Samuel Jace England v. Amber Leigh Lowry
E2019-01660-COA-R3-CV
A husband and wife were divorced after three years of marriage. The trial court divided the marital assets and debts and designated the husband as the primary residential parent. The wife appeals the court’s finding of transmutation and designation of the husband as the primary residential parent, and both parties challenge aspects of the division of property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Originating Judge:Special Judge Brett A. York |
Cumberland County | Court of Appeals | 07/29/20 | |
In Re K.L.E. Et Al.
E2019-02207-COA-R3-PT
A mother and her husband petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the father of two of the mother’s children. The mother and father of the children were married when the children were born. The father was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment when the children were six months and two years old. The mother subsequently divorced the father and married another man who now is interested in adopting the two children. The trial court terminated the father’s rights, and the father appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the father’s rights.
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Originating Judge:Chancellor John C. Rambo |
Washington County | Court of Appeals | 07/29/20 | |
Candice Mosby v. Fayette County Board of Education, et al.
W2019-01851-COA-R3-CV
This case involves a challenge to a decision to non-renew the employment of a non-tenured teacher. The plaintiff brought suit challenging her non-renewal on the basis that she did not receive six required observations per school year. In her complaint, the plaintiff challenged the non-renewal decision itself, stating it was procedurally flawed, and alleged the director improperly delegated the decision. After the plaintiff presented her proof at trial, the defendants moved for an involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Originating Judge:Chancellor Martha B. Brasfield |
Fayette County | Court of Appeals | 07/29/20 | |
Mitzi Sue Garner v. Robert Allen Garner
E2019-01420-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a long-running divorce case. In 2009, Mitzi Sue Garner (“Wife”) sued Robert Allen Garner (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The matter was tried in 2010. An appeal to this Court was dismissed in 2012 for lack of a final order. In 2019, a final order at last was entered. Husband appeals. Husband raises several issues, including whether the Trial Court erred in its valuation of certain marital property, in determining his income for purposes of child support and temporary alimony, as well as in granting Wife an award of transitional alimony to secure certain marital debts assigned to Husband. We discern no reversible error. However, we modify the Trial Court’s characterization of Husband’s marital debt obligations from transitional alimony to alimony in solido. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Judge L. Marie Williams |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 07/29/20 | |
Herbert Moncier v. Timothy Wheeler
E2020-00943-COA-T10B-CV
Petitioner appeals the denial of his motion to recuse the trial court in an attorney’s fees lawsuit. Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 10B of the Rules of Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Originating Judge:Judge Kristi M. Davis |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 07/28/20 | |
William A. Reese, Jr. v. Dominick Amari
M2019-00329-COA-R3-CV
This is an action to revive a judgment originally entered in 1987; the judgment debtor moved to have the judgment set aside, contending that the judgment was void. The trial court denied the motion and renewed the judgment; the judgment debtor appeals. Upon our review, we conclude that the record shows that the debtor answered the complaint but failed to appear at the trial, which proceeded in his absence and led to the judgment; consequently, the judgment was valid. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside the judgment.
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Originating Judge:Judge Clara W. Byrd |
Wilson County | Court of Appeals | 07/28/20 | |
Todd Randolph Napier v. Kristen C. Napier
M2019-00978-COA-R3-CV
Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment. Discerning no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, we affirm and remand for a determination of Mother’s fees incurred in this appeal.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Originating Judge:Judge James G. Martin, III |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 07/27/20 | |
in Re Madison J.
M2019-01188-COA-R3-PT
This case involves the termination of a biological mother’s parental rights to her minor child. The father and the stepmother initiated the case by filing a petition to terminate the mother’s rights and to allow stepmother to adopt the child. In their petition, the parties argued the mother abandoned the child by failing to visit and failing to provide support. Trial was held in March 2017, nearly three years after the petition was filed. In June 2019, the trial court granted the petition and entered its final order, finding there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the child and that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother timely appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Originating Judge:Judge Ted A. Crozier |
Montgomery County | Court of Appeals | 07/24/20 | |
The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee v. Prime Nashville, LLC
M2019-00564-COA-R3-CV
This is an action to enforce a citation from the Codes Department of the Metropolitan Government for operating a short-term rental property without a permit. The owner of the property appeals the default judgment entered as a sanction for failing to comply with the trial court’s order granting a motion to compel discovery. Upon a thorough review of the record, we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the judgment as a sanction; accordingly, we affirm the judgment in all respects.
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Originating Judge:Judge Amanda Jane McClendon |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 07/23/20 | |
In Re: Braelyn S.
E2020-00043-COA-R3-PT
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found grounds for termination by abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. The trial court also found termination was in the best interests of the child. We affirm in part and reverse in part, but affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Originating Judge:Judge John S. McLellan, III |
Sullivan County | Court of Appeals | 07/22/20 | |
In Re Braelyn S. - concurring and dissenting
E2020-00043-COA-R3-PT
Because I believe that the line of cases holding that the petitioner seeking to terminate a parent’s rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) must prove both a “failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody” with respect to the first prong of the analysis, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion. See In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). In all other respects, including affirming the termination of Father’s parental rights, I concur.
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Originating Judge:Judge John S. McLellan, III |
Sullivan County | Court of Appeals | 07/22/20 | |
Suzette Michelle Gibson v. Michael Wayne Gibson
E2019-01051-COA-R3-CV
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court dismissed a Husband’s petition to modify or terminate the transitional alimony he was obligated to pay on the basis of the provision of the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement that made the alimony obligation nonmodifiable. Husband appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Originating Judge:Judge Gregory S. McMillan |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 07/22/20 | |
In Re Estate of Paul D. Freeman, Deceased
M2018-02131-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from an action to remove the decedent’s son as the executor of the estate. The action also sought to remove the decedent’s son as the nominated trustee of two testamentary trusts; however, the trustee never assumed his duties because neither trust was ever funded. The decedent’s wife was the principal beneficiary of the estate and both testamentary trusts. The action was initiated by the conservator for the decedent’s wife who alleged, inter alia, that the executor/trustee failed to distribute any property or income to the wife and used the assets for his personal benefit. The conservator also alleged that he improperly used the estate’s assets to satisfy a bank loan that encumbered real property he jointly owned with the decedent for which he and the decedent were liable. The conservator claimed the bank loan was not a lawful debt of the estate because the bank failed to file a claim against the estate within the time limits set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307. In response, the executor/trustee contended the action to remove him was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for breach of trust actions. He also contended the debt to the bank was properly paid in accordance with the law of exoneration. After a hearing, the trial court found that the law of exoneration did not apply and held that the estate was not obligated on the debt to the bank because the bank did not timely file a claim against the estate. Additionally, the trial court removed the decedent’s son as both the executor and trustee based on his persistent failure to administer the estate and appointed a successor executor and successor trustee. The successor executor filed an inventory and accounting for the estate, and the former executor filed an objection. At the hearing that followed, the former executor submitted into evidence a document entitled “Land Agreement” and claimed that the agreement was enforceable against the estate as a contract to make a will. The trial court determined that the Land Agreement was a contract to make a will, but the claim was time barred. In its final order, the court assessed damages against the former executor and awarded the conservator her attorney’s fees. The former executor appealed, arguing that (1) the action was barred by the statute of limitations for breach of trust actions, (2) the Land Agreement was enforceable against the estate, (3) the debt to the bank was properly paid under the law of exoneration, and (4) he was not liable for attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Louis W. Oliver |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 07/22/20 | |
James Scarlett v. AA Properties, GP
E2019-01371-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a default judgment in a detainer action. AA Properties, GP (“AA Properties”) filed a detainer warrant against James Scarlett (“Scarlett”) in the General Sessions Court for Knox County (“the General Sessions Court”) concerning real property of Scarlett’s that had been foreclosed upon. Default judgment was entered against Scarlett and a writ of possession was issued. Scarlett later filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Circuit Court”). AA Properties filed a motion to dismiss, which the Circuit Court granted. Scarlett appeals, arguing that the warrant was deficient in that it failed to state specifically that personal service was attempted. Scarlett argues further that, under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, only five days elapsed from the posting of the warrant to the hearing, when per statute he was entitled to six days. We hold, first, that the warrant sufficiently reflected that personal service was attempted. We hold further that, in this instance, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply in the General Sessions Court. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney, C.J.
Originating Judge:Judge Kristi M. Davis |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 07/21/20 | |
Sheila Mikel v. Tennessee Department Of Children's Services
E2019-02112-COA-R3-CV
A foster parent appealed the removal of two foster children from her home. This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services Administrative Procedures Division’s decision to dismiss the foster parent’s appeal on the basis of mootness. The Chancery Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Finding substantial and material evidence in support of the Commissioner’s decision, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Originating Judge:Judge Jerri S. Bryant |
Court of Appeals | 07/21/20 | ||
In Re: Sallie Ann Hofmann
E2019-01856-COA-R3-CV
This appeal concerns an action to establish undue influence and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-6-120, et seq.2 The trial court denied the claims submitted by Plaintiff. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Originating Judge:Judge John C. Rambo |
Johnson County | Court of Appeals | 07/21/20 | |
In Re Ne'Khiya M.
W2019-02223-COA-R3-PT
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother and stepfather petitioned the trial court to terminate father’s parental rights as to mother’s and father’s minor child on the ground that he had willfully abandoned the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A). Additionally, mother and stepfather petitioned that stepfather be allowed to adopt the child. While it was undisputed that father had abandoned the child, based on his failure to support or visit the child, the trial court found that father had attempted to establish a child support obligation against himself and that he had made numerous, yet unsuccessful, attempts to contact mother in order to visit the child following his release from prison. Accordingly, the trial court found that father’s abandonment was not willful and denied the termination petition. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Originating Judge:Chancellor Jim Kyle |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/20/20 | |
Cook's Roofing, Inc. v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company
W2019-00271-COA-R3-CV
This appeal involves retrospective insurance premiums for an assigned risk workers’ compensation insurance policy. The insured employer is a roofing contractor. The insurance company conducted a retrospective premium audit and determined that the roofing contractor owed retrospective premiums based on the fact that its primary subcontractor was uninsured during a portion of the policy period. The roofing contractor refused to pay the increased premium, so the insurance company canceled the insurance policy. The roofing contractor filed this lawsuit against the insurance company, alleging negligence, promissory estoppel, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The insurance company filed a counterclaim for the unpaid balance owed for the premiums under the policy. The insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted by the roofing contractor and on its own counterclaim. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissed the claims asserted by the roofing company, and entered judgment in favor of the insurance company and against the roofing contractor for $66,212 plus prejudgment interest. However, the trial court denied the insurance company’s subsequent motion to enforce the judgment against the two individuals who operated the roofing company and served as the sole officers and shareholders of the corporation. Both parties raise issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court in part, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Originating Judge:Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/20/20 | |
John Thomas Link v. Royce Hinson, Et Al.
M2019-00483-COA-R3-CV
Appellant sought a prescriptive easement over an existing road across Appellees’ property. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of Appellant’s proof and held that Appellant’s occasional use of the road to access his property for hunting purposes did not satisfy his burden of proof to establish an easement by prescription. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Originating Judge:Judge Suzanne Lockert-Mash |
Humphreys County | Court of Appeals | 07/20/20 | |
Zula Wortham v. Kroger Limited Partnership I ET AL.
W2019-00496-COA-R3-CV
Defendant grocery store appeals a jury verdict against it after a shopper fell in its store while operating a three-wheeled cart. The grocery store argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict, in granting summary judgment to a third-party defendant, and in not granting a new trial or remittitur of the substantial verdict. Because the grocery store has not met its burden to show reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/16/20 | |
George E. Chittenden, Et Al. v. BRE/LQ Properties, LLC
M2019-01990-COA-R3-CV
This is a premises liability action arising from an injury suffered by a guest who slipped on ice in the parking lot of a hotel. The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no dispute of material fact and that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was properly granted; accordingly, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Originating Judge:Judge Kelvin D. Jones |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 07/15/20 | |
Carol Buckley v. The Elephant Sanctuary In Tennessee, Inc.
M2020-00883-COA-T10B-CV
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we reverse the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal and remand with instructions for another judge to be designated to preside over this case.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Deanna Bell Johnson |
Lewis County | Court of Appeals | 07/14/20 | |
The City of Jackson v. Lou Bosco ET AL.
W2019-00547-COA-R3-CV
This case concerns a municipality’s attempt to restrict the persons who are able to collect and dispose of construction waste within its city limits. In relevant part, the municipality generally prohibits persons from collecting and disposing of waste accumulated within its borders. That task is reserved, subject to certain exceptions, to the municipality, who has entered into an exclusive contract with a corporate entity for waste disposal. The Appellants herein are a waste disposal services company and its managing member. The managing member was cited individually in the municipality’s Environmental Court for unauthorized refuse and trash disposal, and he was found to be in violation of the municipal ordinance. A de novo appeal was thereafter taken to the Circuit Court, where the waste disposal services company became a participating party. Among other things, the waste disposal services company asserted that the municipality’s effort to circumscribe waste collection was a violation of the Tennessee Constitution’s anti-monopoly and equal protection provisions. These constitutional claims were dismissed at summary judgment. In addition to its asserted constitutional claims, the waste disposal services company averred that certain of the City’s municipal ordinances provided it with authority to conduct its operations. Following a later hearing, the Circuit Court declined to issue any fines but nonetheless enjoined the waste disposal services company from further removal of waste when it was not the actual producer of waste. Several issues are now raised for our review on appeal. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the injunction is vacated. |
Madison County | Court of Appeals | 07/14/20 | |
Douglas D. Dailey v. Violet L. Dailey
E2019-00928-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a divorce action. During the trial court proceedings, the parties agreed on a distribution of a majority of the marital property. However, a hearing was necessary concerning missing gold and silver that had been purchased during the marriage. The Trial Court found Husband not to be a credible witness. The Trial Court further found that the gold existed, that Husband had control of the safe room where the gold was located, and that Husband was responsible for the gold being missing. Husband appeals the Trial Court’s judgment to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Judge Tammy M. Harrington |
Blount County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/20 | |
In Re Daniel B. Jr. Et Al.
E2019-01063-COA-R3-PT
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. The juvenile court determined that there were five grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support both the grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Originating Judge:Judge Brian J. Hunt |
Anderson County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/20 |