APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan. The trial court found a material change in circumstances had occurred and it was in the child’s best interest to award custody to the father. Because the evidence does not preponderate against either finding, we affirm.

This case concerns the procedure used by the Tennessee State Board of Equalization when it determined the 2018 appraisal ratio for Shelby County. In 2017, Shelby County real property was reappraised. Accordingly, the Board of Equalization set the County’s 2017 appraisal ratio at 1.000. In 2018, the Board of Equalization used the 2017 reappraisal to set the Shelby County 2018 appraisal ratio at 1.000. Appellants—owners of commercial tangible personal property in Shelby County—challenged the Board’s methodology as violative of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 and unsupported by substantial and material evidence. Following review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the trial court determined that: (1) the Board did not violate Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 when it set the County’s appraisal ratio at 1.000 in 2018; (2) the Board’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence; and (3) the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This lawsuit arises from a real property/boundary dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants. The trial court found that a prior circuit court condemnation judgment vesting title to the Knoxville Community Development Corporation “bars the claim of [the plaintiff] as an impermissible collateral attack upon the condemnation judgment.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the condemnation judgment barred the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim against the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court for Meigs
County, arguments of counsel, and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon
consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is no reversible error in the
trial court’s judgment.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s finding of contempt against the father for his failure to pay child support and the court’s calculation of his support arrearage owed. We affirm.

In this health care liability action, the trial court granted summary judgment to the appellee
surgeon based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and the appellant patient’s
failure to show evidence of causation and damages. On appeal, we conclude that (1) there
is a genuine dispute of material fact as to when the appellant’s cause of action accrued; (2)
the trial court did not specifically rule on the propriety of appellant’s pre-suit notice; and
(3) there are genuine disputes of material facts as to the causation and damages elements
of the appellant’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings.

Appellants, Amelia Vaughn and Gemelia Johnson appeal the March 3, 2023 order of the
Shelby County Probate Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is
dismissed.

This appeal concerns an order of dismissal entered by the Tennessee Claims Commission. Though Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal, this Court is unable to review any of the issues due to Appellant’s noncompliance with applicable appellate briefing requirements. Because all of Appellant’s issues on appeal have been waived due to his failure to comply with the appellate briefing requirements, we affirm the judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission.

This case involves an election contest filed by the plaintiff based on the defendant’s residency eligibility for the office of Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant had complied with article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution because the clause required, inter alia, that he be a resident within the judicial district, not necessarily within the city limits, to preside over the municipal court, which has concurrent jurisdiction with a general sessions court. The
plaintiff has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the language of article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requiring a judge elected to an inferior court to have been a resident of the “district or circuit” to which he or she is assigned means, under these circumstances, that the Lenoir City Municipal Judge must have been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the judge’s election because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General
Sessions Court. Accordingly, inasmuch as the defendant had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the election, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s election contest. However, we modify the trial court’s judgment to state that the defendant complied with the residency requirement at issue because he had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year rather than because he had been a resident of the Ninth Judicial District for the prescribed time period.

Because the circuit court orders from which the appellant has sought to appeal do not
constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal involves a contract for the removal of a tree. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant tree company. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. This appeal arises
from a civil action in which the plaintiff has brought claims of fraud and civil conspiracy
against his former counsel in a criminal case that resulted in a conviction and his counsel
in a pending post-conviction case. While this civil action was pending, the trial court
allowed the attorneys who were representing the plaintiff in the post-conviction case to
withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a recusal motion, contending that the trial
judge should be recused because he showed bias in favor of the plaintiff’s post-conviction
attorneys when he granted their motions to withdraw without a hearing, during which the
plaintiff wished to share his grievances about the attorneys. The trial court denied the
plaintiff’s recusal motion, and this Rule 10B appeal followed. We have concluded that
neither the legal grounds nor the evidence that the plaintiff relies upon in his affidavit in
support of the recusal motion are sufficient to prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to
reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
denying the motion for recusal is affirmed.

This is an appeal from a divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Donna Booker (“Wife”) and Mike Booker (“Husband”) married for the first time in 1993 and divorced in 1998. They remarried shortly thereafter in February of 1999. The day of their second wedding, Husband and Wife executed a prenuptial agreement addressing Husband’s interest in his family’s steel erection business. Wife filed the current divorce action in the trial court in February of 2020, and a trial was held May 3 and 4, 2022, and July 6, 2022. The trial court ordered the parties divorced, divided the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro. Finding that the prenuptial agreement was valid, the trial court determined that Husband’s interest in his family business was separate property. Wife appeals. Following thorough review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns an inmate’s lawsuit over injuries he sustained from falling off a top
bunk bed in prison. Jody Higgins (“Plaintiff”) was an inmate at Silverdale Detention
Facility (“Silverdale”). CoreCivic, Inc. operated Silverdale through a contract with
Hamilton County. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC (the two CoreCivic entities together,
“CoreCivic”) employed security at Silverdale. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”)
provided medical treatment to Silverdale inmates through a contract with CoreCivic.
Plaintiff sued CoreCivic, CCS, and Hamilton County (“Defendants,” collectively) in the
Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) asserting health care liability and
other claims. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court
granted based in part on a lack of expert proof. Plaintiff appeals. He argues among other
things that it is common knowledge that Plaintiff, who suffers from seizures, should have
been given a bottom bunk pass and anti-seizure medication. We hold, inter alia, that
Plaintiff failed to present competent, admissible expert proof in support of his health care
liability claim at the summary judgment stage, and that the issues of this case do not fall
under the common knowledge exception. Plaintiff’s other claims are barred by the statute
of limitations. We affirm.

Jason M. Peterson (“Plaintiff”) was the passenger in a vehicle driven by Jodi L. Carey
(“Defendant”) at the time of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff filed a personal injury
action against Defendant more than one year after the accident. Plaintiff argues that
Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of limitations for his
action to two years because Defendant was cited for the violation of a traffic ordinance
contained in the Kingsport Municipal Code in relation to the accident. The Circuit Court
for Sullivan County (“trial court”) applied the one-year statute of limitations set forth in
section 28-3-104(a)(1) and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Finding no
error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse the trial court’s finding on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans because the initial permanency plan does not appear in the record, but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

The plaintiff, John H. Packard, IV (“Plaintiff”) was struck by a vehicle driven by Jonathan
R. Bentley while Plaintiff attempted to walk across a roadway in Gatlinburg, Tennessee.
Plaintiff brought a suit arising in negligence against a number of parties, including the City
of Gatlinburg (“City”). As to City, Plaintiff alleged that it created an unreasonably
dangerous risk of harm to pedestrians attempting to use the crosswalk because it failed to
inspect and maintain LED lights it had previously installed on a nearby crosswalk sign.
The Circuit Court for Sevier County (“trial court”) granted summary judgment in favor of
City, finding that City negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, that City was
entitled to immunity pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
(“GTLA”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101 et seq., and that City was also
immune pursuant to the public duty doctrine. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

A mother appeals from the judgment holding her in criminal contempt of court, denying her motion to dissolve an ex parte no-contact order entered against her, and denying her motion to transfer the case to another county. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment. Due to the passage of time and the position taken by the parties and by the trial court when issuing its ruling, we remand for a new evidentiary hearing on the ex parte order suspending the mother’s contact with the children.

The plaintiffs filed this breach of contract action against their homeowners association for failure to rectify alleged violations of the neighborhood restrictions. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the issues complained of were actual violations of the restrictions. The trial court dismissed the action in favor of the homeowners association and the plaintiffs’ neighbors who joined as interested parties. We affirm.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellant seeks to appeal from the denial of three separate motions to recuse the trial judge. As to the first motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion on the basis of Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. As the second and third recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal, as no effective order denying those motions has yet been entered by the trial court.

This appeal arises from a forfeiture action regarding funds seized during a traffic stop. In
a prior appeal, this Court vacated and remanded for entry of an order that complied with
Rule 58 and Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court entered
an additional order on remand, and the appellant has again appealed. Due to deficiencies
in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of his issue on
appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

After a long-term marriage, the parties divorced. The trial court, which found the husband’s testimony not to be credible, set the value of the marital property, divided the marital property, and awarded alimony in futuro to the wife.  The husband appeals, challenging the credibility finding, the trial court’s valuation of the marital property, the division of property, and the alimony award.  We affirm the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the marital property, but we vacate the trial court’s alimony award, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this breach of implied warranty of good workmanship and materials case, the trial court awarded Appellee $77,494.36 in damages. Although the parties agree that the proper measure of damages is the cost to repair the defects, the parties dispute the method of repair and its cost. In determining Appellee’s damages, the trial court relied on testimony from Appellee’s expert contractor. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. The parties’ respective requests for appellate attorney’s fees are denied.

This appeal arises from a petition filed by a beneficiary of a trust seeking an accounting and removal of the trustee. The trustee asserted the affirmative defense that the beneficiary violated the no-contest clause in the settlor’s trust. The trustee served the beneficiary with requests for admissions, to which the beneficiary responded with objections to the majority of the requests. After the trial court granted his motion for the requests for admissions to be admitted, the trustee filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the no-contest clauses in the trust and will of the settlor. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the beneficiary’s petition with prejudice. The beneficiary appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a health care liability action filed in circuit court by a conservator
on behalf of a ward. After a three-week jury trial resulted in a mistrial, the conservator
took a nonsuit. The conservator refiled the complaint against only one defendant hospital,
asserting that it was vicariously liable for the actions of a doctor based on a theory of
apparent agency. The defendant hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the conservator had entered into a consent agreement agreeing not to sue the doctor in the
refiled suit if the doctor agreed to withdraw his motion for discretionary costs. According
to the defendant hospital, this agreement releasing the alleged agent from liability
extinguished the conservator’s right to pursue a vicarious liability claim against the
principal. In response, the conservator took the position that the consent agreement was
not binding because it was never approved by the probate court that appointed her. The
circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant hospital, finding that the order
appointing the conservator authorized her to dispose of property, execute instruments, enter
into contracts, pursue legal causes of action, and manage money, thereby authorizing her
to enter into the consent agreement. The circuit court found nothing in the order of
appointment, the relevant statutes, or caselaw that would impose a mandatory requirement
for approval of the settlement by the probate court. Because the conservator had released
the alleged agent from liability, the circuit court found that the conservator could not pursue
vicarious liability claims against the defendant hospital. The conservator filed a motion to
alter or amend, asking the circuit court to consider an “Advisory Opinion” of the probate
court on the matter. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that it respectfully
disagreed with the Advisory Opinion of the probate court. The conservator appeals. We
affirm and remand for further proceedings.