January 24, 2024. The trial court denied the motion on two
independent grounds. First, the trial court determined that the motion was not timely filed.
Second, the trial court found that, even if the motion was timely, Employee had failed to
show that relief was warranted. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals
Board") affirmed on both grounds. Employee has appealed and the appeal has been referred
to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, David James Paul, was convicted of two counts of driving under the influence. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. He contends that the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure because the officers who detained him did not testify, leaving the record without proof of the circumstances justifying the stop. The State responds that reasonable suspicion was established through a “be on the lookout” dispatch report, or BOLO, and the testimony of the arresting officer, who arrived after the Defendant had been detained. Upon our review, we hold that because the State offered no admissible evidence concerning the circumstances of the initial seizure, it fell short of establishing that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the judgments of the trial court and remand for dismissal.

This matter is before the Court upon the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The Petitioner argues that Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), established a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law regarding the application of the Confrontation Clause to expert testimony. Upon our review of the application and the State’s response, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

The defendant, Gerald Lovelace, was convicted by a Stewart County Circuit Court jury of three counts of first-degree felony murder, which were merged into one conviction and for which the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement; (2) his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated; (3) the trial court erred in allowing witness testimony concerning his prior purchase of drugs from the victim, his “habit” of keeping a gun under the hood of his car, and his being “suited and booted” when he left the house the night of the murder; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this action, the plaintiff, through her conservators, asserted health care liability and breach of contract claims against the senior living facility where she resides and its parent corporation. Following some amount of discovery, the parties filed competing motions for partial summary judgment concerning the breach of contract and financial claims. The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the motions and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the senior living facility based on the terms of the contract signed by the plaintiff. The trial court further certified the judgment as final. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this landlord-tenant dispute sought a temporary injunction in the general sessions court, asking the court to force the defendant landlords to repair an air conditioning unit. The general sessions court granted a temporary injunction and later held a final hearing, after which it awarded the plaintiff $24,793.63 in damages. The defendants appealed to the circuit court which, following a bench trial, dismissed the plaintiff’s case. The circuit court, inter alia, concluded that the plaintiff offered no proof of his damages. The plaintiff timely appealed the circuit court’s judgment to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this case involving termination of the adoptive mother's and father's parental rights to their child, the Greene County Juvenile Court ("trial court") determined that the statutory ground for termination—severe child abuse—had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest. The parents have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Grundy County jury convicted the defendant, John W. Smith, of one count of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, one count of attempted second-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and eight counts of reckless endangerment, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 calls, in refusing to admit Jerome Powell’s statement that “she had her gun then,” and in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we reverse the imposition of consecutive sentences and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for consideration of the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). We also remand for corrected judgment forms in counts five, fourteen, and fifteen.

Defendant, Matthew James Wood, appeals from his Polk County Criminal Court
convictions for attempted possession with intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 grams of
methamphetamine; possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the attempted
commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he
received a total effective sentence of seven years’ incarceration. Defendant contends that:
(1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from
the traffic stop; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted text messages in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) the trial court erroneously restricted Defendant’s
cross-examination of a police officer; and (4) the evidence of his intent to sell or deliver is
insufficient to support his convictions for attempted possession of methamphetamine and
possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the attempt to commit a
dangerous felony. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A woman sued a dog owner for injuries caused by the owner’s dog biting her while she was on the owner’s property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog owner based on the owner’s testimony that the dog had never bitten anyone and had never exhibited a dangerous propensity to bite. We have concluded that the woman presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the dog owner’s credibility regarding his knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Louis Wayne Frazier, pled guilty to the attempted sexual battery of his granddaughter. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of six years and ordered that the sentence be served in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence and denying his request for an alternative sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s decision to impose a six-year sentence. However, we respectfully remand the case to the trial court for a new hearing regarding the denial of an alternative sentence.

The mother and father of Justice W., a minor, appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven against each parent and that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s ruling that (1) the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, mental incompetence, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child supported the termination of her parental rights and (2) termination was in the child’s best interest. Although we reverse as to the ground of abandonment by failure to support, we affirm the remainder of the trial court’s ruling, including the termination of Mother’s rights.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her minor child based on several statutory grounds. The mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The plaintiffs were injured by gunfire when the police were called to their residence to stop a domestic incident and burglary in progress. The plaintiffs sued the defendant city, arguing that their employee police officers were negligent in failing to adhere to department policies and rules. Some years after the case had been filed, the city filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the claims involved civil rights and that the city’s governmental immunity was not removed under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court agreed and granted the city’s motion, dismissing the case. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action regarding whether one homeowner in a subdivision has the exclusive right to access a private road within the subdivision. The homeowner asserted that it had exclusive access to the road pursuant to a contractual agreement between the homeowner’s association and a previous owner of the property, so it maintained a gate across the road, preventing other homeowners from accessing it. The trial court ruled, in the context of various summary judgment motions, that the contractual agreement did not give the homeowner exclusive access to the road, and it ordered the homeowner to provide access to all HOA members. The trial court also awarded attorney fees to the respondents, which included the homeowner’s association and the owners of a neighboring property. The petitioning homeowner appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This action involves interpretation of a right-of-first-refusal provision originally executed
in 1953 within four property deeds. Upon competing motions for summary judgment, the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who was seeking to enforce
the provision as to two parcels of real property in the chains of title descending from the
1953 deeds. In the 1953 deeds, the rights of first refusal had been extended to adult
descendants of the original grantor and secondarily to other title holders of the parcels. The
defendants are two grandchildren of the original grantor and two trusts. The plaintiff is a
great-grandson of the original grantor. The defendants filed third-party claims for
declaratory judgment against all living adult descendants of the original grantor, seeking
to establish that the rights of first refusal had expired. One of the third-party defendants
was the plaintiff’s mother, who joined in the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
determining that although the rights of first refusal may have expired on their own terms
each time one of the properties involved had been sold, the provisions had been renewed
by language in subsequent deeds that incorporated prior restrictions. The trial court
ordered specific performance of the sale of the defendants’ parcel to the plaintiff. The
court also ordered that a 2019 deed, wherein the individual defendants had transferred a
portion of another parcel to one of the defendant trusts, be set aside to allow the original
grantor’s adult descendants the option to exercise the right of first refusal. The trial court
denied a motion to alter or amend filed by the defendants. The trial court subsequently
entered a “Final Judgment,” concluding that the right remained enforceable in each of the
deeds. The defendants have appealed.1 Determining that the rights of first refusal in the
subject deeds have expired and are unenforceable, we reverse the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the court’s order of specific performance
against the defendants. We also reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims and accordingly grant declaratory
judgment that the rights of first refusal at issue on appeal are expired and unenforceable.