APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves an award of retroactive child support. Approximately seventeen years after the child's birth, the Tennessee Department of Human Services, acting on behalf of the child's Mother, filed a petition in the Sumner County Juvenile Court seeking to establish paternity and to obtain past and future child support from the Father. Genetic testing confirmed that Father was the child’s biological father. Thereafter, the juvenile courtentered an order establishing paternity and ordering Father to pay $574.00 per month in child support. The juvenile court also awarded Mother seven years of retroactive child support totaling $48,216.00. On appeal, both Mother and Father take issue with the amount of the award of retroactive child support. Upon thorough examination, we conclude that the record does not support the amount of the award of retroactive child support. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

This case focuses on the proper classification and distribution of the parties’ assets incident to a divorce. Troy Steven Potter (“Husband”) filed a divorce complaint against Christa Gilman Potter (“Wife”) on August 17, 2011. The parties proceeded to trial in August 2012 on the issues of alimony and classification and division of property. The court awarded transitional alimony to Wife and divided the parties’ assets and debts. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification and division of property. We affirm.

Plaintiff sued his former co-worker, and months later, he filed an amended complaint naming his former employer and several other employees as additional defendants. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against the new defendants, finding them barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the claims should have been deemed timely pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 and/or Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Travion B. and Davion B., the minor children (“Children”) of Samantha B. (“Mother”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on January 24, 2011, after the younger child suffered a head injury. On October 6, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother. Following a bench trial spanning four days, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had committed severe child abuse. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Charles H. Roberts, seeks to appeal was entered on April 3, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the April 3, 2013 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (May 9, 2013). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal concerns a settlement agreement in a divorce. The parties purportedly had reached an agreement regarding the division of their property. An order, proposed by the wife, was signed by counsel for both parties and entered by the trial court. The husband later filed a pro se notice of appeal containing allegations that he did not agree to the terms of the settlement and that it is incomplete. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Sharon Lynn Puckett (“Wife”) sued Bobby Wayne Puckett (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on October 4, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that Husband was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of Wife’s inappropriate marital conduct, that Wife was guilty of perjury, and that Wife was in contempt of court both for selling property during the pendency of the divorce in violation of the restraining order and for possessing a cell phone in court. Wife appeals raising the sole issue of whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant her motion for recusal. We hold that Wife failed to show any grounds justifying recusal, and we affirm.

This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying a petition to terminate the parental rights of the appellant, Willie G., to his three minor children. Because the judgment of the trial court is not adverse to the appellant, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

This appeal involves jurisdiction as to a parentage petition and related issues. The mother of the subject child lives in New York and the father lives in Tennessee. The child lives with the mother in New York. The mother filed this parentage petition in Tennessee. The Tennessee juvenile court entered an order establishing the father’s parentage and adjudicating child support, the designation of the primary residential parent, and the allocation of the parties’ residential parenting time. The mother appeals, challenging in part the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to adjudicate custody and child support. We affirm the juvenile court’s final order on the father’s parentage. We vacate the final order on the designation of primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time, as the Tennessee court did not have jurisdiction over these issues under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. We hold that the Tennessee court had jurisdiction to adjudicate child support, but vacate its final order on child support because the determination is based in part on the adjudication of the primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time.

This action arises out of the alleged breach of a construction subcontract due to the general contractor’s failure to pay for work performed by the subcontractor. At issue in this appeal are the plaintiff’s two claims against the general contractor and the insurer that provided the performance and payment bond. One claim is for breach of the subcontract; the other is for violation of the Prompt Pay Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 66-34-101 through -703.The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that both claims were time-barred by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-109(a)(3), the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. We affirm.

Civil service employee appeals the trial court’s judgment affirming the Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate the employee for the good of the service pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-326. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This case involves the application of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant doctor, finding that the statute of limitations defense was not waived by her failure to raise it in her first pre-answer motion, that the defense was sufficiently pleaded, and that the undisputed facts in the record supported a finding that the statute of limitations had expired at the time of filing the initial complaint. Affirmed and remanded.

Customer of a restaurant who was injured when she fell on a concrete ramp leading into the restaurant brought suit against the restaurant, alleging that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition and that the restaurant failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to customers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the ramp did not constitute a dangerous condition and that the owners did not have notice that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Ex-wife appeals from a trial court’s adoption of a report by the clerk and master that her ex-husband had fully satisfied a judgment for unpaid pension payments arising from the parties’ 1996 divorce and the determination that she is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the underlying case and other proceedings. The clerk and master found that an October 2001 judgment for an unpaid arrearage in pension payments had been satisfied and the ex-wife did not timely file an objection. The trial court adopted the clerk and master’s report and entered judgment accordingly. The court also ruled that the ex-wife was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees in this or other proceedings including those specified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order. Although the ex-wife waived any objection to the report of the clerk and master, and thus, the trial court’s adoption of that report is affirmed, we have determined that the reference to the clerk and master was limited to determining the ex-husband’s pension obligations under the October 2001 chancery court judgment. Whether the sums owed by the ex-husband for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $13,904.44 identified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order were not specified as issues in the order of reference to the master. Because the ex-husband’s obligations to pay to the ex-wife the attorney’s fees and costs specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order were not identified in the order of reference, the ex-wife’s failure to timely file an objection does not constitute a waiver of that issue. We have also determined that whether the sums owing under the 2003 bankruptcy order are a legal obligation of the ex-husband is a question of law, not a question of fact, and the failure to timely object to the master’s report does not constitute a waiver of an issue of law. The 2003 bankruptcy order expressly states the ex-husband owes the sum of $13,904.44, plus interest, to the ex-wife for her attorney’s fees and costs, and he is collaterally estopped from denying the debt specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order. Therefore, we have concluded that the ex-wife is entitled to recover $13,904.44, plus interest. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Taxpayers appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and dismissal of the taxpayers’ claims for refund of sales taxes paid to the State of Tennessee. Holding that the service at issue was not excluded from the definition of taxable telecommunications as a private line service or as an enhanced service, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the petitioner’s application for four billboard construction permits on I-240 in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee. The dispositive issues concern the zoning classifications of the proposed billboard locations. The Department of Transportation denied the permits based upon the finding that none of the proposed billboard locations met the zoning requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated § 54-21-103(4) or Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1680-2-3-.03(1)(a)1, or the definitions for “Zoned Commercial” or “Zoned Industrial” in Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.1680-2-3-.02(29). The trial court affirmed the Department’s denial of the permits, finding subsection (d) of 23 C.F.R. § 750.708, which states, “A zone in which limited commercial or industrial activities are permitted as an incident to other primary land uses is not considered to be a commercial or industrial zone for outdoor advertising control purposes” was controlling. The trial court also found the area was comprehensively zoned for residential, agricultural and flood plain uses, not commercial or industrial, and that “TDOT acted within its statutory authority in denying the petitioner’s application for permits,” and thus the court dismissed the petition. We affirm the decision to deny the permits based upon federal and state law.

A police officer who was terminated for violating chain of command and insubordination filed suit for retaliatory discharge pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, alleging that he had been terminated for reporting illegal activities of the Police Chief to the Mayor. Following a trial, the court held that the evidence did not establish that the officer had been terminated solely for his refusal to remain silent about the illegal activities. Finding that the reasons given for the officer’s termination were pretextual within the meaning of the applicable statute, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

William Ned McCoy and Carolyn McCoy (“Plaintiffs”) sued Richard Lee Bales and Shelia M. Bales (“Defendants”) alleging, in part, that Defendants had encroached upon real property owned by Plaintiffs, and seeking, in part, a determination with regard to a boundary line. The case was tried before a jury, and the Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that the property is owned by the parties as set out in the Dennis Fultz survey dated February 29, 1996. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the evidence supports the jury’s verdict. We hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and we affirm.

The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on January 7, 2013. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on February 7, 2013, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

The trial court dismissed Claimant’s claim against Decedent’s estate as void not with standing the failure of the Estate to file a timely exception to the claim. We reverse.

This appeal arises from a divorce and child custody determination. After 18 years of marriage, Terri Ann Kelly (“Wife”) sued Willard Reed Kelly (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court, among other things, awarded Wife alimony and custody of the parties’ son, Will. Husband appeals, raising several issues. We reverse the Trial Court in its award of custody of Will to Wife. We modify the Trial Court’s division of the marital estate and its award of alimony to Wife. Finally, we affirm the Trial Court as to its award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We affirm, in part, as modified, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

I agree with the majority that the evidence in this case preponderates against the trial court’s division of the net marital estate. I also concur in the majority’s further conclusion that the evidence preponderates against the type and amount of alimony awarded to Ms. Kelly. In my judgment, the evidence preponderates in favor of the majority’s division of the net estate and its award of transitional alimony in the amounts stated in the opinion.

Consulting group that served as the agent of record for a trust established to provide insurance to employees of a county school system filed a complaint alleging a violation of the Open Meetings Act when a group of trustees met for lunch with one of the consulting group’s employees and later changed the school system’s agent of record when the employee formed a different association with another company. The trial court found that no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred at the lunch meeting because no decision was made during the lunch. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict, dismissing Appellant’s claims of: (1) slander/defamation; (2) false light invasion of privacy; (3) false imprisonment; (4) malicious harassment; (5) negligent supervision, hiring, and retention; (6) negligent failure to affirm identification; (7) negligence; (8) assault and battery; and (9) civil conspiracy. Appellant also raises issues concerning the scope of cross-examination and the admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion concerning either the scope of the cross-examination, or by excluding certain evidence. We further conclude that Appellant failed to put forth sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case for any of the foregoing claims. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict. Affirmed and remanded.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint alleging fraudulent paternity testing.  Discerning no error, we affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.