APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Grandparents brought a criminal contempt petition against Father for alleged violations of a grandparent visitation order. After a bench trial, the trial court found the father guilty on all 23 counts of criminal contempt and sentenced him to the maximum sentence of 10 days per count to be served consecutively. Of the 230 days, 140 days were suspended, with a sentence of 90 days of actual confinement. Father raises multiple challenges on appeal to every count and also challenges the sentences imposed. We affirm 11 of the counts, reverse 12 of the counts, and remand for resentencing.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a will contest for failure to prosecute.
We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this case that began as a breach of contract action, the defendant property owner attempts to appeal from two cases that were not consolidated in the trial court but resulted in the entry of a single order in favor of the plaintiff roofing company. Because the order appealed from did not adjudicate all of the claims of all of the parties, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash Plaintiffs’ post-judgment subpoena for financial records he alleges are statutorily exempt from the subpoena process. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment and that no good cause exists to waive the finality requirement. As a result, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and we grant Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this appeal.

This appeal arises from the termination of a tenured teacher. The trial court determined that the school district terminated the teacher without legal cause and ordered that she be reinstated with backpay but denied her request for attorney’s fees. Finding that the teacher waived any issue pertaining to whether the school board followed the procedural requirements of the Teacher Tenure Act, and that she engaged in conduct which constituted two of the three charges levied, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

An out-of-network hospital sued a TennCare managed care organization (“MCO”), seeking additional payment for healthcare services rendered to the MCO’s members. The MCO moved for summary judgment on the hospital’s claims for payment for post-stabilization services provided to both existing and retroactive members. With respect to the existing members, the MCO argued that the hospital could not show that the MCO had a legal obligation to pay for the post-stabilization services at issue. So the hospital could not establish that the MCO was unjustly enriched. The trial court agreed and summarily dismissed these claims. It also certified the dismissal as final. We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

A wife appeals from the final judgment in a protracted divorce. Based on the proof at trial, the court classified and divided the marital estate, adopted a permanent parenting plan, set monthly child support, and awarded the husband retroactive support back to the date of the divorce filing. The wife raises numerous issues on appeal, many of which we deem waived for failure to comply with our procedural rules. Because the final order lacks sufficient factual findings with respect to the calculation of retroactive child support, we vacate that award and remand for additional findings. Otherwise, we affirm.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Because clear and convincing evidence supports that at least one of the termination grounds exists and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The parental rights of Chasity H.1 (“Mother”) were terminated by the Knox County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on January 22, 2024. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

This is the second appeal in this action involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and to allow the petitioners to adopt the child. In the first appeal, the petitioners challenged the trial court’s determination that despite establishment of a statutory ground for termination, the petitioners had failed to demonstrate that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. This Court affirmed the trial court’s finding as to the statutory ground. However, concluding that the trial court had erred by applying an outdated set of statutory best interest factors, this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of the updated factors. On remand and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court confirmed its previous determination that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioners have appealed, and the mother has raised an additional issue regarding the statutory ground for termination. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to recuse. Because appellant failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal involves a claim for breach of contract filed by the personal representative of a deceased husband’s estate against his former wife, asserting that the former wife breached the parties’ marital dissolution agreement by accepting the proceeds of the former husband’s retirement account upon his death. The parties’ marital dissolution agreement had provided that the retirement account would be “the sole and absolute property of the Husband” and that any “marital interest” the wife had was divested from her and vested in the husband. However, the wife remained the designated beneficiary of the account when the husband died six years later. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the estate and by the wife. The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate, concluding that the wife breached the marital dissolution agreement and that the estate was entitled to the entire sum in the account. The wife appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for further proceedings.

This is a healthcare liability/wrongful death case. Appellees, healthcare providers, alleged that appellant abused the discovery process in failing to make her expert available for deposition within the time set by the trial court’s scheduling order. Appellant moved for amendment of the scheduling order and for continuance of the trial date. The trial court denied appellant’s motions and granted appellees’ motion to exclude appellant’s expert. The exclusion of appellant’s expert resulted in the trial court granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment, thus dismissing appellant’s lawsuit. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s exclusion of appellant’s expert (and the resulting dismissal of her lawsuit) was too harsh a punishment. Vacated and remanded.

Appellant, as personal guarantor for a third party, signed a credit agreement with appellee. After obtaining a default judgment against the third party in a separate lawsuit, appellee filed suit in the general sessions court to collect the judgment from appellant as the third party’s guarantor. Appellee obtained a default judgment against appellant, and appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant did not respond to appellee’s request for admissions. Appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that appellant’s failure to respond to the request for admissions deemed them admitted and the admissions provided the basis for the undisputed material facts in support of the motion. Appellant failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted it. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, and award appellee damages for frivolous appeal, including appellate attorney’s fees

This appeal arises from a legal malpractice action filed by Terry J. Lee (“Plaintiff”) on July 11, 2024, against several attorneys who represented him at various times and in different aspects of his defense of a multi-count indictment and the appeal of his 2020 conviction on all counts, including kidnapping. Plaintiff asserted a cause of action for legal malpractice against the defendants, claiming that they “failed to investigate plaintiff’s [criminal] case to know that the court [Williamson County Criminal Court] did not have territorial jurisdiction to prosecute him on the kidnapping charge.” Plaintiff was convicted in 2020 and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on all grounds effective January 26, 2023, when mandate issued. See State v. Lee, No. M2021-01084-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 16843485 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2022). After noting that the statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims, codified in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(c)(1), requires that the action be filed “within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued,” and that the claims accrued more than one year prior to the commencement of this action, the trial court dismissed the complaint as time barred. Plaintiff contends that this was error. Finding no error, we affirm.

In this custody case, the trial court adopted a parenting plan that ordered equal parenting time. The father appeals, seeking a reversal of the award of equal parenting time, an increase in the mother’s monthly income for child support purposes, payment of one-half the childcare costs, custody on alternating July the fourth holidays, and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

Following a mechanical failure, an employee parked his tractor-trailer on the shoulder of an interstate highway.  As result of delays in the repair of the tractor-trailer, the vehicle had been on the shoulder for at least seven hours when a driver crashed into the parked tractor-trailer.  Two of the driver’s passengers, the driver’s son and his son’s fiancée, died.  The estates of the deceased and their shared minor child (the Plaintiffs) filed a tort suit against the driver and also against the driver of the tractor-trailer and his trucking company employer.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant tractor-trailer driver and his employer.  In doing this, the trial court based its decision upon what it termed a special rule of Tennessee tort law called the Carney Rule, a reference to this court’s decision in Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).  In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied upon an understanding of the Carney decision set forth in several federal court decisions.  The Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in its application of the Carney Rule.  We agree and reverse the trial court’s decision, remanding for further proceedings. 

In this case involving termination of the parents’ parental rights to their three minor children, the trial court found that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence: (1) abandonment by failure to financially support the children and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the children. The trial court further found that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this parental termination case, the mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, Heavenly M. The trial court found that four grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s finding that four grounds were properly pled and proven: the grounds of abandonment for failure to support, abandonment for failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. We also affirm the finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

State employee Insured received radiation treatment for tongue cancer. Insurance Company denied authorization of the treatment as “investigational” and not “medically necessary” pursuant to the insurance plan and its medical policy. After two direct appeals of the denial to the insurance claim administrator, Insured appealed to the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Claims Commission found that the treatment was investigational under the plain language of both the plan and the policy and thus not a covered expense. As the denial of coverage did not amount to a breach of contract, the Claims Commission granted Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

An administrative law judge entered an order of default against Appellant for failing to appear at a resetting of his contested case hearing on a civil asset forfeiture. On appeal, the Commissioner’s Designee for the Department of Safety and Homeland Security affirmed the administrative law judge’s entry of default, denying Appellant’s request to set aside the same order. Appellant appealed the Commissioner Designee’s decision to the Chancery Court, raising that the administrative officials lacked authority to default his case because they did not swear an oath of office commensurate with that sworn by judicial branch judges of the Tennessee state judiciary. The Chancery Court affirmed the administrative officials’ decisions. Appellant appealed to this court. We affirm.

Father was held in criminal contempt for withholding visitation from Grandmother.  The trial court found 28 counts of contempt and imposed a sentence of 280 days.  The trial court also revoked the suspension of a prior 100-day sentence and ordered that sentence to be served consecutively to the 280 days.  We conclude that because the visitation was withheld while an order of protection prohibiting contact between the child and Grandmother was in place, the trial court’s findings and the evidence presented are insufficient to support a finding that Father acted willfully. Accordingly, we reverse the finding of contempt and the revocation of the suspended sentence. 

William Joseph Robinette and his daughters, Delores Reynolds and Jody Stewart, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Sullivan County Chancery Court (“the Trial Court”), seeking a declaration of their rights as the lawful owners of Fuller Enterprises, LLC against the right of ownership by Tina Robinette (“Widow”), the widow of Mr. Robinette’s son and Ms. Reynolds and Ms. Stewart’s brother, Will Robinette (“Decedent”). Plaintiffs later added Decedent’s estate and Fuller Asphalt Material, LLC, as additional defendants (collectively with Widow, “Defendants”). Widow filed abusive civil action (“ACA”) motions against Plaintiffs, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a divorce action filed by the appellee/husband. Following a course of inaction by the appellant/wife, the trial court granted a final decree of divorce by default in favor of the husband. The wife filed multiple motions seeking to have the trial court alter or amend the final decree. The trial court ultimately granted in part, and denied in part, wife’s post-judgment motions. The appellant appeals the ultimate judgment of the trial court. Having determined that the appellant’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that her issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed. Additionally, the appellee requests his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to find this appeal frivolous and further decline to award appellee his attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal.

A business sought a special use permit from the City of Memphis to operate a used car lot. At a meeting of the city council, the council voted to remand the business’s application back to the local land use control board. At the next meeting, the council reconsidered the application and denied it. The business filed a writ of certiorari challenging the denial, alleging due process violations and stating that the council failed to follow its rules of procedure. The trial court found that no due process right applied and that the council had properly followed its rules of procedure. We affirm.