APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court granted Appellees’ respective motions averring that Appellant’s lawsuit failed to state a claim against them. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2022, the Petitioner, Jaslene Washington, pleaded guilty in the Marion County General Sessions Court to assault and resisting arrest and received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days of unsupervised probation conditioned upon the payment of fines and costs. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging multiple claims including ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that counsel was ineffective in providing erroneous information regarding the expungement of her convictions and that the Petitioner relied upon this erroneous information in deciding to enter the guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Tommy Gene Couch, Sr., appeals from his guilty-pled conviction for aggravated assault. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the Defendant’s sentence. Subsequently, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing and imposed a three-year sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing as an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2021, the Petitioner, Christopher Matthew Taylor, pled guilty to the offense of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a term of six years and placed him on probation. After his suspended sentence was revoked, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in April 2023, alleging that his original plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a hearing by a juvenile magistrate, Mother filed a timely petition for rehearing before the juvenile judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d). Over five hundred days later, section 37-1-107(d) was amended to eliminate the de novo hearing procedure and require a party seeking rehearing to file written exceptions to the magistrate’s order. Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s request for rehearing based on the amended statute. The juvenile court ruled that the amended statute would apply retroactively to Mother’s request for rehearing but granted her additional time to comply with the amended procedure. In this interlocutory appeal, we reverse the decision of the trial court to apply the amendment to section 37-1-107(d) retroactively to this particular case and remand to the juvenile court for a de novo hearing.

The plaintiff, who is pro se, filed an inverse condemnation action against a city, county, and related governmental entities, alleging that the defendants constructed and operated an outdoor event venue on property partly owned by him without his knowledge or consent. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for a change in venue. The court ultimately granted summary judgment to the defendants for two reasons. First, it concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-124. Second, the trial court found that the defendants affirmatively negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim for inverse condemnation – that his property suffered a decrease in value – and therefore summary judgment was appropriate on that basis as well. The plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion, asking the trial court to consider the impact of a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. After a hearing, the trial court denied the post-judgment motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The pro se plaintiff asserted claims against the defendant for negligence and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, alleging faulty repair work on her vehicle. After the plaintiff presented her proof at a jury trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on all claims. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to present enough evidence to establish a prima facie case to show that the defendant was negligent or violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. As such, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Ladarius Quashon Kees, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and reinstatement of the remainder of his original five-year sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to adequately consider the appropriate consequences for his violations and by failing to weigh his request for a rehabilitation program.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

A Jefferson County jury convicted the Defendant, Melvin Chism, III, of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that he constructively possessed the firearm; and (2) evidence in this case was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when an officer took and retained his identification card without reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Fabian Claxton, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After a full review of the record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Following a woman’s death in a nursing home facility, the woman’s daughter sued the facility and its affiliated entities for negligence and wrongful death. The defendants moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement that the woman’s daughter signed when the mother was admitted to the facility. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion but also granted the plaintiff’s request for an interlocutory appeal. This Court agreed with the trial court and granted the interlocutory appeal. Because the woman’s daughter, the plaintiff, did not have the requisite authority to sign the particular arbitration agreement at issue, we reverse and remand.

I concur in the decision to reverse the order compelling arbitration. I write separately to address the interpretation of the durable power of attorney by which the decedent, Lucy Leach, designated her daughter, Anita Buchanan, as her attorney-in-fact. In arguing whether the durable power of attorney authorized Ms. Buchanan to sign an arbitration agreement associated with Ms. Leach’s admission into a nursing home, the parties contend that Owens v. National Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876 (Tenn. 2007) controls. The majority describes Owens as “helpful background” in that “the trial court’s order and much of the parties’ arguments on appeal center around that case.” But, in my view, Owens also provides important context for interpreting the durable power of attorney.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Byron Hartshaw, of two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to serve an effective term of fifteen years. After that, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to prepare a defense, failed to clarify a pretrial ruling, and failed to object during cross-examination, opening statements, and closing arguments. He also argued that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies was sufficient to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Colby Mason Kilburn, was convicted in the Lawrence County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove premeditation and intent.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Brian C. Lautenschlager, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the Petition”), seeking relief based on a “newly discovered” affidavit that was signed in 2007 and “sent” to him in 2023. The coram nobis court found that the Petition was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations and that Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and summarily dismissed the Petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety based on failure to serve the named defendants. Although we affirm the dismissal of the named defendants for insufficiency of service of process and expiration of the statute of limitations, we vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s attempt to hold the uninsured motorist carrier liable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206.

Petitioner, Derek Cunningham, Jr., claims that the trial court erred by summarily denying his pro se Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and his pro se Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, both for failing to state a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Andre JuJuan Lee Green, --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2022-00899-SC-R11-CD, 2024 WL 3942511 (Tenn. 2024). See State v. Torrian Seantel Bishop, No. W2023-00713-CCA-R3- CD, 2024 WL 1564346, (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2024) (Bishop I), case remanded (Tenn. Aug. 27, 2024). This court concluded in the previous appeal that the certified question was dispositive of the case and that the officers had probable cause to search the Defendant’s car because an officer smelled the odor of marijuana. Upon further review, we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case because our supreme court in Andre JuJuan Lee Green made clear that a trial court must apply a totality of the circumstances analysis when determining whether an officer has probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a car. --- S.W.3d ---, 2024 WL 3942511, at *6. Upon consideration of the certified question and our supreme court’s holding in Andre JuJuan Lee Green, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the certified question presented. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns a motion to set aside a default judgment. Roland Brown (“Plaintiff”) sued HDR Logistics, LLC (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he sustained injuries from an incident in which Defendant’s employee backed his tractor-trailer into Plaintiff’s parked tractor-trailer. Plaintiff served a copy of the complaint and summons on Lisa Blackwell (“Blackwell”), Defendant’s designated agent in Tennessee for service of process. Defendant failed to respond, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant later filed a motion to set aside. Defendant submitted the affidavits of two individuals who said that the company did not receive notice of the lawsuit. Notably, the record contains no affidavit from Blackwell explaining what happened. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals, arguing that its failure to respond was due to excusable neglect in that it lacked actual notice of the lawsuit even though its agent was served, and that the Trial Court failed to conduct a writ of inquiry on unliquidated damages as required. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment. We hold further that Defendant failed to meet its burden showing the Trial Court did not conduct an appropriate evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. We affirm.

Jonathan Douglas (“Mr. Douglas”) filed a Complaint to Enforce Deed Restrictions seeking to enjoin Five Star Properties, Inc. (“Five Star”) from building a CrossMod home in a subdivision in which the parties each own property. Mr. Douglas argued that the CrossMod is a “mobile home” and is thus prohibited by the parties’ respective deeds. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Douglas. Five Star appeals that judgment. We conclude that the CrossMod home at issue is not a “mobile home,” reverse the judgment of the trial court, and vacate the injunction entered by the trial court.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Andre Davis, Jr., for one count each of harassment and aggravated stalking. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective two-year sentence. Defendant appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff Terry Case did not make his mortgage payments for several years. The real property which secured his loan was subsequently sold at a foreclosure sale following the postponement of a prior sale date. Mr. Case brought a claim for “wrongful foreclosure,” among others, alleging Defendants Wilmington Trust, N.A. and Wilson & Associates, PLLC violated the notice requirements in the applicable deed of trust by failing to provide him with written notice of the postponement. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Mr. Case solely appealed the dismissal of his claim for “wrongful foreclosure.” The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Defendants failed to satisfy their notice obligations under the deed of trust and that summary judgment on the claim for “wrongful foreclosure” was therefore inappropriate. Defendant Wilmington Trust applied for permission to appeal to this Court, and we granted review to determine (1) whether Tennessee recognizes a common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure,” and (2) whether the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Deed of Trust requires written notice of postponement in addition to oral announcement pursuant to section 35-5-101(f) of the Tennessee Code. We further instructed the parties to address whether Mr. Case satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing. We hold that Mr. Case has constitutional standing to bring his claim. However, we also hold that there is no common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure” in Tennessee. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

I concur in the majority’s well-written opinion. I write separately only to clarify a point that is important but tangential to the Court’s resolution of the issues presented. It relates to the majority’s discussion of the Open Courts provision in our Constitution, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17.

Defendant, Alexis Faxon, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of reckless driving and
speeding which resulted in a fatal two-car accident. The trial court sentenced Defendant
to consecutive sentences of thirty days’ incarceration for speeding and six months
suspended to probation for reckless driving. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence
is insufficient to support her conviction for reckless driving, that the trial court erred by
denying a mistrial based on alleged discovery violations, and that the trial court erred by
admitting photographs and victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing and by
ordering thirty days’ incarceration. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the
parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning the enforceability of covenants not to compete in the medical field. The trial court held the covenants unenforceable as applied to the plaintiff clinicians who provide anesthesia services at local hospitals in Tennessee. We affirm.