APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the conclusion that the Circuit Court for Davidson County correctly denied the petition of Ms. Nancy Maureen Jarman to increase her alimony.  But I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Jarman.  I share the view of Franklin N. Jarman that the trial court lacked the authority to award attorney’s fees in this instance.

This case involves a petition to modify a parenting plan to change the primary residential parent. The father sought to be designated as the primary residential parent, citing to the children’s excessive absenteeism from school while in the mother’s care. The trial court agreed and found that, while the children were doing well in school, they could be doing better and would be less stressed without the problem of their excessive absenteeism. We reverse, finding that the mother had remedied the children’s excessive absenteeism from school prior to trial and that the prior absenteeism does not rise to the level of a material change in circumstance warranting a modification of the parenting plan so as to change the designation of the primary residential parent from mother to father.

After the plaintiff’s father was killed by an armed security guard, she filed a wrongful death action against the security guard’s employer. The complaint alleged both vicarious and direct liability and sought an award of compensatory and punitive damages. The employer maintained that the guard acted in self-defense. After the first trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. But the trial court ordered a new trial based on errors in the calculation of damages. A second jury verdict apportioned the greater proportion of fault to the decedent, resulting in a defense judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court made numerous errors in the conduct of the second trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error. So we affirm.  

Declaratory judgment action in which lessee of real property on which it had constructed a retirement facility sought a declaration (1) of its right pursuant to the lease agreement to obtain a mortgage loan insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to finance repairs and improvements to the facility and (2) absent an express right, a declaration that what it asserted was a “settlement agreement” with the lessor gave it that right. After considering the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted the lessor’s motion. Lessee appeals; we affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves a contract between an aspiring country music artist and a record company owner for promotion of the artist’s songs. After the record company owner died, the artist demanded an accounting from the owner’s widow and filed this lawsuit alleging that the record company and its owner breached the promotion agreement executed by the parties. The trial court found that the record company owner breached the contract by failing “to adequately promote” the artist’s singles and awarded the artist a judgment for $223,069.89. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

Father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

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Having pursued relief under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Jacob Davis filed a petition for a declaratory order with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC” or “the Department”) to challenge the Department’s interpretation of the statutes regarding release after a sentence of life, and the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i). Upon receiving an unsatisfactory response, Davis then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court against the TDOC and the Tennessee Attorney General (collectively, “the State”) about the calculation of his sentence, including his eligibility for release and the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501. The chancery court ruled against him and he appealed. The Court of Appeals finds, based on rules of statutory interpretation, Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106 (Tenn. 2006), and a number of cases from the Court of Criminal Appeals, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i) establishes the legal release date for someone sentenced to life. The court also finds that the statute is constitutional. The chancery court is affirmed.

Following adverse disciplinary proceedings against him while in prison, Appellant filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in Chancery Court. The Chancery Court later dismissed the case upon determining that the petition for certiorari was not timely filed. Because Appellant was released from prison during the pendency of this appeal, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for the entry of an order dismissing the petition due to mootness.

This appeal arose from a divorce action filed by the wife. Prior to the onset of the litigation, the parties had been married for eighteen years with one minor child born during the marriage. On November 2, 2017, the trial court granted the divorce; divided the marital property according to the wife’s proposed property distribution; awarded to the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,100 per month; awarded to the wife half of her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido; and adopted the husband’s proposed permanent parenting plan. Although the husband’s permanent parenting plan contained a child support calculation based on monthly income estimates, the court ordered the child support payments to be calculated using the average of the parties’ respective incomes from the previous three years. The husband has appealed. Because it is unclear whether the trial court classified the real property upon which the marital home is located as marital property or the wife’s separate property prior to awarding her its value and because we determine that the order appealed from contains an internal inconsistency with respect to the amount of child support awarded, we vacate the trial court’s distribution of marital property and its awards of alimony and child support. We remand for the trial court to clarify its property classification and resolve the inconsistency concerning child support prior to rendering judgment regarding an award of alimony. The trial court’s judgment granting the divorce is otherwise affirmed.

This case involves a claim of unjust enrichment following the execution and partial performance of a contract for the sale of a laundry and dry cleaning business. On December 21, 2012, the parties executed a contract, selling the business in exchange for $100,000.00. The buyers tendered $50,000.00 at the time of the contract’s execution and simultaneously tendered a promissory note to the seller for the remaining $50,000.00 with a pre-arranged payment plan. The contract contained a provision stating that it was conditioned on the buyers’ ability to obtain a satisfactory commercial lease from the owner of the building where the business was located. The buyers took possession of the business and began making payments pursuant to the promissory note. However, the buyers were unable to enter into a written or long-term lease with the building owner. The buyers ceased making payments on the promissory note after nine months. In November 2013, the buyers began contacting the seller, requesting a return of the down payment and money paid on the promissory note in exchange for the business. In June 2014, the buyers filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the contract of sale was void due to an unsatisfied condition. The seller filed an answer and countercomplaint requesting enforcement of the contract and promissory note, including the enforcement of a vendor’s lien held on the business equipment. On December 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order dismissing the buyers’ complaint and granting the seller’s requested relief pursuant to the contract and promissory note. The buyers have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Homeowners filed a declaratory judgment action related to the operation of a group home in their neighborhood. Among other things, homeowners claimed that the use of the property for a group home violated the local zoning ordinance. On motions for summary judgment, the court concluded that the operation of the group home did not violate the zoning ordinance because the group home’s residents constituted a “family” as defined in the ordinance. The court further concluded that the use was protected under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. 2017). We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

This is a parental termination case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of a mother based on the statutory grounds of severe child abuse, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. The mother appeals. We reverse in part, with respect to one ground for termination, but otherwise affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

This case involves a contentious divorce between parties who share one minor child. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The husband appealed raising numerous issues related to property classification, valuation, and division. He also challenges the alimony awards and child support determination. After our review of the record, we determine that the trial court erroneously set the husband’s income for the purpose of child support, and we therefore remand the case for a new determination of the husband’s income and calculation of his child support obligation. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects.

This appeal concerns punitive damages. Skyco Staffing Services, Inc. (“Skyco”) provided Derrick Gilbert (“Gilbert”) to Dealers Warehouse Corporation (“Dealers”) for temporary work. On February 14, 2014, Gilbert was driving a Dealers truck when he collided with a truck driven by Charles Edward Poole (“Poole”). Poole1 sued Gilbert, Dealers, and later Skyco for damages in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”).2 Dealers filed a third-party claim against one-time Skyco affiliate People 2.0 Global, LLC (“People 2.0”), as well. Skyco and People 2.0 filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted. The jury returned a verdict for Poole against Dealers and Gilbert for compensatory damages of $431,508.71. In a second phase, the Trial Court directed a verdict in favor of Dealers regarding punitive damages. Finally, the jury returned a verdict for Poole against Gilbert in the amount of $250,000 in punitive damages. Poole appeals, arguing he is entitled to joint and several judgment against Dealers for the punitive damages assessed against Gilbert. Dealers, for its part, argues both that the Trial Court was correct and that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it exercised supervision of Gilbert. We hold, inter alia, that Dealers is not jointly and severally liable for punitive damages assessed separately against Gilbert. We hold further that Dealers’ exclusive supervisory responsibility for Gilbert was laid out in unambiguous contractual terms. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Ex-husband appeals the entry in a Tennessee Chancery Court of an order authenticating a judgment entered against him in his California divorce proceeding; the judgment also imposed a constructive trust on real property he purchased in Tennessee in violation of orders of the California court. We discern no error in the judgment of the Chancery Court and accordingly, affirm.

A landowner filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the Bedford County Board of Commissioners’ denial of his request to rezone his property was arbitrary and capricious, violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, constituted a regulatory taking, and that the Commission violated the Tennessee Open Meetings Act when it met with its counsel prior to taking the vote. The landowner requested compensatory damages for the manner in which his application to rezone his property was handled and compensation for the taking of his property. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and violated the landowner’s due process rights; the court ordered the property rezoned from residential to commercial and awarded the landowner damages. The court held that there had been no regulatory taking and no violation of the Open Meetings Act. Both parties appeal. Upon review, we have determined that the court erred in holding that the Commission’s decision to deny the application for rezoning was arbitrary and capricious and in ordering the property rezoned; in holding that the landowner’s due process rights were violated and in awarding damages and attorney fees to the landowner; we affirm the decision in all other respects.  

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one child. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit by an incarcerated parent; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of a child by an incarcerated parent; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, as well as the trial court’s division of the parties’ 2017 tax refund. The trial court determined that Wife’s need was in the range of $17,500.00 per month and awarded Wife $15,000.00 per month in alimony in futuro, as well as $3,500.00 per month in rehabilitative alimony. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Wife’s need is in the range of $17,500.00 per month. We also affirm the trial court’s award of $15,000.00 per month in alimony in futuro. We vacate, however, the award of rehabilitative alimony and the division of the parties’ 2017 tax refund and remand for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision regarding: (1) the parenting plan for the minor children; (2) the enforcement of the parties’ prenuptial agreement in its denial of Husband’s request for alimony and a portion of Wife’s retirement accounts; and (3) the designation and division of property. Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, we vacate the trial court’s order enforcing the waiver of spousal support provision of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and the case is remanded for determination of whether alimony is warranted in this case and, if so, the amount thereof.  

This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court declined to terminate father’s parental rights, but it found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother’s on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The juvenile court further found that termination was in the best interests of the children. We reverse as to the former two grounds, but affirm as to the latter two and further find that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

In this divorce action, the wife was shown to be economically disadvantaged compared to the husband, and the trial court awarded to the wife a slightly greater share of the marital estate in addition to rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $4,000.00 per month for a period of four years. The husband has appealed. Although we conclude that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, we also modify that judgment to include an indemnification clause in the husband’s favor regarding the mortgage on the marital residence. We further grant the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal.

This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court declined to terminate father’s parental rights, but it found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother’s on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The juvenile court further found that termination was in the best interests of the children. We reverse as to the former two grounds, but affirm as to the latter two and further find that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

Roger Elliott (“Elliott”) appeals the January 23, 2018 order of the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) holding that Elliott had violated Church Hill Municipal Ordinance No. 11-101 and assessing a civil penalty of $25.00 against Elliott for the violation. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Elliott violated Church Hill Municipal Ordinance No. 11-101. We, therefore, affirm

At issue in this appeal is the custody of an 8-year-old boy. On one side is his maternal grandmother and her husband, who have raised the child since he was one year old, pursuant to a court order placing him in their custody. On the other side is the child’s father, who was incarcerated at the time the child was placed with his grandparents. When the father was released from incarceration, he filed a petition seeking visitation with the child; over the course of proceedings, he sought custody of the child. The juvenile court awarded custody to the father, holding that the he did not forfeit his superior parental rights and that the grandparents did not prove that the child would suffer substantial harm in the father’s care and custody. The grandparents appeal; finding no error, we affirm the judgment.