APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State appeals a judgment against it for an injury caused by the gross negligence of its employees in the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition on state-owned property. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims for gross negligence, we reverse.

Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s claims for the return of funds held by the plaintiff hospital as untimely filed. We reverse the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that the plaintiff revived the obligation throughout its repeated negotiations with the defendant.

A dental patient brought this negligence action against the dentist who performed implant procedures on her and his dental practice. After the patient voluntarily dismissed the case against the dentist, the trial court granted the dental practice’s motion for summary judgment. We have determined that genuine issues of material fact exist as to when the dental patient reasonably should have discovered that the dentist had acted wrongfully. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision.

This is an appeal concerning the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-203, 29-20-204, and 29-20- 205 of the Act. At issue is the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a county government for damages sustained from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the washout of a road maintained by the county. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

This appeal concerns the statute of limitations for a will contest. David Estes (“Petitioner”) filed a will contest in the Probate Court for Wilson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking to set aside the will of Petitioner’s father, Joe Richard Estes (“Decedent”). Jennifer Brooke Estes Little, Executrix of the Estate of Joe Richard Estes (“Respondent”), Petitioner’s sibling, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the applicable two-year statute of limitations had expired by the time of day that Petitioner filed his will contest. The Probate Court granted Respondent’s motion. Petitioner appeals to this Court. Petitioner’s will contest was filed two years from the date that Decedent’s will was admitted to probate; thus, it was timely filed. The exact hour and minute of the day the will contest was filed is immaterial. We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the Probate Court, and remand for this case to proceed.

Pro se litigant sought to receive part of the proceeds of a delinquent tax sale. The trial court found that she failed to prove her case. She appealed. We dismiss the appeal due to her failure to follow Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.

This is a post-divorce criminal contempt case. The trial court found Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt based on Appellant’s violations of the trial court’s order. Discerning no error, we affirm

In this divorce action, the wife appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, the duration of the transitional alimony awarded to her, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees and expenses as alimony in solido. The husband challenges the trial court’s decision to award any transitional alimony to the wife. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal.

A property owner filed suit against a contractor, asserting that a driveway built by the contractor was defective. The contractor filed a counterclaim against the property owner, seeking compensation for the balance owed for the driveway and additional work the contractor had done on the property. Prior to trial, the contractor made a motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial on the merits, the court awarded the property owner the cost of repairing the driveway and dismissed the contractor’s counterclaim. The contractor appealed the court’s order. Because we conclude that the trial court should have granted the contractor’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement, we reverse.

The majority opinion adopts Extreme Excavation’s position on appeal that the email exchanges between the parties’ attorneys contained all the material terms of the settlement, making the correspondence an enforceable contract. I must respectfully disagree. I believe that the parties here made an agreement to agree. Agreements to agree are unenforceable in Tennessee because their terms lack the definiteness required for performance. Four Eights, LLC v. Salem, 194 S.W.3d 484, 486-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Contracts must have terms of sufficient definiteness to allow courts to give them exact meanings. United Am. Bank of Memphis v. Walker, 1986 WL 11250, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1986).

Husband appeals aspects of the trial court’s classification, valuation, and division of property in its order of absolute divorce. The trial court’s decision is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further consideration.

This appeal is before this court on a remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court to address issues that had been previously pretermitted related to a punitive damages award. Upon consideration of the pretermitted issues in the present case, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 25, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until September 3, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This suit was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The plaintiff was a home improvement contractor replacing a door at a client’s home. He discarded the old door, which was placed in a garbage truck allegedly owned and operated by the defendant. The truck’s compacting mechanism was engaged, causing the door to rise and strike the plaintiff in the head. The plaintiff filed suit and was awarded damages based on injuries he suffered. The defendant filed this appeal raising several issues. Because we have determined that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, we affirm.

A husband and his wife found their rental boat unsatisfactory.  So they sued the rental company, alleging a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.  The rental company moved to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause in the rental agreement that required all disputes to be brought in a different county.  The husband and wife responded that the venue provision of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act controlled over the forum-selection clause.  The trial court agreed with the rental company and dismissed the suit without prejudice.  We vacate the judgment.

This appeal concerns premises liability. Michael Darren Franz (“Mr. Franz”) and his wife Pamela Franz (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued Oscar Funes (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Mr. Franz sustained from falling down the stairs at a residential rental property built and owned by Defendant. The stairs, which led from the first floor to the second floor, lacked a code-compliant handrail going the length of the stairs. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We conclude that the reasonably foreseeable probability and gravity of harm to Plaintiffs, namely serious injury or death from falling down the stairs, outweighed the burden on Defendant to engage in alternative conduct which would have prevented a risk of harm, such as extending the railing to the top of the stairs. Under common law principles of negligence, as well as negligence per se from the code violation, Defendant owed a duty of care. In addition, genuine issues of material fact exist in this case regarding causation and comparative fault. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the trial court found that six statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.  The father has appealed.  Upon thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

This is a breach of contract case involving a purchase and sale agreement for real property.  Because the parties’ mutual mistake of law concerning ownership of the subject property negates the prima facie element of mutual assent, there is no enforceable contract.  Reversed and remanded.

Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this dispute about real property. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief, we dismiss the appeal. We also conclude the appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.  The chancery court found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination.  The court also determined termination was in the child’s best interest.  After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

Following the death of his minor child, the appellant filed suit against the State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission (the “Claims Commission”) asserting claims for wrongful death and for violation of his rights as a crime victim. The Claims Commission granted partial summary judgment and partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State. The appellant appeals the judgment of the Claims Commission. Having determined that the appellant’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed.

I believe that the majority opinion accurately reflects existing law.  Therefore, I concur.  I write separately to express my concern that the existing law on voluntary nonsuits as outlined in this opinion allows a plaintiff to avoid sanctions for  his bad actions taken before the nonsuit.  In my opinion, defendant Osborne had at least an inchoate right to receive an undetermined amount of attorney’s fees based on the trial court’s order that “the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay all of each Defendant’s attorney’s fees associated with Plaintiff’s delays, including attendance at prior hearings on Motions to Withdraw, today’s hearing and all preparations for any such hearings.”  The sanction was ordered.  Only the amount was yet to be determined.  A voluntary nonsuit should not allow Plaintiff to escape responsibility for his actions or to prevent Osborne from being properly compensated for Plaintiff’s wrongdoing.

In this appeal arising from a divorce action, the husband raises issues pertaining to the trial court’s classification, valuation, and distribution of marital assets, as well as the alimony award to the wife. Upon our review, we affirm the determination of the trial court.

The parental rights of Cedric G., Sr. (“Father”) were terminated by the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on November 20, 2023. Father appeals. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights as to Cedric G., Jr. (“the Child”) for abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit, failure to support, and exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistence of conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the Child. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the Child’s best interests.