APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this divorce with no children, the trial court declared the parties divorced and referred the property issues and requests for attorney’s fees to a special master. The special master recommended an equal division of the marital estate and that each party pay their own attorney’s fees. The wife objected to these recommendations. After a hearing, the trial court adopted the special master’s findings and recommendations, with one small exception. On appeal, the wife challenges the division of the marital estate and the failure to award attorney’s fees. We affirm.

A man sought to intervene as of right in a family member’s action for partition of real property. The trial court determined that the proposed intervenor did not have an interest in the subject property. So it denied his request to intervene and his other requests for relief. We affirm.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Richard Brock Hill, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), brought an action for defamation against the State regarding statements made in connection with a sexual harassment investigation that resulted in the termination of his employment. The Claims Commission dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Claims Commission analyzed the potentially defamatory statements and concluded that each statement was time-barred and/or failed as to an essential element of a defamation claim. Regarding statements contained in an “Investigation Summary Memorandum,” the Claims Commission also concluded that Mr. Hill’s defamation claim failed because the document was prepared by a Deputy Commissioner and was, accordingly, protected by absolute executive privilege. We conclude that Mr. Hill adequately alleged defamation such that dismissal of his claim was error and that the existent record and filings do not support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, absolute executive privilege protects the statements contained in the Investigation Summary Memorandum. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

After discovering that her neighbors had built a home on rural property that she owned, the property owner brought an ejectment action to remove them. The neighbors asserted an affirmative defense based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-103, which protects against ejectment if the defendant can show adverse possession for seven years. Following a trial, the trial court found that the neighbors had proven adverse possession and set a boundary line of the possessed area, drawing upon an exhibit produced by a surveyor. The property owner asserts that the boundary determined by the trial court was too expansive and unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. The neighbors assert that the trial court drew the boundary line in a manner too restrictive, failing to encapsulate the entirety of the area they actually possessed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of certain property. Because the trial court’s order contains conflicting findings, we vacate and remand.

The defendant, Bath Fitter Tennessee, Inc. (“Bath Fitter”), appeals the denial of its motion to submit its contract dispute with the homeowner to arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The parties executed a written contract for the installation of a new shower for the homeowner, the parts for which were manufactured in Canada. Both parties signed the contract on the front page of the two-page agreement where the signature lines were provided; however, neither party signed or initialed the arbitration provision that appeared on the back of the contract. Although not explicitly stated in its order, it appears that the trial court denied arbitration based upon the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“TUAA”), which, at the time of contracting, required that arbitration clauses in residential construction contracts be separately signed or initialed. It is undisputed that the materials installed by Bath Fitter were manufactured in Canada; thus, the transaction involves interstate commerce. For that reason, the FAA applies. Because the FAA does not require signatures or initials to indicate approval of arbitration clauses and preempts conflicting state laws that invalidate otherwise valid arbitration agreements, we reverse and remand with instructions to submit the contract dispute to arbitration pursuant to the FAA and stay proceedings until arbitration is complete.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. Richmond S. and Lisa S. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Fentress County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Cory S. (“Father”) to his minor children Dawson S. and Bentley S. (“the Children,” collectively).1 The Children were removed from Father’s custody following an incident in which Bentley was severely injured. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on five grounds, including severe child abuse. Father appeals, arguing among other things that he did not intentionally or knowingly harm Bentley. We vacate the Trial Court’s waiver of a home study of Bentley in Petitioners’ home because Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116 requires that such a study be conducted when the child, like Bentley, is unrelated to the prospective adoptive parents.2 Otherwise, we find that each of the grounds for termination found by the Trial Court were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We remand to the Trial Court for a home study to be conducted in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116.

In this post-divorce action, the parents filed cross-petitions to modify the agreed permanent parenting plan concerning their minor child. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order determining that a material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The trial court changed the designation of primary residential parent from mother to father and adopted a new permanent parenting plan, which granted 237 days with the child to the father and 128 days to the mother annually. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the father’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

Petitions involving child custody and support were filed in juvenile court. After a juvenile court magistrate ruled on the custody issues, Father filed a request for rehearing before the juvenile court judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d)(1)(E). The juvenile court judge affirmed the decision of the magistrate without explanation or addition. Because neither the juvenile court magistrate nor the juvenile court judge adjudicated the pending child support matter, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in his brief, we conclude that he has waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from a landowner’s complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that proposed construction was consistent with a permitted non-conforming use on its property. The parties agreed that the property was rezoned in 1957 and that certain non-conforming uses are permitted on the property. However, the city opposed the declaratory action due to the landowner’s refusal to submit plans to the city administrative zoning body to obtain its decision on whether the proposed use was a permissible extension of that non-conforming use. The city asserted that, without the landowner having applied for a building permit, the action was not ripe for adjudication. The trial court determined that the matter was ripe and that the landowner had standing, that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and that the proposed use was protected by the terms of the grandfather statute. Because the city was never permitted to rule on the proposed non-conforming use, we find that the matter was not ripe for review. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

Pro se Appellant, Robin Springer, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on July 3, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

David Ray Conley and Wade Parks (together, “Appellants”) appeal from the order of the Cocke County Chancery Court (“trial court”) granting summary judgment to plaintiff Robert John Collins (“Appellee”). The underlying controversy is a will contest surrounding the estate of Sandra Kay Parks (“Decedent”). Appellee, Decedent’s only heir-at-law, filed a Petition for Probate Administration asserting that no will of the Decedent had been located. Appellants subsequently sought to probate a document purported to be Decedent’s Last Will and Testament. Following cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Decedent’s proposed will had not been executed with the formalities required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104 and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellants timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

TKY Acquisitions, LLC (“TKY”) and its predecessors in title have owned the property now in dispute (“Subject Property”) since as early as 1922. The company introduced its chain of title during these proceedings. No evidence existed that someone other than TKY and its predecessors in title claimed ownership of the Subject Property. Although never in his chain of title, Billy Ray Blankenship’s father added the description of the Subject Property in a deed to his son dated and recorded in 2010. However, both before 2010 and after 2010, TKY paid property taxes on the Subject Property. TKY offered clear and convincing proof of payment of property taxes by it and its predecessors in title regarding the Subject Property from at least 1999 through 2022.

This is a post-divorce parent relocation dispute. After the mother relocated out of state with the child without notice, the father filed a petition objecting to her relocation, a petition for criminal contempt on multiple grounds, and a petition to modify the parenting plan. The mother then filed a petition to approve her relocation and a petition challenging the child support calculations in the court’s November 6, 2023 order. After conducting a best-interest analysis, the court adopted the mother’s proposed parenting plan with modifications that removed the father’s supervision requirement, required the mother to bear transportation costs, and required the mother to give the father notice of the child’s school and extracurricular activities, among other modifications. The trial court also granted the father’s first amended petition for three counts of criminal contempt, imposing a sentence of 30 days, with 10 days suspended, “based upon Mother’s full and complete compliance, during the next five (5) years, with the terms set forth within this judgment.” Father appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by applying an improper legal standard in respect to the notice requirements of the parent relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting a best-interest analysis, affirm the trial court’s determination that the relocation was in the best interest of the child, and affirm the trial court’s adoption of the mother’s parenting plan with modifications.

Lonnie Elmore (“Decedent”) died on July 5, 2020, a few weeks after being treated by Angelo J. Sorce, M.D., (“Sorce”), an employee of Tennessee Valley Orthopaedics, LLC (“TVO”), (collectively “Defendants”) and Travis Mills, CRNA, (“Mills”) an employee of Lakeway Regional Anesthesia Services, PLLC (“Lakeway”). On July 2, 2021, Robert Elmore, as Executor of the Estate of Lonnie Elmore, (“Plaintiff”) sent pre-suit notice to Defendants. Relying on the 120-day extension provided for by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 121(c), Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging wrongful death on November 1, 2021, in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), claiming that the accrual of Plaintiff’s cause of action arose no later than June 21, 2020, meaning Plaintiff provided pre-suit notice past the one-year statute of limitations, rendering his complaint untimely. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). The Trial Court disagreed and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed. We reverse.

A mother and father filed competing petitions to modify their parenting plan. The Father also sought to modify his child support obligation. In furtherance of these goals, he asked the court to admit evidence of events occurring before the denial of his previous petition to modify the parenting plan. He also moved for appointment of a guardian ad litem and for an order requiring his past Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 examinations to be destroyed. The court denied each of Father’s pretrial requests. It found that no material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the parenting plan was not in the children’s best interests. Because the trial court erred in its application of the child support guidelines, we vacate part of the child support award and remand for recalculation of Father’s obligation. Otherwise, we affirm.

A property owner filed a complaint against her neighbor and the municipality seeking to enforce a local zoning ordinance. The trial court dismissed the property owner’s claims against the municipality. Among other things, the court ruled that mandamus was not available because the property owner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. It also determined that the municipality retained immunity for the tortious acts alleged in the complaint. On appeal, the property owner argues that (1) Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-208(a)(2) authorized her to bring a mandamus action to abate the zoning violation without exercising administrative remedies and (2) the complaint contained sufficient allegations of negligent supervision to withstand a motion to dismiss. Upon review, we affirm the dismissal.

This is a premises liability case. While attending a gathering at the appellees’ apartment, the appellant fell from a second-floor balcony, sustaining multiple injuries. The appellant sued the owner of the apartment and each of the tenants/appellees for negligence. This appeal concerns the tenants/appellees only. The appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that they did not owe the appellant a duty of care because: (1) the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious and the appellant’s accident was not reasonably foreseeable; (2) the appellees did not have superior control over the apartment such that they could remedy the allegedly dangerous condition; and (3) in his deposition, the appellant was unable to articulate what steps the appellees could have taken to prevent his injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment on its conclusion that: (1) the tenants had no control over the apartment to remedy the allegedly dangerous condition; and (2) the allegedly dangerous condition was open and obvious. We affirm, although on different grounds.

In this conservatorship action, we address whether subject-matter jurisdiction over the ward’s assets remains with the court appointing the conservator. Here, the conservatorship was opened in Madison County. Appellee and the ward’s conservator agreed to transfer some of the ward’s rights to payments from a structured settlement, the ward’s sole asset, to Appellee. Appellee filed a petition for approval of the transfer in Anderson County, where none of the parties resided, and the Anderson County court approved the transfer. A second conservator was appointed for the limited purpose of challenging the Anderson County order, and the instant lawsuit was filed to set aside the Anderson County order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court initially held that Anderson County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but on Appellee’s motion to alter or amend, reversed itself. Appellant appeals. Because subject-matter jurisdiction over the ward and her property remained with the conservatorship court, Anderson County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and its order allowing the transfer of the asset was void ab initio. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders finding otherwise and affirm and reinstate its initial order finding no subject-jurisdiction in Anderson County.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because the order denying recusal conflicts with the trial court’s previously entered standing order of recusal regarding all cases involving Appellant’s attorney, we vacate the trial court’s order denying recusal and remand for resolution of the conflicting orders.

After this Court dismissed the appellant’s first appeal as untimely, he filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide support and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination decision.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child. The trial court named the father the primary residential parent, entered a parenting plan awarding the father the majority of parenting time during the school year, and gave the father authority over the child’s education. The mother appeals. We affirm.