APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s classification, valuation, and equitable division of marital property. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After a jury trial, Appellant received a $500.00 award. She then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the exclusion of certain testimony, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Appellant again argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony. Because Appellant failed to properly raise these issues post-trial, the issues are waived, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This appeal concerns service of process and the statute of limitations. Vicki Ann Giro (“Giro”) sued Kaleb Wilburn (“Wilburn”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Giro sustained in a car accident with Wilburn. Giro failed to timely serve the summons in compliance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and failed to issue new process before the statute of limitations expired. Giro filed a motion for enlargement of time. In opposition to Giro’s motion, the Trial Court was furnished with an altered copy of Hollis ex rel. Nicole N. v. Sanchez, No. M2022-01190-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5920145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2023), no appl. perm. appeal filed. The altered copy of Hollis retains the heading “MEMORANDUM OPINION” but omits Footnote 1 stating that, as a memorandum opinion, Hollis is not to be cited or relied on in any unrelated case pursuant to Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10. The Trial Court, which had been furnished on Wilburn’s behalf with the altered copy missing the explanatory footnote, relied heavily on Hollis to deny Giro’s motion for enlargement of time. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to exercise its discretion on whether to grant Giro’s motion for enlargement of time without considering Hollis or any other opinion designated by this Court as a memorandum opinion.

This is a breach of trust action by a trust beneficiary, Nancy Hardison (Stokes) Williams (“Plaintiff”), against the co-trustees, Ernest K. Hardison, III, and Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (collectively “Defendants”). The issues raised in this appeal only pertain to Plaintiff’s claims against Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (“Cumberland”). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Cumberland committed a breach of trust by failing to properly manage and invest trust assets resulting in the trust sustaining significant financial losses. In her effort to recover damages against Cumberland, Plaintiff also sought to declare two trust indemnity and investment agreements—which she and all qualified beneficiaries entered into with Cumberland in 2006 and 2009—void ab initio on the basis that they are unenforceable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008 because they violate a material purpose of the trust. She also contended that the agreements are unenforceable because they constitute “an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008(b). Upon the motion of Defendants for partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims arising prior to July 1, 2016, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1005(a). Additionally, upon the finding that Plaintiff and the qualified beneficiaries had released Cumberland from liability pursuant to the indemnity and investment agreements, the trial court summarily dismissed all remaining claims against Cumberland. The court then awarded Cumberland its attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $45,594.70 pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1004(a). This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Cumberland is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses it has incurred in this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award.

Bringing a suit pro se, a Patient sued his healthcare providers under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court dismissed the Patient’s claims, deeming them time-barred. Instead of promptly appealing that order, the Patient serially submitted various motions over the course of approximately a year. The trial court denied the Patient’s motions. The Patient appeals. Concluding that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the Patient’s appeal.

This began as an immediate appeal of an order dismissing a suit under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the appeal, the only issue that remains is the request of the defendants, now proceeding as appellants, for an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred on appeal. Because an award is mandatory, we grant the request and remand to the trial court to determine the amount.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal stems from a petition for a parenting plan modification filed by Jacob Cipolla (“Father”). Father shares one child with Sylvia Coutras (“Mother”). The parties engaged in contentious and protracted litigation over the custody of their child. In October of 2022, a juvenile court magistrate entered an order naming Father as the child’s primary residential parent. Mother sought a rehearing before the juvenile court judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107 but later withdrew that request. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order awarding Father his attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. Mother appeals that ruling to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a personal injury case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, and because the order was improperly certified as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is the second appeal involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two children. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s finding that the mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We remanded the case for the trial court to make additional factual findings and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order with additional findings and conclusions. The mother appeals again. We affirm.

The appellants sued the appellee, a law firm, alleging that the law firm committed legal malpractice when it gave the appellants legal advice with regard to the tax implications of a stock sale. The law firm filed two motions for summary judgment arguing that the legal malpractice case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Both motions were denied when the trial court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found that the legal malpractice case was timely filed but that the law firm had not committed legal malpractice. Upon our diligent review of the record, we affirm.

Stephen Charles Johnson (“Husband”) filed for divorce against Elizabeth Kay Johnson (“Wife”) in the Chancery
Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”).2 Former Chancellor Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr., presided at trial.
However, he was defeated for re-election midtrial. Richard B. Armstrong, Jr. succeeded Pridemore as Chancellor.
Shortly before his statutory authority expired, Chancellor Pridemore entered a one-page order adopting Wife’s
59-page proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in full. Husband appeals. We conclude that Chancellor
Pridemore’s order does not reflect his own deliberations and decision-making. We, therefore, vacate the Trial
Court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

Greywood Crossing Owners Association, Inc. (“Greywood”) commenced this action to enforce the
development’s Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions (“the Declaration”) against one of its homeowners,
Barbara Holleman, who had failed to pay assessments for more than three years.1 Specifically, the complaint
asserted claims against Ms. Holleman on a sworn account to collect unpaid assessments plus attorney’s fees
and costs of collection as well “an Order of Sale of the Property to satisfy [Greywood’s] assessment lien and
judgment.” Ms. Holleman, acting pro se in the trial court, filed an answer in which she denied the debt. Upon
Greywood’s motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court found that Ms. Holleman owed the
assessments, awarded fees and costs to Greywood, and ordered Ms. Holleman to list her property for sale to
satisfy the debt. When Ms. Holleman failed to list her property for sale as ordered by the trial court, Greywood
filed a Rule 70 motion for specific performance, which the court granted, directing the clerk and master to sell
Ms. Holleman’s property. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Appellant, Raven Cobins, appealed a February 16, 2023 order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is dismissed.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned his child by failure to visit. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

The parties to this appeal separated in 2019 and executed a separation agreement requiring
the husband to pay child support for the parties’ three children. When the husband filed
for divorce in 2021, he requested that the child support be modified pursuant to a provision
in the separation agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the
husband’s child support obligation should be modified due to a substantial change in the
parties’ circumstances. Following a motion to alter or amend filed by the wife, however,
the trial court reversed its initial ruling, holding that the husband’s child support obligation
was non-modifiable. The husband appealed to this Court. Because the trial court erred in
granting the wife’s motion to alter or amend, we reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court found multiple counts of criminal contempt stemming from Husband’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug and alcohol testing. It fined him $7,100.00 and sentenced him to fifty days in jail. On appeal, Husband contends that the court’s order holding him in contempt lacked sufficient factual findings. He also contends that the orders requiring testing were ambiguous and unclear and that there was insufficient proof that his failure to submit to testing was willful. Finally, he challenges the punishment because of its impact on his parenting time. We affirm the finding of criminal contempt in part as modified and vacate the sentence.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. Michelle Miller, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two of her children based on three statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Appellant/Father appeals the
trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to
provide more than token support and failure to exercise more than token visitation. Father
also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the
child’s best interest. Because Father met his burden to show that his failure to provide
support and to visit was not willful, we reverse the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights and granting Appellees’ petition for adoption.

The Majority Opinion concludes that the trial court erred in finding clear and
convincing evidence that Father abandoned the Child by failing to either visit or support
him in the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(1) (stating that “abandonment” by the parent is a ground for termination of
parental rights); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A) (offering several definitions of the
term “abandonment,” including failure to visit or support the child in the four consecutive
months preceding the filing of the termination petition, as alleged in this case). Because I
conclude that Tennessee law compels the opposite conclusions, I must respectfully dissent
from the Majority Opinion.

The Tennessee Department of Transportation terminated a preferred service employee. Following the Step I and Step II appeals, the Board of Appeals upheld the termination. The employee petitioned for judicial review in the trial court. The trial court initially affirmed the Board of Appeals’ decision. The trial court then granted the employee’s motion to alter or amend and reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals. We reverse the trial court’s order.

This appeal concerns a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination existed: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) incarceration under a ten-year sentence; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child.

Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him liable for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. We affirm the jury verdict, but reverse, in part, the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under the parties’ contract. We also award the plaintiffs their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code section 27 1-122.

The Plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling through a plastic, debris-covered skylight embedded in the roof of the Defendant’s shop building. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant homeowner, alleging that the debris-covered skylight constituted a dangerous condition and that the Defendant failed to warn of its existence prior to the accident. After the Plaintiff did not call the Defendant as a witness and rested his case in chief, the Defendant sought a directed verdict, arguing that the Plaintiff could not establish that the Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition. The trial court agreed and granted the Defendant’s motion. Viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as required at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict. We remand for further proceedings.