APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The April 2025 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively entered, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to facilitation of first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant, Heather Fisher, of possession with intent to
sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule II, to wit: methamphetamine in an amount
in excess of 0.5 grams (count one); three counts of possession of a schedule IV drug with
intent to sell or deliver (alprazolam, diazepam, and clonazepam) (counts three through
five); possession with intent to sell or deliver a schedule VI controlled substance, to wit:
marijuana in excess of 0.5 grams or more (count six); possession of a weapon during
commission of a drug offense (count seven); maintaining a drug involved dwelling (count
eight); and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia (count nine), for which she received
an effective thirteen year sentence.1 In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges
only her conviction in count seven for possession of a weapon during the commission of a
drug offense and argues (1) the evidence failed to establish that she possessed a weapon
and failed to establish that she had the requisite intent to go armed; and (2) that the trial
court erred in determining that the offense of carrying a weapon was not established by the
evidence and that it erred in excluding carrying a weapon as a lesser-included offense of
count seven.2 Upon our review, we affirm.

The plaintiff, Patricia Slate, appeals the dismissal of her complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against either of the defendants. Because the appellant’s brief is profoundly noncompliant with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal.

We do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

This appeal presents the question of whether, under the Health Care Liability Act, a party in a wrongful death action can rely on a prior beneficiary’s pre-suit notice after succeeding to that beneficiary’s interest in the wrongful death litigation.  The trial court concluded that such reliance is permissible.  We affirm.

The Petitioner, Rickey Benson, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm.

In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

Defendant, Ronald Eugene Fox, II, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and initiating a false report. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for his first degree murder conviction, the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue, and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants reversal of his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

A physician disciplined by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners challenges the reasonableness and necessity of the costs assessed against him. We find substantial and material evidence to support the cost assessment and affirm the chancery court’s decision affirming the Board’s final order.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her special needs child. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination were proven and that termination is in the best interest of the child. We reverse one ground for termination but otherwise affirm and remand for further proceedings.

I concur with most of the majority’s analysis of the grounds for termination of the parents’ parental rights. However, I disagree with the finding of severe abuse by the father and I disagree that the best interests of the child require termination.

In this action to terminate parental rights, the mother, father, and child all tested positive for methamphetamine. Accordingly, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the child into protective custody, and the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Despite completing many of DCS’s requirements, the mother and father continued to fail drug tests. DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights, and the trial court determined that three grounds supported termination as to both parents: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also concluded that termination of both parents’ rights was in the child’s best interest. Both parents have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce with minor children.  Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s designation of Appellee/Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest children.  Discerning no error, we affirm.  Both parties request awards of appellate attorney’s fees, which are denied. 

Mother and Stepfather petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. The trial court found two grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. This Court reversed the finding of grounds, but the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the ground of abandonment by failure to support and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of additional findings as to the best interest analysis. On remand, the trial court again found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 26, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until October 12, 2025, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellants are seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A self-represented party seeks accelerated interlocutory review of the trial court’s order denying her motion seeking disqualification of the trial court judge. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to two of her children. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights on the findings that the petitioner, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, had proven the ground of severe abuse and that it was in the best interests of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. The mother appeals, contending that the finding that termination was in the best interests of the children was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

The Defendant, Marlikka Jordan, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, for which she is serving an effective fifteen-year sentence in confinement. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2025) (subsequently amended) (aggravated child abuse and neglect). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s injuries observed on or about August 1, 2020, and that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this parental termination case, the trial court found that one ground for termination of the mother’s parental rights had been proven by clear and convincing evidence but failed to make findings of fact to support this conclusion. We vacate and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by statute.

This appeal concerns a dismissal for lack of service of process. The trial court determined that appellant failed to properly effectuate service and comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Benjamin Hartshaw, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her two children. The juvenile court found that four grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm in part and vacate in part. We remand for entry of an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the children and the factors concerning the best interests of the children.

This is an action to recover damages for purported breach of contract, negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied duty of indemnity, and fraud in construction of a home. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.