APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After her daughter was attacked by a tenant’s dog, the mother plaintiff sued the tenant and the property owners. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owners based upon a lack of knowledge/notice of the dog’s vicious propensities. For the following reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and we remand for further proceedings.

Company providing dial-up and broadband Internet services to Internet Service Providers that in turn provided these services to end-users sought refund of sales taxes it had paid to the State from January 2001 through March 2004 on the ground that its services did not constitute “telecommunications” or “telecommunication services” as those terms are defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(a)(32). Both the Company and the State filed motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted the Company’s motion. The trial court found the Company provided Internet access services, the services were “enhanced” rather than “basic” services, and the true object of the services was not telecommunications. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a breach of contract case in which Company sought to hold Defendant personally liable for the amount remaining on a contract. During Company’s proof-in-chief, Defendant used parol evidence attempting to show that while he signed the contract, the parties understood that he was signing as a representative of his business. Following Company’s presentation of its proof, Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, finding that Company failed to establish that Defendant was personally liable. Company appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Mother appeals from the trial court’s post-divorce modification decreasing Father’s child support obligation. Finding no error, we affirm. We have also determined that Father is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees he incurred in this appeal  pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

This appeal arises from a proceeding to recover fees under an attorney’s lien. The wife in the underlying Tennessee divorce action retained the appellant Washington, D.C. attorney to advise her on business issues related to the parties’ largest marital asset, an international business. The attorney’s engagement agreement gave the attorney a lien against any proceeds collected by the wife in the divorce and also provided for a monthly service charge on fee bills that were not paid when due. After considerable litigation, the divorce settled. After the settlement, the wife refused to pay the appellant attorney’s outstanding fees. The attorney filed a motion in the divorce action to recover those fees under his attorney’s lien. The wife objected to the attorney fees as excessive, unnecessary, and unreasonable. The trial judge in the divorce proceeding conducted an eight-day trial and ultimately held that the fees were reasonable and necessary to the attorney’s representation of the wife. The trial court awarded the attorney damages, a service charge per the engagement agreement, and prejudgment interest, but it denied the attorney’s request for the costs of collection. Both the wife and the attorney now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

Plaintiffs/appellants, who are owners of real property in a residential community that was developed for horse riding enthusiasts, filed this action to enforce restrictive covenants that prohibit the use of motorized vehicles on trails in the residential community. At the hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, all of the parties agreed to the entry of an order prohibiting the use of any motorized vehicles on horse trails within four specified sections that contained the restrictive covenants; at the same hearing, the parties also agreed with the trial court’s statement that all other claims would be dismissed. A Final Order was entered that was consistent with the parties’ agreement. Although the plaintiffs consented in open court to the order that was entered and they did not file a motion to alter or amend that order, plaintiffs now appeal from that order. On appeal, they contend they were deprived of the opportunity to put on evidence at the hearing on the motions to dismiss; they also contend the court erred in dismissing all other claims. Finding the plaintiffs expressly consented in open court to the entry of the order appealed from, that the plaintiffs made no request to introduce evidence, and that they agreed to the dismissal of all other claims, we have determined that the plaintiffs waived all issues raised in this appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court. Defendants contend this was a frivolous appeal and have requested damages. Exercising our discretion, we respectfully deny the defendants request for damages.

The majority opinion in this case is detailed and thorough. However, because I disagree with the basic premise upon which the majority opinion rests, I must dissent. The majority opinion concludes that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider and award Shawn Coulson its requested fee on the basis of the contractual attorney lien included in Ms. Coleman’s contract with Shawn Coulson. I respectfully disagree, and instead, conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award Shawn Coulson its requested fee in this matter.

Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and this appeal must be dismissed.

The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights to Son on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions, and upon its finding that termination is in Son’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to Son.

This appeal involves inquiry notice of the claimed injury for purposes of triggering the medical malpractice one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs, a married couple with four children, wanted to prevent the conception of another child. To that end, the plaintiff wife underwent a procedure to prevent pregnancy at the defendant medical clinic. About a year later, she became pregnant. The wife later gave birth to a healthy baby boy. The plaintiffs filed this medical malpractice lawsuit against the clinic and the treating physician, claiming the wife’s pregnancy as the injury. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The trial court held that the wife was put on notice of her pregnancy by, at the very latest, the day that she obtained a positive result on a home pregnancy test; it held that the claim was time-barred on that basis and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to alter or amend was denied. The plaintiffs now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother of six children appeals termination of her parental rights, contending that the evidence does not support the court’s holding that she abandoned the children within the meaning of the applicable statute, that she failed to comply with the requirements of permanency plans, that the conditions which led to the removal of the children from her custody persisted, and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a “Final Decree of Divorce.”  Because the decree does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal results from the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint on the basis of res judicata.  However, in his appellate brief, the Appellant fails to raise as an issue the trial court's application of the doctrine of res judicata, or the resulting dismissal. Because the Appellant’s brief fails to raise and argue the dispositive issue in this case and does not otherwise comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal.

This is a slip and fall case. Plaintiff sued The Kroger Company after he fell in a puddle of water near a freezer at a local Kroger store. The trial court granted Kroger’s motion for summary judgment, but failed to include findings indicating the reason for its decision. We find that summary judgment was inappropriate and therefore reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

This is a negligence case in which the Grahams were severely injured when the top portion of a tree collapsed, hitting their car while they were driving in Cleveland, Tennessee. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that the County’s failure to maintain and inspect its roadways caused the accident. The County alleged that it could not be held liable pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-10-101, et. seq. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The Grahams appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A twenty-year veteran of the Memphis Police Department was terminated based upon his involvement with a private security company, in violation of departmental policies, and his untruthfulness during the department’s investigation. The officer filed a petition for review in chancery court, and the chancery court upheld his termination. The officer appeals, arguing that the chancery court should have allowed him to introduce evidence of another officer who was treated differently, in violation of his equal protection rights. He also argues that he was impermissibly punished twice for the same conduct. We affirm.

In this second appeal of a child custody decision, Father argues that the trial court erred in naming Mother primary residential parent and in fashioning the permanent parenting plan. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to either the custody or parenting time decisions, and therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court.  Affirmed and remanded.

The trial court awarded partial summary judgment to both parties in this dispute over the division of attorney’s fees.  We affirm the trial court’s holding that Tennessee law, and not the “modern rule” is applicable to this case as a matter of law.  We reverse the trial court’s awards of summary judgment to both parties on the remaining issues, and remand for further proceedings. 
 

This is a post-divorce appeal. In this second appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's ruling on his obligation as to certain expenses.  After a careful review of the record, we affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Husband filed a petition pursuant to Rule 60.02 to set aside a provision of the parties’ divorce decree that required him to pay $80,000 to Wife in accordance with an antenuptial agreement. He sought relief under Rule 60.02(2) for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. The trial court denied Husband’s petition and “confirmed” the divorce decree. We find that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, and as a result, it did not properly exercise its discretion. We also find that Wife’s conduct constituted misrepresentation or other misconduct within the meaning of Rule 60.02(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Husband’s Rule 60 petition and we vacate the challenged portion of the divorce decree.

For the reasons discussed below, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case.

A trial court granted Third-Party Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute where Third-PartyPlaintiff took no steps to pursue his claims against Third-PartyDefendant more than six years after Third-PartyPlaintiff was granted a new trial, and where Third-Party Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s scheduling order, thereby causing additional delays. Third-Party Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Trial courts have broad discretionary authority to control their dockets and proceedings, and the court here did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Third-Party Plaintiff’s complaint against Third-Party Defendant.
 

Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and this appeal must be dismissed.