APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Property was purchased in Mr. Byrd's name alone, but Ms. Wyatt contends that partnership/joint venture profits were used to secure the purchase, such that she is entitled to an interest in the property. We find that, to the extent that partnership profits were used towards earnest money and closing costs, Ms. Wyatt is presumed to have an interest in the property. We vacate the trial court's dismissal order and we remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding whether R & J Remodeling profits were expended towards earnest money and closing costs, and to allow Mr. Byrd an opportunity to rebut the presumption of partnership property.

The order that is the subject of this appeal purports to amend the division of marital property as stated in the final judgment. It was entered in response to a motion filed more than a year after the entry of the final judgment. We have determined the motion was untimely because it did not qualify as a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion; therefore, the order that purports to amend the division of marital property as stated in the final judgment is void. We, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate the order that purports to amend the final judgment.

Husband challenges various rulings of the trial court in this second appeal of the post-divorce proceedings. Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff buyer of land, concluding that defendant seller was liable for rollback taxes pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 67-5-1008(f). We affirm.

After the parties' brief marriage, the trial court awarded Wife $25,000.00 for equity allegedly accrued in the marital residence during the marriage. Finding no contributions by Wife to support a transmutation from separate to marital property, we reverse.

Plaintiffs' action sought the removal of twelve Knox County office holders who had been appointed by the Knox County Commission in violation of the Open Meetings Act, according to plaintiffs' complaint. Another action, independent of plaintiffs' action, sought removal of the office holders on the grounds that the office holders had been appointed in violation of the Open Meetings Act. Plaintiffs were allowed to intervene in the independent case which, following trial, resulted in a finding that the Commission had violated the Open Meetings Act, and the office holders were removed from office. In this case, the trial court held that since plaintiffs had obtained the results that they sought in their action as a result of their intervention that the continuation of this action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs sought and were granted several amendments with their complaint seeking relief on other grounds, but the trial court denied any further relief to plaintiffs' bid. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

Husband appeals the trial court's decision that Wife's payment of taxes, insurance and association dues on houses titled jointly were contributions of separate property to the homes which, under a premarital agreement, entitled her to a credit before Husband could recover appreciation on those homes. The agreement provides for the treatment of a party's contributions of separate property to jointly held property, and we share the trial court's interpretation of those provisions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

In June of 2008, Kelly D. McAlister ("Wife") filed a Petition to Enforce Final Decree against Robert A. McAlister ("Husband") seeking, among other things, to enforce the parties' final decree of divorce entered in June of 2000. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on November 2, 2009 finding and holding, inter alia, that the house at issue shall be sold and the net proceeds divided by the percentages stated in the divorce decree, and that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce using a fraction with the denominator being the number of months worked by Husband when he retires and the numerator being the number of months of the seventeen year marriage with Wife to receive one- half of the calculated amount. Wife appeals to this Court. We affirm as to the division of the house, reverse as to the calculation of the pension based upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce, and order that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon the amount of the pension at the time Husband retires based upon the formula stated in the divorce decree.

On April 10, 2000, William D. Chapman, II ("the Deceased") was involved in a motor vehicle accident. As a result of his injuries, he was admitted to Holston Valley Hospital and Medical Center in Kingsport where he came under the care of trauma surgeons, the defendants, James V. Lewis, M.D., and George M. Testerman, Jr., M.D., as well as other physicians and medical personnel. The plaintiff, Cathy L. Chapman, brought this wrongful death action against the defendants based upon her allegation that they were guilty of medical malpractice in the treatment of her husband; she claims that their malpractice caused the death of the Deceased on April 15, 2000. Following eight days of a jury trial in July 2008, counsel for the parties made their closing arguments. During the defense's argument, counsel for the plaintiff objected when counsel for Dr. Testerman projected on a video screen what purported to be the Q. and A. trial testimony of the plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Philip Witorsch. The trial court overruled the objection and thereafter the jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants. Later, the trial court, acting on the plaintiff's motion, reversed itself and held that the defendants failed to lay a proper foundation for the use of the projected testimony. The court also pointed out that the defendants failed to give the plaintiff prior notice of their intention to use portions of the trial transcript in closing argument. As a consequence, the court granted the plaintiff a new trial. The defendants appeal. We reverse the trial court's grant of a new trial and reinstate the court's judgment in favor of the defendants.

In 2008, Lena Michelle Silvey Rolen ("Mother") sued Charles Martin Wilson ("Father") alleging, in part, that Father had failed to pay child support as ordered. Father responded and filed a counter-claim seeking custody. After a trial, the trial court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Father was in contempt for willful failure to pay child support as ordered, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to justify a change in custody. Mother was awarded a judgment against Father for the child support arrearage, among other things. Father appeals to this Court. Because the record on appeal contains no transcript and no Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c) statement of the evidence, we affirm.

This appeal involves a father's child support and alimony arrearages. The trial court found the father in contempt and sentenced him to ten days in jail, with three days suspended. The court also awarded interest on the alimony and child support arrearages. We affirm in part and reverse and vacate in part.

The father has appealed from the trial court's order naming the mother as the primary residential parent and allowing her to move to Indiana with the parties' minor child. Because the trial court's order does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Employee sued her employer under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, alleging that she was denied a promotion because of her race. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer. We reverse the summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce case, the trial court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and, pursuant to their agreement, divided the bulk of their property. The parties litigated the issue of how the proceeds from the sale of a piece of improved real estate should be distributed. Following a hearing, at which each of the parties testified, the court awarded Delmer Coleman Wyatt ("Husband") $6,500, the stipulated pre-marital value of the unimproved lot, based upon Husband's ownership of the lot before the parties' marriage. It then divided the remaining net proceeds from the sale of the improved property, i.e., $111,376.37, equally between Husband and his wife, Barbara Ann Wyatt ("Wife"). Husband appeals. We affirm.

This is an action to enforce a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for a subdivision. The trial court found the defendant homeowners erected a fence without having obtained proper approval from the Architectural Control Committee, that the fence was in violation of restrictive covenants, and that the fence must be removed. We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that defendants failed to obtain the necessary approval to construct the fence and that the fence is in violation of restrictive covenants; thus, we affirm.

Stoneybrook Golf Course, LLC, purchased approximately 190 acres of land ("the Property")_ on part of which was located a golf course _ with plans to develop the vacant land surrounding the course. Before purchasing the property, Stoneybrook met with the mayor and other officials of the City of Columbia and received their verbal assurances of strong support for the annexation of the 190 acres into the City and the re-zoning of the area to permit the building of condominiums. After Stoneybrook purchased the property, the city council of Columbia refused to go forward with the annexation and re-zoning until a comprehensive land use plan could be completed against which to evaluate the proposed rezoning. Stoneybrook filed this action against the City, claiming, in essence, that the City's refusal to act promptly in accord with the verbal "commitment" constitutes an unconstitutional moratorium and, alternatively, that the City is estopped from refusing to rezone the property. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings. Stoneybrook appeals. We affirm.

At a bench trial, the court permitted the Williams to take a non-suit as to the estate of Mr. Hollingsworth.The trial court found Laurel Valley in violation of the court's orders and awarded the Williams damages of $194,915.60. Laurel Valley appeals. We affirm.

After a bench trial, the court found that, in September 2005, the principals "settled up" their affairs and that thereafter Leedy wrongfully took an excess of $131,489.99, for which the court gave the Agency a judgment. The court declined to award the Agency approximately $70,000 that it claimed Leedy had taken before September 2005 in excess of what he had earned. Leedy appeals, challenging the trial court's denial of a continuance, among other things, including the award to the Agency. Jones and the Agency challenge the trial court's refusal to award judgment against Leedy for the monies taken before September 2005. We affirm.

Father of child appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to continue hearing to terminate his parental rights and subsequent termination of his rights on the grounds of abandonment and failure to establish/exercise paternity. Finding that the court erred not recessing the hearing to allow Father to be present at the termination hearing, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sustained personal injuries resulting from a fall on defendant's premises and brought this action for damages, which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff for damages against defendant. Defendant appealed, and asserted that the trial judge erred when he refused to allow defendant's expert to testify to his conversation with a third party. On appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the proffered testimony, but the error was harmless. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Father’s request for a continuance and proceeding with the trial on the petition to terminate his parental rights. I reach my decision based on two factors: (1) the decision to grant a continuance or to proceed with the trial was within the discretion of the trial court, a decision that will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made; and (2) the fact that Father was arrested three weeks prior to trial and knew he would be unable to attend, yet he did not inform his attorney until the night before trial.
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Party A obtained a default judgment in general sessions court against Party B. The general sessions court subsequently granted Party B's motion to set aside the default judgment. Party A appealed to circuit court. The circuit court reversed the general sessions court's decision to set aside the default judgment. Party B appeals to this court. We affirm the decision of the circuit court.

Plaintiff brought this action, charging defendant utility breached its contract with plaintiff to construct a line and deliver electricity to his property. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial judge held that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and defendant was not obligated to construct a line to deliver electricity to plaintiff's dwelling. On appeal, we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.