APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is the second time this case, filed by John P. Konvalinka ("the Petitioner") to force disclosure of public documents, has been before us. In the trial court's order that generated the first appeal, the court held that the records the petitioner requested from Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority ("the Hospital" or "Erlanger") were exempt from disclosure under state law, and pretermitted the question of whether they were exempt from disclosure under federal law. On appeal, we held that the records were not protected from disclosure by state law and remanded for a determination of whether they were protected from disclosure by federal law. The Hospital attempted on remand to assert additional state law defenses to disclosure. The trial court held that the new state law defenses were outside the scope of the remand. It also held that federal law did not protect the documents at issue from disclosure. Accordingly, it ordered the Hospital to produce the documents. The Hospital appeals challenging both aspects of the trial court's judgment. We affirm.

I concur in the decision to vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. I agree that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) controls the outcome of this appeal. I further agree that the issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs intentionally caused the delay in the prompt service of the summons. I further agree that the record before us shows that Plaintiffs did make at least some attempts to serve Defendant. This being so, I agree that Defendant did not meet her burden of showing that Plaintiffs intentionally delayed service of the summons.

This case was precipitated when defendants blocked plaintiffs' use of an existing driveway. Plaintiffs brought this action for a declaratory judgment and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to use the driveway and that defendants would be required to restore the driveway as well as the excavations damaging plaintiffs' lots. On appeal, we affirm.

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a gravel drive running through their property is a private easement rather than a public road. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the drive is a public road. Finding this case inappropriate for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits.

Carter County -Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., and Bonnie K. Hakey (collectively "the plaintiffs") filed suit against Jennifer L. Lund ("the defendant") seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a April 22, 2005, multiple-vehicle accident in Carter County. With her answer, the defendant coupled a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 "on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process." Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with prejudice finding "that the plaintiffs have not provided to the Court any valid reason for the delay in obtaining prompt service of process upon the defendant." Plaintiffs appeal. We (1) vacate the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and (2) remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, the trial court awarded Dawn Lyn Tousignant Gordon ("Wife") 59% of the marital estate, or approximately $231,100. It also ordered Robert Frank Gordon ("Husband") to pay Wife "permanent spousal support" of $2,200 per month. Husband appeals and challenges both the division of marital property and the court's award of alimony in futuro. We modify the trial court's division of marital property and its award of alimony. As modified, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Father appeals the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion to void an order appointing a parenting coordinator. We find that the appeal is now moot.

Plaintiff, a nurse practitioner formerly employed by a staffing service and supplied to a hospital emergency department, sued the hospital for retaliatory discharge under Tennessee common law and the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-1-304. The hospital moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The trial court found Husband guilty of two counts of criminal contempt for violation of a court order. Husband appeals the findings of contempt on the ground that he did not receive proper notice. The trial court dismissed a third count of criminal contempt without prejudice and allowed Wife to re-file her claim so as to provide Husband with proper notice. We affirm the court's two findings of contempt and reverse its dismissal of the third count of contempt, finding that Husband was given sufficient notice. We remand the matter to the court for a determination of whether Husband violated the order.

The defendant was found in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and sentenced to serve 180 days in jail unless she purged her contempt with the payment of $2,200. Finding the evidence inadequate to support a finding that the defendant had the ability to pay child support when it was due or that she had the ability to pay $2,200 at the time of the hearing in order to purge the sentence, we reverse.

This is a divorce action. Wife asserts the trial court erred by not granting her a new trial, by declaring the parties divorced rather than awarding the divorce to her, and in its division of property, award of alimony, and by not naming her the primary residential parent and setting child support accordingly. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of a disciplinary conviction. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and a certified copy of the record of the disciplinary proceedings was filed with the trial court. The respondents then filed a motion for judgment on the record. After review of the parties' briefs and the administrative record, the trial court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the record. The petitioner inmate appeals. We affirm, concluding that material evidence supported the conviction, and that the petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated.

Plaintiff insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine which of the two policies issued to defendants insured and their corporation, covered a van which had been involved in an accident. Plaintiff named the insureds as defendants, as well as the third party who had filed a tort action against the insureds for personal injuries. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the insureds had told the agency plaintiff to keep the van in dispute on the commercial policy, but it had transferred the van to the insureds' personal policy. The court further ruled that a notice of the transfer was sent to the insureds by plaintiff, and plaintiff sent at least five bills to the insureds that reflected the van was then insured under the personal policy and not the commercial policy. The court concluded that the insureds ratified the change and ruled that the van was insured under the insureds personal policy. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss the action.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The appellee, Tennessee Department of Children's Services, has filed a motion to dismiss based upon its assertion that the Court "lacks jurisdiction to consider [the appellant's] appeal." We agree with the appellee. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs taxed to the appellant, Mark J.T.

We agreed to hear this extraordinary appeal in order to decide whether the proper venue for a case involving the breach of a construction contract is in the county named in the forum selection clause of the contract, or in the county where the realty is located upon which the construction took place. We hold that the forum selection clause determines the proper venue, because the underlying action cannot fairly be characterized as an action for injury to real property and is, thus, a transitory action.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services concedes that it did not prove the grounds for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. We likewise find that procedural errors were committed by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is vacated.

Plaintiff insurer of insured brought this action as a subrogee of the insureds, who had been paid under plaintiff's policy for a fire loss to their home. The insureds had employed a roofer to replace their roof, whose subcontractor caused the fire which destroyed the home. Plaintiff brought this action to recover from defendant roofer who filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court ruled defendant could not be held liable in tort for the negligent acts of his subcontractor under the facts of this case, and plaintiff could not recover under the theory of contract, because plaintiff could not show that the loss was caused by the contractual services or foreseeable. On appeal, we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate, because under contract law the defendant had a non-delegable duty to see that the work he was contractually obligated to perform was done in a careful, skillful and workmanlike manner. The case is remanded with instructions to proceed in accordance with this Opinion.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant for an unpaid debt. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted plaintiff's summary judgment and denied defendant's summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision.

In this divorce case, Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court's division of marital property and denial of her request for alimony. Finding that the trial court correctly valued the dental practice and properly awarded same to Husband/Appellant, we affirm that portion of the trial court's order. However, because the trial court did not specifically determine whether certain debt was separate or marital debt, and, consequently, did not allocate that debt, we vacate the trial court's division of marital property, and remand for a determination of the nature of the marital debt, and division of same. Because the trial court did not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i), we vacate the trial court's denial of alimony, and remand for further proceedings concerning Wife/Appellant's need for alimony, and Husband/Appellee's ability to pay same. Affirmed in part; vacated in part, and remanded.

Julie-Cristie (Barone) Neal ("Step-Daughter") brought an action to quiet title to a nearly three hundred acre farm in Cumberland County, Tennessee, against Veronica Monde Barone ("Ex-Wife") and Anthony F. Barone ("Father"). She primarily asserts that she has acquired adverse possession rights in the entire farm pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103. The disputed property was also the subject of prior litigation in a circuit court proceeding involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment and fraudulent conveyance claims against Father by Ex-Wife as a judgment creditor. In the present action Ex-Wife moved for summary judgment on several theories including the assertion that filing a lien lis pendens barred Step-Daughter's adverse possession claim. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on all grounds. Ex-Wife filed a motion asking the trial court for permission to submit an application for interlocutory appeal on one issue raised on summary judgment _ whether the lien lis pendens tolled the seven-year adverse possession statute found in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103 during the circuit court proceeding. The trial court granted that motion and we likewise granted the application for interlocutory appeal on the asserted issue. We reverse the trial court's judgment on the sole issue presented to us.

This is a fraud claim between ex-spouses. While the petitioner mother and the respondent were dating, the mother became pregnant, and she told the respondent that the child was his. Consequently, she and the respondent married, and the child was born during the marriage. Years later, the parties divorced, and the respondent paid child support to the mother. After several years, the respondent obtained a DNA test, which revealed that he is not the child's biological father. After he told the mother of the test results, she filed a petition requesting a court-ordered paternity test and modification of the parenting plan. The respondent filed a counter-petition, alleging negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation by the mother for falsely representing that he was the child's biological father. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the respondent compensatory damages for past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums paid for the child, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and attorney fees. The mother now appeals. We conclude that under Tennessee statutes, the respondent cannot recover the past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums, as this would be a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. We find that the remaining damages for emotional distress cannot be awarded for the tort of fraud and misrepresentation, because such damages are non-pecuniary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

Bethany (Bumgarner) Schroedel ("Mother") and Timothy Adam Bumgarner ("Father") are the divorced parents of one minor child ("the Child"). In October of 2007, Mother filed a petition alleging, among other things, that Father was refusing to allow Mother her visitation with the Child. Mother's petition sought, in part, to modify the parenting plan to name Mother as the Child's primary residential parent. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order on June 29, 2009 finding and holding that a change of circumstances existed that affected the Child's well-being in a meaningful way, but not one sufficient to justify a change in primary residential custody. The trial court's June 29, 2009 order did modify the parenting plan to allow Mother greater visitation. Mother appeals to this Court raising an issue regarding the trial court's refusal to change primary residential custody, and an issuec regarding the trial court's finding her in contempt. We affirm the trial court's order as to the parenting plan, vacate the trial court's order finding Mother in contempt, and remand for further proceedings in compliance with this Opinion.

This is an interlocutory appeal involving intercounty transfer of post-divorce matters. The divorce was granted in Carroll County, Tennessee. The mother and the parties' minor child reside in Davidson County, Tennessee. The father once resided in Carroll County, but has since moved to Georgia. The father filed a motion in the Carroll County trial court seeking modification of child support, alimony, and the parenting plan. The mother filed a request to transfer the case to Davidson County. The Carroll County trial court granted the transfer as to the child support and parenting plan issues, but denied transfer as to the alimony issues. Both the trial court and the appellate court granted the mother's request for permission for an interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, finding that the entire case must be transferred to Davidson County.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The child at issue was born to teenage parents who never married and have long-term, continuing problems with substance abuse. As a result of his substance abuse, the father has been in and out of prison for much of the child's life. The child has lived with the petitioners, the maternal grandfather and maternal step-grandmother, who filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents and adopt the child. The mother subsequently joined in the petition. After a trial, the trial court terminated the father's parental rights, finding abandonment by, inter alia, engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. The father now appeals. We affirm, finding that the undisputed evidence supports the trial court's finding on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard, and that termination of the father's parental rights is in the child's best interest.

This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion. The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries arising out of a car accident. Several months later, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was not opposed, and was granted. The plaintiff later retained new counsel and filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for relief, commenting that even if the order were set aside, it would nevertheless grant the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court.