APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In denying appellees’ motion to remove an estate’s personal representative, the trial court
adopted appellees’ proposed findings of fact verbatim and proposed conclusions of law “to
the degree they [were] not in conflict with [the] court’s order.” The proposed findings and
conclusions were signed by the trial court judge and attached to the order. Because we
cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s order represents its independent judgment, we
vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order that reflects that it is
the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment.

In this will contest initiated by four of the testator's grandchildren, the trial court determined that the execution of the testator's will met the statutory requirements for admitting the will to probate and, accordingly, dismissed the will contest. The grandchildren-contestants appealed. We affirm.

In this child custody case, the record transmitted on appeal creates significant doubt as to whether the trial court’s final order represents its own deliberations and decision. Due to this concern, and because the judge who previously presided over this case has since retired from the bench, we vacate the appealed judgment and remand for a new trial.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the three minor children on the ground of severe child abuse and on the trial court’s finding that termination of her rights is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this real property dispute, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertions that they were
entitled to an easement over the land of the defendant. Among other things, the trial court held that an easement was not essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ land. Although the plaintiffs now appeal, we decline to address their arguments due to their noncompliance with applicable briefing requirements and therefore dismiss the appeal.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his claims related to foreclosed property, asserting that
he was the true, legal, and lawful owner of the property. Because of serious deficiencies in
Appellant’s brief, we conclude that Appellant has waived his issues on appeal. The trial
court’s judgment is therefore affirmed.

The notice of appeal filed by the Appellant, Myan Joy Spear, stated that the Appellant was appealing the judgment entered on February 15, 2023. As the orders appealed from do not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The petitioner, Crystal Gregoire, appeals from the Circuit Court of Lawrence County’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff filed a complaint against two parties in general sessions court. One defendant
was served, but the other was not. Judgment was entered against the served defendant.
Seven months later, the claim against the unserved defendant was voluntarily dismissed.
The served defendant then appealed, but the circuit court dismissed the appeal as untimely.
Because a final, appealable judgment in the general sessions court was not entered until
the claim against the unserved defendant was voluntarily dismissed, we conclude that the
served defendant’s appeal was timely. Reversed and remanded.

This is a negligence and premises liability action. One of the defendants, Appellee property
owner, filed a motion for summary judgment three days after answering and before any
discovery was scheduled or conducted. Appellant filed motions for permission to amend
his complaint and for additional time to conduct discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Civil Procedure 56.07. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for additional time,
reserved his motion to amend his complaint, and heard Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed
Appellant’s claims “with prejudice,” and explicitly reserved its judgment pending
adjudication of Appellant’s pending motion for permission to amend. The trial court
subsequently determined it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant’s motion to
amend and instructed Appellant to file a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion to
set aside the judgment. The trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 60 motion and motion to
amend and certified its order awarding summary judgment to Appellee as final pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We vacate the award of summary judgment to
Appellee and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner/Appellee Matthew Long (“Long”) applied for disability pension benefits due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) caused by various traumatic events he experienced during his time as a firefighter with the Chattanooga Fire Department (“CFD”). The Board of Trustees (the “Board”) for Respondent/Appellant Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (the “Fund”) denied Long’s application. Long filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”) seeking a reversal of the Board’s decision. Finding that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, the trial court reversed the denial of Long’s application. The trial court also denied a motion to alter or amend filed by the Fund. Following thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At issue in this appeal is the classification and division of marital property from a nearly
22-year marriage. The trial court divided the marital property 50/50. The husband appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment to divide the marital property 75% to the husband and 25% to the wife. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from a default judgment originally entered by the General Sessions Court for Knox County (“general sessions court”) and then appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“circuit court”). Because the defendant did not appear in the circuit court, the circuit court also entered a default judgment against the defendant. The defendant then appealed to this Court. However, because of deficiencies in the defendant’s brief, any issues purportedly raised are waived. We thus affirm the circuit court’s ruling.

This appeal involves claims to three disputed areas based on adverse possession and prescriptive easement. We affirm the trial court’s decision denying the plaintiff’s claims.

Appellant attorney appeals the denial of his request for attorney’s fees to be paid from the
estate of a ward in a conservatorship proceeding. The trial court denied the request on the
bases that the legal services contract at issue did not provide for the payment of fees from
the estate, the ward lacked capacity to enter into a power of attorney giving the executor of
the contract authority to do so, and the applicant attorney was never appointed as attorney
ad litem for the ward. We affirm.

This is a divorce action. Wife appeals the trial court’s division of property and debt and
asserts that the trial court erred by not classifying and awarding certain real property in
accordance with the parties’ stipulations. She also appeals the trial court’s denial of her
request for an extension of the order of protection issued against Husband and the
assignment of costs to her. We reverse the trial court’s interpretation of the parties’
stipulations regarding the classification of real property inherited by Wife. Because this
holding impacts the value of the parties’ separate property and the marital estate, we
remand for reconsideration of the division of marital assets. We affirm the trial court’s
equal division of marital debt and denial of Wife’s request for an extended protective order. We vacate the assignment of costs to Wife and remand the case to the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant municipal board claimed that a document
attached to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint was protected by the attorney work product doctrine and therefore could not be relied upon or otherwise utilized by the plaintiffs. The defendant further urged that such protection had not been waived. The trial court disagreed, finding that although portions of the document were protected by the work product doctrine, such protection had been waived. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In the course of two separate dependency and neglect proceedings, a mother and father were found to have committed severe child abuse on their two children. In this termination proceeding, the trial court found that the grounds for termination of (1) severe child abuse, and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the children had been proven and that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate their parents’ parental rights. The parents appealed. We affirm.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his second lawsuit seeking damages and injunctive relief against four defendants allegedly associated with his criminal prosecution. The trial court dismissed the second lawsuit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

In a prior appeal, we addressed multiple issues connected to a judgment that was entered
following a bench trial. Among other things, we affirmed the trial court’s determination
that one of the Defendants in this litigation should be held liable for breach of fiduciary
duty, but we also rejected multiple issues raised by the Plaintiffs in pursuit of additional
relief. As part of our disposition, we remanded the case for further proceedings with
respect to matters of costs and expenses under Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-15-
1004, as well as prejudgment interest. After the trial court entered orders on remand
addressing these issues, the Plaintiffs filed the present appeal, chiefly arguing (a) that they
are entitled to 100% of their costs and expenses and (b) that the trial court erred in the
amount of prejudgment interest it awarded them. Having reviewed the record transmitted
to us on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from a forcible entry and detainer proceeding. Because Appellant’s
principal brief fails to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure
and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, the appeal is dismissed.

The Plaintiffs filed suit against a neighboring church and its pastor, alleging violations of local ordinances, as well as nuisance and trespass. The Defendants responded with a petition for dismissal under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). After the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ attempt to voluntarily dismiss the pastor, the Defendants, in response to a statement by opposing counsel, filed a motion seeking an order of dismissal of the pastor with prejudice. The trial court denied that motion. Before the scheduled hearing on the TPPA petition could occur, the Defendants appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion for an order of dismissal as to the pastor, purportedly proceeding under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-17-106, a provision of the TPPA that allows for an immediate appeal of a grant or denial of a TPPA petition. Because the order being appealed is not a dismissal or a refusal to dismiss a legal action pursuant to the Defendants’ TPPA petition, which is still pending before the trial court, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The appeal is dismissed because Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7)(A) and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6(a). In addition, Appellant failed to provide a written transcript of the relevant proceedings despite our order requiring same. The absence of a transcript negates our ability to review the trial court’s substantive findings, and the failure to comply with the rules of briefing puts this Court in the position of having to create Appellant’s arguments, which we decline to do. Appeal dismissed.

Employee alleges that his termination from a county election commission was based on discrimination. His timely-filed federal case against the State of Tennessee was subsequently dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Twenty-one days after the federal case was dismissed and a total of almost three years after his termination, Employee refiled in state court, raising the same allegations of violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Tennessee Disability Act against the State. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent that the federal savings statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), does not apply against a nonconsenting State defendant dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (2002), we conclude that Employee’s state court complaint was untimely. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment on a different ground than that relied upon by the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by
Arthur A. Allen (“Father”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed
the petition for recusal appeal filed by Father, and finding no error, we affirm.
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the
Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded