APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

This case involves a protracted and contentious child support action, which began when
the State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition for child support in
2005 against the father for financial support of the parties’ minor son. Over the years, the
parties filed numerous petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt
for failure to pay medical and other expenses, petitions for changes in visitation for the
child, objections to the appointment of magistrates by the juvenile court judge, and requests
to rehear many of the motions and petitions. The trial court addressed each of these
motions and pleadings as they were filed. On September 1, 2020, a magistrate judge
entered an order ruling on all of the mother’s outstanding motions for rehearing in the case
but reserved the mother’s outstanding petition for contempt against the father for failure to
pay the child’s medical and dental expenses and the mother’s petition for rehearing of a
motion to modify child support. Those matters were set for hearing on November 24, 2020,
before a special judge. At that time, the Tennessee Supreme Court had issued a standing
order that all in-person hearings and trials were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic;
therefore, the November 24, 2020 hearing was set to be heard remotely via “Zoom”
technology. The mother objected to the virtual hearing on grounds that the notice was
insufficient and accordingly sought a stay of the pending matters via a motion filed on
November 23, 2020. Neither party appeared for the Zoom hearing on November 24, 2020,
and the special judge dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The mother then filed
a motion for rehearing and a motion to alter or amend the judgment, both of which were
heard and denied by the special judge. The mother has appealed the trial court’s dismissal
of the child support action. The father has not appeared or filed a responsive brief. Upon
thorough review of the record and consideration of the issues raised by the mother on
appeal, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

A defendant employer appeals the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in this action alleging breach of a plaintiff nurse’s employment contract. We conclude that the contract language is unambiguous and that partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was properly granted. Accordingly, we affirm.

This case arises from a protracted and contentious child support action, which began in
2005 with a petition for child support filed on behalf of the mother seeking child support
assistance from the father for care of the parties’ minor son. Over the years, the parties
filed numerous petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt for
failure to pay medical and other expenses, petitions for changes in visitation with the child,
objections to the appointment of magistrates by the juvenile court judge, and requests to
rehear many of the motions and petitions. All pending matters were ultimately dismissed
for failure to prosecute in an order entered December 1, 2020.1 This appeal arises from
two petitions filed by the mother after the dismissal for failure to prosecute. The first was
a petition for contempt against the father for failure to pay medical and dental expenses for
the child and failure to pay the full child support amount, and the second was a petition
seeking payment of extraordinary expenses for the child related to his senior year of high
school and an extension of the father’s child support obligations until the child reached the
age of twenty-one. Upon thorough review of the record and consideration of the issues
raised by the mother on appeal, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a petition to access public records filed against a private entity. David L. Hudson, Jr. (“Hudson”) and Public.Resource.Org filed a petition against Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a division of LexisNexis Group (“Lexis”), in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (“the TPRA”) seeking access to and a copy of the complete and current electronic version of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the TCA.”).1 The Tennessee Code Commission (“the Commission”) intervened on Lexis’s side in part to protect the state’s alleged copyright interest in the TCA. The Trial Court held that the TCA is exempt from disclosure because Tennessee law provides a separate avenue for publication of the TCA. In addition to its dispositive ruling, the Trial Court held that Lexis operates as the functional equivalent of a governmental entity, and that the TCA is disqualified from copyright protection. Hudson appeals. Lexis and the Commission raise issues as well. We hold, inter alia, that Lexis is a private company performing specific services for the state on a contractual basis. It has not assumed responsibility for public functions to such an extent as to become the functional equivalent of a governmental entity. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment in that respect. Otherwise, we affirm.

I would also affirm the dismissal of the petition for access to public records and to obtain judicial review of denial of access. But I would do so only “on the threshold issue” identified by the trial court. The trial court framed the issue as “whether Tennessee Code Annotated constitutes a document required for public access under the Public Records Act.” On that threshold issue, I reach the same conclusion as the trial court and the majority. State law otherwise provides for access to Tennessee Code Annotated, so Tennessee Code Annotated is not a “state record” subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2023) (making all state records “open for personal inspection by any citizen of this state . . . unless otherwise provided by state law”); see also Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 485 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tenn. 2016) (recognizing Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7- 503(a)(2)(A) as “a general exception to the Public Records Act, based on state law”). The trial court recognized that resolving the threshold issue was “dispositive, making it unnecessary to decide the other two defenses asserted.” Yet, “in the interest of avoiding a time-consuming and expensive remand” in the event of a reversal on the threshold issue, it also ruled on the other defenses.

This appeal concerns a petition to modify alimony. Gerald Edward Baker (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against his ex-wife Kim Covarrubias (“Respondent”) seeking to modify his alimony obligation as a result of a massive post-retirement drop in his income. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order declining to modify Petitioner’s alimony obligation despite having found that Petitioner was credible; that his decision to retire was objectively reasonable; and that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred. Petitioner appeals. We find, inter alia, that the Trial Court erred by failing to account for Petitioner’s ability to pay in light of all of his expenses. The Trial Court’s decision lacked a factual basis properly supported by evidence in the record; was not based on the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision; and was not within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. Thus, the Trial Court abused its discretion. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to modify Petitioner’s alimony obligation.

This post-divorce action concerns the trial court’s order finding the husband in civil
contempt based on his failure to pay alimony to the wife and to maintain security for his
alimony obligation as ordered. The trial court entered an order on April 29, 2022, finding
the husband in contempt and assigning a punishment. Husband did not file a notice of
appeal, or a specified motion tolling the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.01, within thirty days of entry of the contempt
order. As such, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the husband’s
issues concerning interpretation or alteration of the April 29, 2022 contempt order as
sought in his untimely motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 52.02
and 59.04. To the extent that the trial court denied relief to the husband pursuant to his
motion based on Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, we find no abuse of discretion
and affirm that ruling. We award to the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on
appeal, and we remand this issue to the trial court for determination of a reasonable
amount of attorney’s fees incurred by the wife in defending against the husband’s appeal.

In this ongoing divorce litigation, the father filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial
court’s denial of his motions to recuse the trial judge. Having reviewed father’s petition
under the required de novo standard, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

A mother sought to terminate the parental rights of her child’s father pursuant to the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support.  At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court concluded that the mother failed to prove any termination grounds by clear and convincing evidence and dismissed her termination petition.  Determining that the mother lacked standing to seek termination of the father’s parental rights pursuant to those grounds, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the termination petition.

In this matter, the petitioner seeks a reversal of the trial court’s decision not to recuse itself. Due to the failure of the petitioner to meet the mandatory requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2.03, this appeal is dismissed and the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

The Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, alleging sexual harassment by her supervisor and claiming constructive discharge. The Employer moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in the Plaintiff’s employment agreement. The Plaintiff responded by invoking the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, which the trial court concluded invalidates the mandatory arbitration provision. We reverse the trial court’s decision because the harassment of the Plaintiff and her constructive discharge occurred prior to the effective date of the Act.

The parents of a child brought suit to personally recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress in relation to sexual abuse of their child that had been perpetrated by the
defendant church’s former paid volunteer coordinator. The church filed a motion to
dismiss the parents’ claims and argued that the parents’ attempt to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress was not legally cognizable because the parents did not
perceive any injury-producing event. The trial court countenanced this position and
entered an order dismissing the parents’ claims. The parents then filed a motion seeking
relief from the dismissal order and, alternatively, to amend their complaint. The trial court
ultimately denied the parents’ motion, following which the present appeal ensued. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination existed as to the mother: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistent conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The juvenile court also found that the termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

A homeowner, displeased with the work performed by a handyman, brought suit, seeking
damages and relief under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The handyman
counterclaimed for the value of the oral contract for services, asserting the homeowner
breached the contract by improperly terminating it. The circuit court denied relief to both
parties, and the parties appeal. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining
that there was no enforceable contract, precluding relief for the handyman. Likewise, the
homeowner is not entitled to relief because the evidence does not preponderate against the
circuit court’s finding that there was no misrepresentation and that the handyman rendered
services to earn certain prepaid amounts. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

This appeal arises from a Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Martin Walker (“Petitioner”), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Petitioner seeks review of the decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“Board”) to deny him parole. He raises numerous challenges to the propriety of the Board’s action and procedures. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her two children. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that six grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the mother’s parental rights were terminated. The mother appeals. Of the six grounds the juvenile court found had been proven, we affirm four of them but reverse two. We also affirm the determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of her parental rights.

Neighbors sued to invalidate zoning ordinances that would allow two real estate development projects to be built at significantly taller heights than prior zoning regulations allowed. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim in part because it found that the passage of two zoning ordinances gave the developers vested property rights under the Tennessee Vested Property Rights Act of 2014 (VPRA). We conclude the trial court erred in its application of the VPRA, but we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim.

This is an appeal from a case arising in the Shelby County General Sessions Environmental Court. For the reasons stated herein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review this appeal. Moreover, we are unable to transfer this appeal because it was not timely filed for the appropriate court that has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it is, therefore, dismissed.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on four grounds. The Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services does not defend two of the four grounds, so we reverse
as to those grounds. We affirm the ground that Mother is unable to parent the children due
to her present mental condition. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient
findings of fact, we vacate the trial court’s findings that the mother failed to manifest a
willingness and ability to parent and that termination is in the children’s best interests.

Father appeals the trial court’s finding of abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination of his parental rights, as well as its finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

The Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim after falling off his own ladder while at the Defendant’s residence. The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing he had no duty to warn and could avoid liability under principles of comparative fault. The Plaintiff countered that the Defendant was actually his employer and that the Defendant’s decision not to provide workers’ compensation insurance prevented the Defendant from being able to raise a comparative fault defense. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant did have a duty to warn. The trial court granted the Defendant summary judgment finding no duty to warn and that even if a duty existed that Plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law based upon comparative fault principles. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We affirm.

The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed appellant’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this divorce action, the court limited Wife’s proof at trial as a sanction for her failure to respond to pre-trial discovery. After the trial, the court granted the parties an absolute divorce, equitably divided the marital estate, adopted a permanent parenting plan for their minor children, and declined to award Wife spousal support. Wife argues that the court erred in limiting her proof at trial, dividing the marital estate, and denying her request for spousal support. Discerning no abuse of discretion in these decisions, we affirm.