APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of penalties and interest on ad valorum taxes owed by a funeral home business after the business was placed in receivership. The Appellant/Shelby County Trustee filed a claim with the Appellee/Receiver to recover delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. The trial court denied the penalties and interest, but allowed the Receiver to pay the base taxes. The Trustee appeals. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm and remand.

This civil action is the progeny of a criminal proceeding in which Plaintiff was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for criminal trespass and stalking following an incident that occurred at the headquarters of Nissan North America. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal trespass; however, the stalking charge was dismissed because a corporation is not defined as a “person” under the stalking statute. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan North America asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process pertaining to the stalking charge. Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed facts that was supported by the affidavit of the Williamson County Deputy District Attorney General who investigated and prosecuted the criminal proceedings. Plaintiff filed a response opposing Nissan’s motion for summary judgment; however, she failed to file a statement of disputed facts or any affidavit or deposition testimony to dispute the facts relied upon by Nissan as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 requires. After setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 56.04, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon the findings that Nissan presented competent evidence to negate essential elements of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to create an issue of disputed material fact regarding any of the grounds relied upon by Nissan. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on Sworn Account, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 245-107, for unpaid credit card charges against the credit card holder. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by a statement of the material facts as to which Plaintiff contended there was no genuine issue for trial, and each fact was set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph as the rule required, with a specific citation to the record. Defendant filed a response objecting to the motion; however, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the facts Plaintiff relied upon in making the motion for summary judgment were, in fact, disputed as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. As a consequence, the facts relied upon by Plaintiff were undisputed and the trial court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the amount owed. We affirm.
 

This consolidated appeal concerns Plaintiff’s ownership interest in condominium units. Plaintiff filed several complaints concerning the alleged mismanagement of her property. The complaints at issue in this case were dismissed by the trial court, which found that the applicable statute of limitations had passed and that several of Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2006, and their parenting plan did not include an award of child support because residential parenting time was equally shared and they were earning roughly the same amount. Mother filed a petition in 2010 seeking an award of child support based on Father’s increased income. The trial court deviated downward from the presumptive amount of child support established by the child support guidelines to take into account each party’s expenses incurred in driving back and forth to work, and then awarded Mother child support payable on a monthly basis. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its authority by deviating downward for a reason not explicitly set forth in the guidelines. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because tribunals have discretion to deviate from the guidelines for reasons other than those explicitly set forth in the guidelines.

Attorney filed petition pursuant to the Public Records Act for disclosure of documents held by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, the Board’s Chair, and Disciplinary Counsel to the Board relating to eight disciplinary proceedings. Access to the documents had been withheld based on a claim that the documents were exempt from disclosure in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 25.3. Responding officials appeal the trial court’s order that the documents be produced. Finding that the documents sought were confidential and privileged from disclosure, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition.

The Disciplinary Board of the Turney Center Industrial Complex convicted Petitioner of assault based upon his involvement in a gang stabbing of another inmate, the conviction was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction. Petitioner then filed this common law writ of certiorari with the Chancery Court of Hickman County to challenge his conviction. The trial court granted the writ and the administrative record was filed with the trial court. Thereafter, on motion of the respondents, the trial court denied relief to Petitioner on the grounds the record demonstrated that the disciplinary board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or exceeded its jurisdiction, and that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. Finding no error, we affirm.

Father appeals the parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent entered by the trial court in this divorce action. We remand for further proceedings, if necessary, and findings regarding the comparative fitness of the parties.
 

In a post-divorce action, Mother filed a motion to set aside the permanent parenting plan that had been incorporated into the parties’ final decree of divorce. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for relief based on a mutual mistake of the parties. Additionally, the trial court amended the parenting plan to reflect parties’ original agreement and ordered Father to pay child support. Father appealed. After reviewing the record, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the classification and division of the marital estate, the alimony and attorney fee awards, and the parenting plan decision of the trial court. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and modified in part.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s medical malpractice and wrongful death case for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement found in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(a). Appellant’s pre-suit notice contained a misnomer, naming the Appellee’s fundraising entity, rather than Appellee, as the proper defendant. The trial court determined that under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012), substantial compliance was not effective to satisfy the statutory requirement for pre-suit notice. Furthermore, because the type of notice required under Section 29-26-121 precedes the filing of the lawsuit, it is not the same type of notice as required for correction of misnomers in pleadings under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03; thus, this rule will not operate to cure the misnomer in the pre-suit notice. Because the Appellant failed to show extraordinary cause for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing this matter. Affirmed and remanded.
 

This case concerns custody and alimony decisions relative to a divorce. Discerning no error, we affirm

This case concerns Erie’s refusal to pay insurance proceeds to Plaintiff, who filed suit, alleging claims of breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-101, et. seq. The case proceeded to jury trial. After denying a myriad of motions and reopening the proof to admit the insurance policy into evidence, the trial court submitted the case to the jury. The jury awarded Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages and found that Erie’s failure to pay was in bad faith and in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The court assessed the statutory bad faith penalty and awarded treble damages and attorney fees. Erie appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s determination that Defendant Taxpayer was entitled to a refund in the amount of $323,596.14. We affirm the  trial court’s determination that Taxpayer is entitled to a refund, but vacate the judgment with respect to the amount of refund due Taxpayer. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This appeal focuses on a public request for juvenile court records. Morristown Certified Properties General Partnership (“Petitioner”) was sued in a civil action by the victim of an assault that took place on its property. In preparing for its defense, Petitioner filed a motion in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County seeking access to the juvenile court records of Jaylen J. and Adrian H (“the juveniles”), the two individuals who allegedly perpetrated the subject assault. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted Petitioner access to a portion of the records, but refused to release the remaining records based upon its finding that they were not relevant to the civil suit. On further review, the trial court adopted the juvenile court’s ruling and denied further inspection of the records. Petitioner appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the issue of whether Petitioner is entitled to access the court records has become moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff appeals judgment in favor of Defendant apartment complex. We affirm.

This action presents the question of whether a claim properly may be brought against the City of Knoxville (“the City”) pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) under circumstances where a tree located on the real property of a private landowner fell and caused the death of a motorist traveling on a city street. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the City maintained immunity pursuant to the GTLA and the public duty doctrine. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the claim.

Megan A.A. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights to her children, Kayla N.A. and Haylei M.A. (“the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition alleging that the Children were dependent and neglected as a result of both parents’ drug abuse. On the same day, the juvenile court entered an ex parte order awarding temporary custody of the Children to Teresa W., the Children’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). After later entering an agreed order that adjudicated the Children as dependent and neglected, the court awarded temporary legal and physical custody to Grandmother. More than a year after the Children came into her custody, Grandmother filed a petition in the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition based on its finding that Mother abandoned the Children by willfully failing to visit and support them. The court further found that termination of Mother’s rights is in the Children’s best interest. The court stated that it made both findings by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract claim brought by the appellant road paving contractor, APACAtlantic, Inc., Harrison Construction Division (“APAC”), after the defendant, the Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”), refused payment of $221,998.36 pursuant to a special “rideability,” or smoothness, provision of the parties’ written contract. The Claims Commission, William O. Shults, Commissioner, finding the special provision language to be unambiguous, denied the claim. APAC appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Two executive employees of Continental Car Club, Inc., resigned in order to start a business in competition with their former employer. The issues on appeal are (1) whether the employees resigned for “Good Reason” as that term is defined in their employment agreements; (2) whether the employees violated their employment agreements by copying all the data on their work computers to personal computers shortly before resigning; (3) whether the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions of their agreements are enforceable; (4) whether the trial court correctly found the employees liable for conversion; and (5) whether the employees violated the Tennessee or Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act. We hold that the employees did not establish that they resigned for “Good Reason.” We further hold that they violated their employment agreements, and, accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment awarding them severance pay and benefits. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the conversion claim but modify the judgment to award the former employer the value of tickets to a football game that one of the employees converted by sending the tickets to business clients, then renting a bus and taking the clients to the game several months after the employee’s resignation. We hold that the trial court correctly determined that the covenants not to compete were valid and enforceable and that the agreements are reasonable in time and geographic limits but overbroad in scope. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and modify it in part. With respect to the portion of the trial court’s judgment not reversed, we affirm, as modified.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and severe child abuse and that termination of his rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order of terminating a biological father's parental rights. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

I concur fully in the result in this case as well as in the reasoning espoused to reach such. However, I write separately to clarify this Court’s holding in Jacob I. The majority implies that Jacob I required the filing of an appeal bond “with no monetary limit” to satisfy the requirements of section 27-5-103. Such was not the holding in Jacob.

This appeal calls into question the validity of a covenant not to compete. A former employee of a seller and distributor of brick brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that his agreement not to compete for two years with his former employer in the employee’s sales territory is unenforceable. Following a bench trial, the court held the covenant unenforceable and void. We hold that, because the employee had access to confidential pricing and profit margin information and was the sole commercial brick salesperson for the company in the Chattanooga area, the employer had a legitimate protectable business interest. We further hold that the terms of the non-compete agreement are reasonable under the facts of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This is a lawsuit alleging unauthorized cremation. The plaintiffs’ mother, a Tennessee resident, died in Arkansas while visiting a friend. The plaintiffs hired a Tennessee funeral home to transport the decedent’s body back to her hometown of Medina, Tennessee, for an informal family viewing. The plaintiffs instructed the Tennessee funeral home operator that, after the viewing, the decedent’s body was to be taken to Nashville, Tennessee, to be cremated there. The Tennessee funeral home retained the defendant Arkansas funeral home to handle the matter. The Arkansas funeral home delivered the body to an Arkansas crematory. The plaintiffs’ mother’s body was cremated by the crematory in Arkansas, so the plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to view their mother’s deceased body in Tennessee. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against several defendants, alleging various causes of action arising out of the unauthorized cremation of their mother’s body in Arkansas. The defendant Arkansas funeral home filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts of the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Arkansas funeral home on all counts and certified the order as final under Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 54.02. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.