APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax. They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax.  They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject. In addition, we affirm the commission’s decision not to allow Chubb’s proposed amendment as to the 2009 tax year payment.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a voluntary dismissal because a motion for summary judgment was filed prior to the entry of the order on the nonsuit. We hold that a motion for summary judgment filed after a written notice of nonsuit has been filed does not preclude the plaintiff’s right to take a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We also conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Affirmed and Remanded.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax.  They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1102(1)(A)(i); abandonment by willful failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and persistence of conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113(g)(3).  We reverse in part and we affirm in part; we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims inwhicheach challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Father in this juvenile court custody dispute has filed a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal de novo as required by Rule 10B, §2.06, we summarily affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on grounds of: (1) abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and (ii); and (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(2). We conclude that the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that clear and convincing evidence also exists that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Affirmed and remanded.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatoryinsurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a retaliatory discharge action filed by Phillip Dean Patrick (“Plaintiff”), a former employee of Nelson Global Products, Inc. (“the Employer”). Plaintiff alleged that, on a day during his employment, he was standing nearby when a co-worker sustained a work-related injury. Plaintiff alleged that he was unlawfully terminated after the injured co-worker filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. According to Plaintiff, the co-worker’s filing was a “substantial factor” in the Employer’s decision to discharge him. The trial court granted the Employer’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce case stemming from the parties’ competing pleadings, both of which sought a modification of their earlier-filed agreed permanent parenting plan as well as other relief. Within a few months of their divorce, Mary Katherine Taylor (“Mother”) had filed a petition to modify the residential parenting schedule. Joshua Wayne Taylor (“Father”) filed a counterclaim also seeking a modified residential schedule and, furthermore, a change in the custody designation. Following a bench trial, the court found that there was no material change in circumstances warranting a change in the identity of the primary residential parent, but that there was a material change supporting a modification  of the residential schedule. The court ordered a new schedule that substantially increased Mother’s parenting time and provided Father with only standard visitation. The court dismissed each party’s attempt to find the other in contempt. Father appeals. We affirm.

The General Sessions Court of Montgomery County entered a final judgment against the garnishees for the full amount of the judgment debtor’s debt, even though the garnishees had filed an answer and informed the court of the amount of their payments made to the judgment debtor. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed this final judgment, and the garnishees timely appealed to this Court. We vacate the final judgment for the full amount of the debt because (1) no conditional judgment was entered, (2) the garnishees were not provided with notice of a conditional judgment, and (3) the garnishees answered and properly informed the court regarding the amount of their payments made to the judgment debtor. We remand this action to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition for temporary custody of child, alleging that he was dependent and neglected. On de novo review from the Juvenile Court, the Circuit Court, Maury County, adjudicated child dependent and neglected and found that child suffered severe abuse while in the care of his parents. Mother appealed. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the Parties’ numerous post-divorce issues. As relevant to this appeal, Father filed a petition to correct his child support obligation, alleging that his alimony payments to Mother should have been considered as income in setting his support obligation. Father also sought to modify his support obligation in recognition of the birth of his new son and his payment of health insurance. Following numerous hearings, the trial court declined to consider Father’s alimony payments in setting the support obligation but modified the obligation to reflect the birth of Father’s son and the payment of health insurance. The court awarded Mother attorney fees. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Tennessee Department of Human Services appeals an order of the trial court reversing the Department’s holding that an applicant was not eligible for food stamp benefits or to apply for certain medicare coverage due to excessive income. Upon consideration of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, affirm the decision of the Department and dismiss the petition for review.
 

This is a breach of contract case in which an administrator filed suit against a school for unpaid severance pay. The school claimed that the administrator did not provide the requisite 30-day notice for severance pay pursuant to the terms of his contract. The trial court found that the administrator satisfied the notice requirement under the term of his contract and awarded him damages. The school appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

David M. Dulaney and Traci L. Dulaney (“Plaintiffs”) sued Don Walker Construction (“Walker Construction”) and Rhonda P. Walker (collectively “Defendants”) with regard to real property and a house constructed and sold by Defendants to Plaintiffs. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to prove negligent construction and had failed to prove misrepresentation and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

The father of the parties’ four-year-old child appeals the permanent parenting plan established by the juvenile court judge; specifically, he challenges the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent, the parenting schedule, the income imputed to each parent, and child support he is ordered to pay. He also contends Mother waived her right to a de novo rehearing of an earlier “order” by the magistrate, which favored Father, as she did not file a timely request for a de novo hearing; therefore, the juvenile court judge was without authority to conduct a de novo hearing or to enter judgment contrary to the magistrate’s order. We have determined the magistrate’s “order” was not a final judgment because the magistrate never prepared “findings and recommendations in writing,” which are to be provided to the juvenile court judge, as is expressly required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(d). Following the de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge, Mother was named the primary residential parent and she was awarded 218 days of parenting time; Father was awarded 147 days. In calculating child support, the trial court found that Mother was attending college part-time but that she was voluntarily unemployed and imputed income to her based on federal minimum wage. The court found that Father’s evidence concerning his modest income was unreliable and imputed income to Father pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)(2)(iv). The court additionally afforded Mother a day care credit of $516 per month and set child support pursuant to the guidelines based upon the above findings. Father appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

The issue in this case is whether a tolling agreement between the parties precludes the application of the savings statute set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a). We agree with the trial court that the tolling agreement does preclude application of the savings statute and that the plaintiff’s legal malpractice action is barred by the termination date established in the agreement.

The issue in this wrongful termination action is the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an agreement between the plaintiff employee and his former employer. Plaintiff executed an employment agreement in 2007. Employer terminated plaintiff without cause in April 2012. He brought this action alleging common law retaliatory discharge and violations of the Tennessee Public Protection Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Employer filed a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause is unenforceable because it is unconscionable due to the “excessive” and “prohibitive” costs of arbitration. The trial court found that the agreement had been freely negotiated and was neither a contract of adhesion nor unconscionable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court enforcing the agreement and ordering arbitration.

The appeal involves a petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. The children at issue were removed from their parents’ Wisconsin home in 2005 based on abuse and neglect. Since 2006, the children have been living with the petitioners, the paternal aunt and her husband. The petitioners filed the instant petition in Tennessee to terminate the parental rights of both the mother and the father and to adopt the children. After a trial, the trial court held that the petitioners had established three grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit, (2) abandonment for failure to support, and (3) persistent conditions. It also found that termination of parental rights would be in the children’s best interest, and so terminated the parental rights of both biological parents. The parents now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Edna Lee Weaver (“plaintiff”) was employed as a bookkeeper for the Briarcliff Health Care Center, a nursing home facility in Oak Ridge. After plaintiff’s employment was terminated, she brought this action against her former employer alleging (1) common law retaliatory discharge; (2) violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2008 & Supp. 2013); and (3) violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-301 (2011). The trial court granted the employer summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to show a causal link between the conduct alleged to be protected, i.e., speaking out against alleged harassment and discrimination against other Briarcliff employees, and her termination. The court further held that the employer established legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff’s termination, and that plaintiff failed to present any evidence tending to show that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether these reasons were pretextual. We affirm.