APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother and Father were divorced in 2007 and granted joint custody of their then-six year old child. Mother filed a petition for modification in which she asked to be named the primary residential parent because the joint arrangement was not working for the parties and was not in Child’s best interest. Trial court granted Mother’s petition to be named primary residential parent, but directed that major decisions for Child should be made jointly. Father appealed, arguing that trial court erred in finding material change of circumstances had occurred since the initial parenting plan was entered and that the comparative fitness analysis favored Mother as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed trial court’s judgment regarding major decision making. We affirm trial court’s judgment modifying the parenting plan to name Mother the primary residential parent and amend the plan to have Mother make major decisions for Child rather than both Mother and Father jointly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Mother’s attorney fees but award her reasonable fees incurred on appeal.

The Circuit Court dismissed this appeal from General Sessions Court based on the Appellant’s failure to file a surety bond. Appellant paid costs in the General Sessions Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i), but did not submit a surety bond under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-5-103. The circuit court held that failure to post the surety bond under Section 27-5-103 resulted in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. Based on this Court’s holding in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, L.L.C., No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Here we have yet another case from Shelby County involving the bond requirements for an appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. This Court squarely addressed this issue in University Partners Development v. Bliss, No. M2008-00020-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112571 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Jan. 14, 2009), a memorandum opinion, and we addressed it again in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 provides that “the person appealing shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the oath for poor persons.” In both Jacob and University Partners, we held that the statute is unambiguous, and that an appellant who seeks to appeal from general sessions court to circuit court cannot satisfy the bond requirements of the statute by merely remitting payment of an initial filing fee. Payment of the initial filing fee, we explained, simply does not constitute giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in both Jacob and University Partners. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney General reached the same result. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-23 (Feb. 23, 2012).

Respondent utility district commissioners appeal the trial court’s determination that a ground for removal from office added to Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-82-307(b)(2), as amended effective June 2009, may be applied retrospectively to acts occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment to remove them from office. They also appeal the trial court’s determination that the additional ground for removal of commissioners, “failing to fulfill the commissioner’s or commissioners’ fiduciary responsibility in the operation or oversight of the district,” is not unconstitutionally vague. We reverse retrospective application of the additional ground for removal contained in the statute, as amended; hold that the statute is not void for vagueness; and remand.

In this appeal we must determine whether an injured worker was an “employee” or a
“temporary worker” within the meaning of a commercial general liability insurance policy.
The policy excludes coverage for injuries to the insureds’ employees, but it covers injuries
to “temporary workers” who are not employees, as that term is defined in the policy. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the worker upon concluding that he was a
“temporary worker,” and therefore covered under the policy, and it denied the insurer’s
motion for summary judgment. We find that the worker was not a “temporary worker” as
that term is defined by the insurance policy. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the
worker’s motion for summary judgment and denying the insurer’s motion. We reverse and
remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to the insurer.

In this appeal we are asked to construe the scope of the Tennessee Lemon Law and to determine whether it applies to Plaintiff’s vehicle. For the following reasons,we find the law applicable to vehicles with a “gross vehicle weight” of 10,000 pounds or less, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Plaintiff is entitled to protection and relief thereunder.

This dispute arises from a fire that destroyed six adjoining buildings in 1997. The buildings were located along a single city block, running north to south, in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant owned the second building, sandwiched between one building to the north, owned by one of the Plaintiffs, and the four remaining buildings to the south, owned by the other Plaintiff. Approximately one month before the fire, a substantial portion of the second and third buildings collapsed, damaging all six buildings, and compromising the structural integrity of each building. Due to safety concerns, the parties were ordered not to enter the buildings and were required to ensure that their buildings were inaccessible to the public. The parties complied with the orders. Shortly thereafter, a trespasser entered the Defendant’s building and started a fire which spread to each of the adjoining buildings resulting in substantial damage. Plaintiffs filed negligence actions against the Defendant and argued that she was liable to them for their property damage caused by the criminal acts of the trespasser. Following a trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant based on its conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any of the requisite elements of their negligence claims. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

The trial court granted Mother’s petition to waive mediation and modify custody, and modified the parties’ parenting schedule upon finding a material change of circumstance. We affirm.

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Lessor and Lessee executed a lease agreement that gave Lessee an option to purchase the rented property during a two-year period. A purchase and sale agreement was executed the same day outlining the terms of the sale if the option were exercised. Lessee did not exercise the option during the period specified, and Lessor sued the Lessee for breaching the purchase and sale agreement. Lessee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Lessor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. Because Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property, the purchase and sale agreement did not become operative.
 

This appeal arises from a dispute over the calculation of jail time credits. Henry J. Nagorny (“Nagorny”), an incarcerated individual, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to compel Sheriff Scott Layel to award him jail behavior credits that allegedly were due him. The Trial Court dismissed Nagorny’s petition sua sponte, stating that the calculation of credits is an administrative matter. Nagorny filed this appeal. We hold that the Trial Court, stating no compelling substantive basis for its decision, erred in dismissing Nagorny’s petition sua sponte. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for proceedings consistent with our Opinion.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on several grounds and determined that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.
 

Plaintiff filed a complaint against a hospital in which she asserted claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. She later amended her complaint to add a party and did not contemporaneously file a certificate of good faith. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We affirm the trial court.
 

Wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony in 2004 that was to terminate in 2012. In 2009 Wife filed a petition to increase the duration and amount of her alimony, or, in the alternative, for an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court found Wife was in need of support, but it denied Wife’s petition, finding Wife had not used all reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself. On appeal we find Wife’s inability to be rehabilitated as that term has been defined by the legislature warrants a modification of Wife’s alimony award. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s petition for alimony and conclude Wife is entitled to alimony in futuro but in a lesser amount. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s request for attorney’s fees.
 

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of property, specifically the appreciation in value of farm property he owned in his own name prior to the marriage as marital property and of a life insurance policy owned by Wife as her separate property. Finding that the court erred in its classification of the increase in value of the farm property, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.
 

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

We granted Robert Ledford Funeral Home, Inc.’s (“the Funeral Home”) application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to consider the issue of whether the Funeral Home was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that its “on call” employee, Johnny Tipton, was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home when the vehicle accident causing injuries to the plaintiffs occurred. We find and hold that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mr. Tipton was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home, and that the Funeral Home is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

In this dispute concerning a real estate sale contract, we have concluded that the gravamen of the action is for injury to property and that, under the applicable legal principles, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding as to when the statute of limitations began to run. Because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

Andrew Spencer (“Plaintiff”) sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Railroad”) for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that the Railroad was not at fault for Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff appeals raising an issue regarding jury instructions concerning foreseeability and notice. We find that the jury instruction regarding foreseeability and notice was misleading, and we vacate and remand for a new trial.

Mother appeals the designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ two minor children and the parenting schedule which gave Father substantially more parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision which was primarily based on the importance of continuity in the children’s lives. As for the parenting schedule, which awards Father 245 days and Mother only 120 days a year, we find that the evidence preponderates against such a disparity of parenting time; therefore, we reverse the parenting schedule and remand this issue for the trial court to adopt a revised parenting schedule that permits each parent to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the children’s lives that is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a).

Following a trial where Plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages, Defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial based on juror misconduct. Defendants alleged the jurors arrived at the punitive damages amount using a quotient, or gambling, verdict. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for a new trial and Defendants appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the jurors’ affidavits indicate that not all jurors agreed in advance to be bound by the mathematical process involved in arriving at a quotient verdict.

The plaintiff, an attorney representing himself, filed this action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Metro Clerk in her official capacity, and the Director of the Metro Department of Parks and Recreation Services in his official capacity. He asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that arises from him being prohibited from speaking on behalf of his clients at two separate meetings of the Board of the Metro Department of Parks and Recreation, because he failed to give timely notice to the Board. He alleges the defendants deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee constitution and seeks nominal damages for the alleged deprivation of his rights. He also seeks a declaratory judgment that the Parks’ Board rule requiring fourteen days’ notice to be heard at a Board meeting is invalid. We have determined, as the trial court did, that the plaintiff’s claims related to the first Board meeting are time-barred. As for the claims related to the second Board meeting, we have determined that the plaintiff’s rights were not violated because the plaintiff had actual notice of the Board policy requiring fourteen days’ notice well in advance of the second meeting. Finally, we have determined the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment because he failed to demonstrate that he is seeking to vindicate an existing right under presently existing facts. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims. We affirm.

Father in child custody and support proceeding appeals the trial court’s findings: (1) that he was in criminal contempt of court; (2) that he was in civil contempt of court and setting the amount necessary to purge himself of contempt; (3) in suspending his parenting time; (4) modifying his child support obligation; and (5) ordering him to pay Mother’s attorney fees. We have determined that the finding of criminal contempt, the order modifying his child support obligation, and the order that Father pay Mother’s attorney fees should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings in connection therewith. In all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A painting contractor filed a complaint against Nashville’s Metropolitan Housing and Development Agency (MDHA) alleging that the agency had violated its own rules by failing to choose him as the lowest bidder on a painting contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because an administrative decision, such as the award of a painting contract, can only be challenged through a petition for writ of certiorari, and the contractor had filed his complaint after the sixty day time limit for filing the writ had passed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. We affirm.