APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Husband in divorce proceeding appeals numerous issues relating to the trial court’s administration of the trial and valuation and division of marital property. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

In this post-divorce action, Mother and Father both sought to modify the child support obligation of Father. The trial court, inter alia, found that Father had an annual income of $65,000 and held that there had been a significant variance. The court raised Father’s child support obligation to $233.00 per month, applied a downward deviation of $83.00, and ordered support to continue past age 21 for one of the children due to her disabilities. Father appeals, contending that the court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm the method used to determine Father’s income; we vacate the child support obligation and remand for a redetermination of the support amount.

Mother’s parental rights to her three sons were terminated after she pled guilty to the second degree murder of a fourth son. On appeal, Mother concedes that termination grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence; she challenges only the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s best interest finding, and thus, its termination of Mother’s parental rights.

I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority. I do not believe that the fact that fees are available to the Pattons requires that they be awarded under the particular facts and circumstances of this case.

This appeal involves the classification and division of Husband’s $66,000.00 personal injury settlement in a divorce proceeding. The trial court classified the settlement as marital property, it deducted $13,400.00 for what it found to be “legitimate expense[s] of the marriage” paid by Husband, and it awarded Wife one-half of the balance, or $26,300.00. We reverse the trial court’s award to Wife.

This is a contract interpretation case involving the proper apportionment of proceeds from the sale of several properties owned by the parties as tenants in common. When Husband and Wife divorced in 2005, a marital dissolution agreement was incorporated into their Final Decree of Divorce. In pertinent part, the agreement required the parties to sell six properties and split the proceeds therefrom. The agreement listed each of the properties with a dollar amount beside it. The agreement provided that Wife could be compelled to accept an offer for a particular property so long as her share of the proceeds equaled the dollar amount listed with that property in the agreement. The sum of the amounts listed with the properties at issue was $565,800. Real estate values declined substantially after the agreement was entered, and the properties were finally sold together for $322,287.71 in 2012. Following the sale Husband filed a motion seeking an equal division of the sale proceeds. Wife answered, insisting that the agreement entitled her to $565,800 and that she was therefore entitled to all of the sale proceeds, less Husband’s expenses related to the properties. During a bench trial, the court found the agreement ambiguous and therefore considered parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Based on its findings, the trial court determined that the parties intended to split the sale proceeds equally. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the agreement entitled Husband to reimbursement for one-half of his expenses on the properties, which the parties stipulated to be $156,270.48. In its final accounting, the trial court awarded $234,834.09 to Husband and $87,453.62 to Wife. We affirm.

Kathy Austin, Vickie Shipley, and Sherry Foshie (“Plaintiffs”) sued their brothers, Jacob Wilds, Jr. and James Wilds (“Defendants”), seeking to have certain deeds from their mother set aside due to alleged undue influence and/or duress. After a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Greene County (“Trial Court”) entered its order rendering judgment in favor of Defendants after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to prove the existence of a confidential relationship necessary to show that the subject deeds were procured through undue influence. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

Appellant medical providers appeal the trial court’s denial of their motions to dismiss a medical malpractice complaint for failure to strictly comply with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122(d)(4). Because we conclude that the trial court had good cause to grant an extension, within which to file a certificate of good faith, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The only issue in this appeal is whether two property owners in a subdivision are entitled to an award of attorney fees for prevailing in a third-party action brought against them by the homeowners association to enforce restrictive covenants. The association argued that the property owners were not entitled to attorney fees because they did not prevail on every issue that came up during litigation, because the attorney fee provision in the restrictive covenants could be read to mean that no such award could be made if additional damages were not also awarded, and because they did not personally pay their own attorney fees. The trial court agreed with those arguments and denied the motion for attorney fees. We reverse the trial court and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the attorney fee award.

This is the second appeal of this case, involving the application of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-1-105 to set aside certain transfers by decedent to his long-term companion, which transfers were allegedly made with intent to deny his surviving spouse of her share of his estate. From the totality of the circumstances, and applying the factors outlined by this Court in Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s award of $8,500.00 in insurance proceeds to the surviving spouse for decedent’s funeral costs, but that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s award of a $28,000.00 bank account to the surviving spouse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Father sought to relocate to Arizona, citing family ties and increased career opportunities. The parties agreed that Father spent substantially more time with the child than Mother; however, Mother objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. The trial court agreed with Mother and entered a parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent. Because the trial court made no best interest finding regarding either the proposed relocation, or the parenting plan, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and Remanded.

The trial court determined that no material and substantial change in circumstance had occurred and denied Father’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan. We affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her young daughter. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights based upon four separate grounds: substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; abandonment by willful failure to visit; abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; and persistent conditions. We find that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her child, and we reverse the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence. This matter is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary.

Father appeals the trial court’s determination that he is willfully and voluntarily underemployed and the parenting schedule established by the trial court. Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that it lacked the authority to award attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). We affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to the parenting schedule and the finding of voluntary underemployment, and vacate with respect to the issue of attorney’s fees. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This appeals arises from the post-divorce modification of child support following the emancipation of the parties’ oldest of three children. Both parents appeal numerous rulings by the trial court including its child support calculations, a judgment against Mother arising from Father’s overpayment of child support following the emancipation of their oldest child, the imputation of income to Mother for voluntary unemployment, an upward deviation for extraordinary education expenses, allocation of the uncovered medical expenses, allocation of the tax exemptions for the two minors, and attorney’s fees. We have determined that although the trial court was justified in finding a deviation for extraordinary education expenses, the trial court erred by applying the deviation prospectively rather than retroactively to the date of the petition. We reverse the trial court only on this issue and remand for the trial court to recalculate the amount of child support and the judgment against Mother consistent with this finding. We affirm the trial court in all other respects and deny both parties’ request to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in this appeal.

This case presents the issue of whether citizens who reside on real property that is proposed for deannexation by a municipal ordinance may, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-201 (2011), properly bring a quo warranto or declaratory judgment action against the municipality to challenge adoption of the deannexation ordinance. The trial court dismissed these claims against the municipality, and the plaintiffs have appealed. The plaintiffs have also taken issue with the propriety of the trial court’s determination regarding who would be qualified to vote in the referendum election, as well as other procedural and evidentiary issues. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

A surgical pathology group filed this action in chancery court, claiming that the Med violated its own rules and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to award the petitioner with a contract after a lengthy request for proposals process. The petition stated that the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the statutes governing petitions for certiorari. The trial court granted the Med’s motion to dismiss for numerous reasons, including lack of jurisdiction. We find that the petition was not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we reverse the trial court’s finding to the contrary. However, due to the petitioner’s failure to appeal the trial court’s alternative grounds for dismissal, we find it unnecessary to consider the issues raised on appeal, and we otherwise affirm the order of dismissal.

This is a condemnation case in which the State of Tennessee Department of Transportation acquired 20.93 acres of a 46.813 parcel of land by eminent domain for the purpose of constructing a highway. The jury awarded the landowner money for the value of the land acquired, the improvements on the land (including interior roadsand culverts), and incidental damages to the remainder of the property not acquired by the State. The trial court suggested an additur and also awarded the landowner discretionary costs. The State appeals the trial court’s award of an additur and discretionary costs. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s suggestion of additur on the issues of incidental damages and interior roads; however, we find the evidence preponderates against the court’s additur with respect to culverts. We also find the trial court erred in assessing discretionary costs against the State.

Bank made a loan to an individual who owned real property and obtained a deed of trust on the property securing the loan. Bank recorded the deed of trust in the wrong county. A few years later Second Bank obtained two judgment liens and properly registered them in the correct county. Bank later realized its error and registered its deed of trust in the correct county but was by that time in the junior creditor position. Bank filed a complaint seeking equitable subrogation in an effort to obtain the prioritycreditor position and get placed ahead of Second Bank, which had no security interest in the property at issue, but which had filed its liens first. The trial court denied Bank this relief after balancing the equities of the parties. We affirm.

A doctor who became the subject of disciplinary proceedings by the Tennessee Medical Examiners Board filed a complaint for legal malpractice against the attorney who had represented him in those proceedings. The doctor asserted that the Board suspended his medical license for one year as a result of numerous acts of professional negligence by the attorney. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, denying that he was guilty of any professional negligence and contending that in any case, the doctor’s complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the attorney on the basis of the statute of limitations. The court ruled that the doctor suffered a legally cognizable injury when the attorney failed to disclose a list of proposed witnesses to the Administrative Law Judge assigned to conduct the evidentiary hearing, which was more than one year earlier than the doctor’s filing of his legal malpractice complaint. The court accordingly held that the attorney could not be held liable for his failure to disclose the witnesses, or for anyother acts that occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the malpractice complaint. The court certified its judgment as final for purposes of appeal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint for lack of prosecution. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the equitable division of property between the Parties. Following the grant of the request for divorce, the trial court credited Husband for separate property he contributed to the marital residence to equalize the overall division of the property. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case stemming from a commercial lease between Plaintiff Landlord and Defendant Tenants. Beginning in August 2011, Defendants failed to make rent payments in violation of their lease with Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit seeking damages specified in the lease. In response, Defendants raised the affirmative defense of unclean hands, contending that Plaintiff breached the lease first by objecting to and/or interfering with Defendants’ right under the lease to sublease the property without Plaintiff’s consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, finding that Defendants failed to perform under the lease by failing to pay rent, and finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding any allegation that Plaintiff interfered with Defendant’s ability to sublease the property. The Defendants argue that summary judgment was inappropriate because there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bayrock breached the lease first by interfering with Defendants’ right to sublease. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff.

Inmate filed petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of decisions of the Board of Parole denying him parole and setting a two year period for his next consideration. Trial court dismissed petition; finding no error, we affirm the decision.

This appeal arises out of an inmate’s allegedly improper early release from jail. Stanley Walker (“Walker”), alleging that he was improperly released early from jail because the authorities did not want to pay for his medical care, sued Bradley County and Capt. Gabriel Thomas (“the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court dismissed certain of Walker’s claims for failure to state a claim and ultimately granted summary judgment for the Defendants on the remaining claim. Walker timely appealed. We hold, inter alia, that Walker has no private right of action for being released early from jail, and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.