APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns an alleged breach of contract. Patsy Yearwood (“Decedent”), an insurance agent with John Robert Whedbee and James L. Whedbee at the Whedbee Insurance Agency (“Defendants”), entered into an agreement (“the Agreement”) with Defendants whereby Defendants would buy all of Decedent’s contracts of insurance and expirations and renewals. For a set period of time, Decedent would receive 50% of her commissions and renewals and Defendants were to receive the other 50%. Decedent, in declining health, was to assist in retaining and producing business. Upon Decedent’s death, her commissions were to go to her estate. Decedent died and three months later, Defendants halted payments. Decedent’s daughter RaShell Holt, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Patsy Yearwood (“Plaintiff”), sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted on the basis that Decedent first breached the Agreement by not working in the period leading up to her death. Plaintiff appealed. We find and hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Decedent breached the Agreement by ceasing to work. We hold further that, even if Decedent stopped working, this in itself was not a breach of contract because her sickness and death were anticipated in the Agreement. We hold further still that, even if Decedent breached the Agreement, Defendants were not entitled to continue receiving all the benefits of the Agreement while denying the estate its benefits. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner was convicted of multiple sexual offenses in Maryland in 1981. Several years after completing his sentence for these convictions, he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a different crime. While serving his sentence in Pennsylvania, he received interstate transfer of parole to Tennessee. Thereafter, the petitioner was informed that he must register as a sexual offender in Tennessee. He registered in 2011 and, in 2016, sent the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) a letter requesting termination of his registration. After the TBI denied his request, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial review in the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the TBI’s denial of the petitioner’s request, and the petitioner appeals. Finding no error in the chancery court’s decision, we affirm.        

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, arising from an appeal filed by the plaintiff to the Monroe County Circuit Court (“trial court”) from a judgment of the Monroe County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”), granting the defendants immediate possession of certain contested property located in Madisonville, Tennessee. The plaintiff challenges both the January 8, 2019 trial court order, which denied his initial and supplemental motions seeking judicial recusal of the trial court judge, and the subsequent order, which denied his motion to alter or amend the January 8, 2019 order. Having carefully reviewed the petition for recusal appeal (“the Petition”), together with the challenged orders, we conclude that the Petition was not timely filed and accordingly dismiss this appeal.

A husband and wife were divorced after being married for nineteen years. The trial court divided the marital estate and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The husband appealed, claiming the trial court erred in classifying a camper as marital property and in awarding the wife long-term spousal support. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and award the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

homeowner and a contractor entered into a contract requiring the contractor to repair damage to the homeowner’s house caused by a kitchen fire. The repairs to be performed were those covered by the homeowner’s insurance policy as outlined in a detailed estimate of repair work. After the contractor abandoned the project, the homeowner hired another contractor to complete the work and sued the original contractor for breach of contract. We affirm the decision of the trial court to the extent of the court’s determination that the contractor breached the contract by his undue delay and poor workmanship. We have concluded, however, that the trial court’s decision fails to adequately explain the award of damages or to dispose of the contractor’s counterclaim. Therefore, we vacate the damages award and remand for more specific findings regarding the basis for the damages award and a disposition of the counterclaim.

In this action to recover for property damage sustained as a result of flooding and seeking injunctive relief, the trial court held that the statutes of limitations and repose barred Plaintiffs’ claims for nuisance and negligent construction of a levee, that Plaintiffs did not prove certain elements of their claims for negligence or willful and wanton conduct, and that no civil conspiracy existed; the court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. Upon review, we reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to the nuisance and negligence claims, and remand the case for further proceedings; we affirm the judgment with respect to the civil conspiracy claim.

Bruce Milton Miller (“Husband”) and Lucinda Miller Miller (“Wife”) were divorced in December of 2017. The parties entered into a Mediation Agreement, a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), and a Permanent Parenting Plan in connection with the divorce. In February of 2018, Husband filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to reform the parties’ MDA. The Trial Court entered its order on May 24, 2018, reforming the MDA based upon mutual mistake and awarding retroactive child support. Wife appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the reformation of the MDA and the amount of retroactive child support awarded. We find and hold that no proof was presented of a mutual mistake, and therefore, the Trial Court erred in reforming the MDA. We further find and hold that Wife waived her issue as to retroactive child support. We, therefore, vacate that portion of the Trial Court’s May 24, 2018 order reforming the MDA and affirm the portion awarding retroactive child support.

The pro se appellant, a state inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Davidson County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Averring that correction facility officials had wrongfully withheld back pay due to him for thirty-seven days of work he missed in his prison employment program pending his ultimately successful appeal of a disciplinary action, the petitioner requested that the trial court direct prison officials to tender $1,475.37 in back pay plus interest. The prison officials, represented by the Tennessee Attorney General’s office, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the petitioner had waived this action in the trial court by previously filing a claim with the Division of Claims Administration (now known as the Division of Claims and Risk Management) and that the petitioner was not entitled to back pay under the applicable program procedures. In an order entered upon the pleadings, the trial court dismissed the petitioner’s action upon finding that the applicable procedures did not entitle the petitioner to back pay. The petitioner then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied. The petitioner has appealed. Having determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action, we vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this case.   

The trial court held that Appellant failed to meet her burden to prove her claims of assault and battery. Appellant appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s appellate brief, we do not reach Appellant’s substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.  

This is a case arising out of the Teacher Tenure Act. A tenured middle school teacher sought review of a decision of the board of education upholding his termination for inefficiency, incompetence, and neglect of duty. The chancery court affirmed the board’s decision, sustaining the teacher’s termination. Teacher appealed to this Court. We reverse the chancery court’s findings with respect to neglect of duty. However, we affirm the chancery court’s findings with respect to inefficiency and incompetence, and thereby affirm the teacher’s termination.

This appeal arises from a re-filed health care liability action brought by the wife of a hospital patient, individually and on behalf of her now-deceased husband, against the hospital. In the first action, the plaintiffs attempted to rely on the 120-day extension to the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, which also required the plaintiffs to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization to potential defendants. The complaint asserted that one of the hospital’s doctors and four of its nurses were negligent in treating the husband in the hospital’s emergency department on July 26, 2009, and that the hospital was vicariously liable. The doctor and nurses, but not Saint Francis, successfully moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with § 121. On interlocutory appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of § 121’s pre-suit notice requirement. This court affirmed the trial court’s determinations that § 121 was constitutional, was not preempted by HIPAA, and did not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Accordingly, this court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the doctor and nurses. Because the claims against the hospital remained, we remanded the case for further proceedings. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the first complaint against the hospital in April 2016. Eight months later, the plaintiffs sent the hospital a new pre-suit notice and medical authorization. Sixty-four days after that, the plaintiffs filed their second complaint against the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, asserting the second complaint was timebarred because the plaintiffs failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization in the first action and, thus, the 120-day extension was not available and the original complaint was time-barred. The plaintiffs responded by asserting that a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization is unnecessary to obtain the 120-day extension and challenging the constitutionality of § 121, including a challenge based on the right to privacy in medical information. The trial court found that § 121 requires a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization before the 120-day extension applies, the law of the case doctrine barred the plaintiffs from re-litigating all constitutional challenges except that based on the right of privacy, and the right to privacy was not implicated. Based on these findings, the trial court dismissed the second complaint as time-barred. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This premises liability action involves allegations of negligence and negligence per se. The trial court dismissed the case at summary judgment, opining that no duty was owed to the plaintiff and holding that the plaintiff’s negligence per se claims were legally insufficient. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In appealing a non-final order, Appellant asks this Court to adopt a jurisdictional exception to the final judgment rule that would allow an immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion under Rule 60.02 where the trial court purportedly lacked jurisdiction to do so. We decline to adopt a per se exception to Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure where the trial court grants a Rule 60.02 motion. We likewise decline to suspend the finality requirement in this particular case. As such, this appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a health club member, seeks damages from the health club based on its alleged failure to protect him from sexual assaults in the locker room by another club member. The complaint alleges that the health club “knew who the assailant was, and was aware that [the assailant] had engaged in such actions many times prior to” assaulting the plaintiff. The health club denied liability insisting it had no prior knowledge of sexual assaults by the assailant or anyone else. It also contended the claims were barred by the exculpatory provision in its membership agreement, which released the club from liability for injuries “resulting from” the plaintiff’s “use of [the] facilities.” The trial court found the exculpatory provision was unambiguous and summarily dismissed the claims. Thereafter, and while this matter was on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court revised the standards by which the enforceability of an exculpatory agreement should be determined. See Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist Rehabilitation Hospital, LP, 565 S.W.3d 260 (Tenn. 2018). We have determined that the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence that the health club knew or should have known of prior assaults by the assailant or anyone else. Because there is no genuine dispute of fact, the health club is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the issue regarding the enforceability of the exculpatory clause is moot. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment, albeit on other grounds than found by the trial court, and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her minor child. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing Mother’s counsel to withdraw the morning of trial, without considering whether Mother had notice of the withdrawal, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a new trial.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B (“Rule 10B”), from the trial court’s denial of a motion for judicial recusal filed by the plaintiff wife during the course of the parties’ divorce proceedings. Discerning no reversible error in the trial court judge’s denial of the motion, we affirm. 

After the plaintiff was arrested by a police officer employed by the defendant town, the plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging that his civil rights were violated during the course of the arrest. Plaintiff further alleged that the town was negligent in its training and supervision of the arresting officer. The federal court dismissed the civil rights claims with prejudice, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the town. As such, the plaintiff filed a second complaint in the Circuit Court for Washington County, in which the plaintiff again alleged that the town was negligent in its supervision and training of the arresting officer. After the town filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act was not removed as to the Plaintiff’s claims because the negligence claim arose out of the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights; accordingly, the trial court determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205(2) preserved the Defendant’s immunity, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Innerimages, Inc. (“Innerimages” or “the developer”) filed suit against homeowners Robert Newman, David and Melba White, and David and Susan Schilt as trustees for the David Schilt and Susan Schilt Trust. It sought to recover unpaid maintenance fees required by the restrictive covenants governing their real property. The homeowners filed a counterclaim, seeking various forms of relief. The homeowners also joined the following third-party defendants: Sandra Gunn, the president of Innerimages, homeowners David and Joan Barrett, and property owner Cupid’s Rose, LLC.2 After a bench trial, the court dismissed the collection action filed by the developer. The court determined: (1) that the restrictive covenants are unenforceable as to the four homeowners and their successors in title; (2) that the developer is liable for breach of fiduciary duty for its failure to honor its obligations under the restrictive covenants; and (3) that Sandra Gunn is personally liable under an alter ego theory of piercing the corporate veil. Finally, the court awarded the homeowners damages in the amount of all fees paid since taking ownership of their property or, in the case of the Schilt family, fees paid over the last three years. In a subsequent order, the trial court clarified that only Mr. Newman was entitled to money damages because the other homeowners had not paid fees to the developer during the relevant time period. The court also denied the homeowners’ request for attorney’s fees. Innerimages, Sandra Gunn, and Cupid’s Rose, LLC appeal. Because this appeal presents novel issues relating to the enforceability of restrictive covenants, we take this opportunity to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.19(1)-(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000). We modify the trial court’s judgment pursuant to the principles set forth in the Restatement. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) award of alimony in futuro to Wife; (2) award of alimony in solido for Wife’s attorney’s fees; and (3) classification of certain jewelry as Wife’s separate property. We affirm.

This is a dispute over a lease agreement for property upon which the lessor permitted the lessee to mine limestone. After the original lessor died, his estate demanded that the lessee provide weight tickets as provided in the lease agreement. When the lessee failed to comply, the estate filed suit and the lessee counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate on its claim for declaratory judgment and declared that the lease agreement was terminated. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the estate on the lessee’s counterclaim for intentional interference with a business relationship. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect. S.Z. (“Mother”) is the mother of both E.Z. and B.G. (“the Children,” collectively). C.G. (“Father”) is the father of B.G.1 In the wake of certain non-accidental injuries sustained by B.G., Father’s father filed a petition seeking custody of the Children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) intervened, and the Children’s maternal grandfather filed a petition, as well. Mother and Father both denied abusing B.G. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) found the Children dependent and neglected. The Trial Court found also that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other parent knows who committed the abuse, but the Trial Court held it could not determine which parent committed the abuse. Consequently, the Trial Court declined to find severe child abuse. DCS appeals to this Court, and Mother raises additional issues. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other knows who committed the abuse. Given that and other findings, we hold that the Trial Court erred in concluding that it could not find severe child abuse. We, therefore, reverse that aspect of the Trial Court’s judgment and hold that severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This action involves petitions for orders of protection filed by a wife against her husband. Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court entered an order of protection against the husband and in favor of the wife on May 23, 2018. The order of protection prohibited the husband from having contact with the wife and granted the husband co-parenting time with his four children every other weekend. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Lequita Nix Hilliard (“Plaintiff”) sued Dolgencorp, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging discrimination in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103, of the Tennessee Disability Act, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311, of the Tennessee Human Rights Act; and retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim. The Chancery Court for Polk County (“the Trial Court”) granted summary judgment to Defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We find and hold that there is no genuine disputed issue of material fact with regard to the fact that due to her medical restrictions Plaintiff is unable to perform the essential job functions of a store manager. Given this, Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims. We, therefore, affirm.

In this post-divorce petition to modify, the Appellant (former Husband) contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his obligation to provide life insurance for the benefit of Appellee (former Wife) was part of a property settlement and therefore not subject to modification.  The trial court’s order included an upward deviation for support of the parties’ youngest child for the twelve month period prior to her emancipation.  The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay college tuition equal to that of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville without providing any allowance for scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter.  The trial court further found that Appellant was not guilty of civil contempt for failure to make payments into Appellee’s retirement account under the terms of the parties’ Agreed Order of Legal Separation (AOLS).  However, the trial court refused to relieve Appellant of his obligation to continue funding Appellee’s retirement account at the same level as he funds his own retirement account.  We conclude from our review that the life insurance policy obligation constitutes spousal support, which is subject to modification.  We vacate the trial court’s judgment concerning college tuition and hold that Appellant is obligated to pay the cost of tuition and books, less scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter.  All other aspects of the trial court’s order are affirmed.  Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

This is a taxation dispute between the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue and a Tennessee corporation. The primary point of contention concerns the proper tax classification of the corporation under Tennessee’s Business Tax Act. After paying an amount of taxes that it deemed improper, the corporation filed a claim for refund. The Department of Revenue subsequently denied the claim for refund, and the corporation thereafter filed suit seeking a refund in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The litigation quickly advanced with the filing of competing cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the chancery court ruled in the corporation’s favor, specifically rejecting the Commissioner’s tax classification of the business. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.