APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce custody dispute, father asserts that the trial court erred in denying his petition to change custody and in granting mother's petition to relocate. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, and we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Brandon Bivins died in an automobile accident on South Rutherford Boulevard in Murfreesboro. His mother sued the city, claiming that the road was unsafe or dangerous and that the city had notice of the condition of the road. The trial court held that the city did not have notice of an unsafe or dangerous condition at the spot of the accident. Because the city had notice of prior accidents along that segment of the road and had a consultant's report stating that the road did not meet design guidelines, we reverse the trial court and remand for a determination of whether the road was unsafe or dangerous.

The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Dickson Housing Authority in this eviction action. Finding the trial court admitted no evidence which would support the Housing Authority's allegations of amounts earned by Defendant tenant, we reverse.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which Petitioner challenges as unconstitutional the retroactive application of the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004. Petitioner was convicted of five counts of indecent exposure in 2001when the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act of 1994 was in effect. The 1994 Act did not classify indecent exposure as a "sexual offense." Three years after his convictions, the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 became law. Unlike the prior Act, the Act of 2004 classified persons convicted of "at least 3 indecent exposure offenses" as "sexual offenders," it required all persons classified as "sexual offenders" to register with the sex offender registry, and it prohibited sexual offenders whose victims were minors from working or residing within 1,000 feet of a school, child care facility, or public park. The trial court made the determination the 2004 Act was part of a non-punitive regulatory framework that did not constitute punishment and the retroactive application of the 2004 Act to Petitioner was not unconstitutional. Petitioner established standing to challenge the classification, registration and employment restraint provisions of the Act of 2004 as applied to him, and we have determined that the 2004 Act, as applied to Petitioner, is not unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

Father appeals trial court finding of substantial and material change in circumstances and resulting modification of parenting plan. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

City employee brought suit to challenge her dismissal for violation of the city's drug and alcohol policy. The trial court affirmed the decision of the city's disciplinary review board. The employee argues that the decision of the disciplinary review board should be reviewed de novo, that the city is estopped by its actions from relying on the blood alcohol test results and from terminating her employment, that she was denied due process by the actions of the city manager and the disciplinary review board, that the city abused its discretion, and that the city's decision is not supported by substantial and material evidence. We have concluded, as did the trial court, that the decision of the disciplinary review board is properly reviewable under the standards set forth in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Under those standards, we affirm the trial court's decision.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish that the use of the medical device to close the site where the catheter was inserted was the cause of husband's injury. Finding that the defendants negated the element of causation essential to each cause of action, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

The State of Tennessee filed a petition for child support on behalf of the child's mother. The respondent acknowledged his obligation to pay such support, and the juvenile court referee established his current and retroactive child support obligation. The respondent filed a request for rehearing before the juvenile court judge, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute. He appealed to this Court but failed to provide a transcript or statement of the evidence. Finding no error in the limited record before us, we affirm.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Mother is underemployed and remand the matter to the trial court for a calculation of imputed income. We also vacate the trial court's calculation and division of medical bills and remand the matter for reexamination, recalculation and redivison. The trial court's decision regarding Child's health insurance coverage is affirmed.

A teacher and the teachers' representative organization appeal the trial court's declaration that the local school board was not required to submit to arbitration as the last step in a grievance procedure set out in a locally negotiated agreement. We affirm the trial court based upon our conclusion that no enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists.

In 1977, the appellant was found guilty of armed robbery and the murder of four individuals. He was sentenced in state court to four consecutive ninety-nine year terms for the murders, and was subsequently sentenced in federal court to ninety-nine years for the bank robbery. He served thirty years in federal prison and was turned over to state authorities in 2007 to begin serving his state sentences. He sought a declaratory judgment that the state sentences were to run concurrently with the federal sentence and that, as a consequence of serving his federal sentence, he was immediately eligible for parole consideration on the state court sentences. The trial court found that the state court sentences ran consecutively to the federal sentence and granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action. The trial court determined that Defendant teacher's grievance against the Franklin County Board of Education was not subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and the Franklin County Education Association. The trial court also dismissed Defendant teacher's counterclaim under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 49-5-510. We affirm.

This is a divorce action. Husband/Appellant appeals from the trial court's division of marital assets, award of attorneys fees to the Wife, and the stay of the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal. Affirmed as modified.

An assistant principal was transferred to a teaching position and grieved the transfer pursuant to a locally negotiated agreement between the local board of education and the organization representing teachers. After pursuing remedies through the school board, the teacher asked the trial court to compel the board to arbitrate resolution of the dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment to the school board, concluding that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 49-2-303 applied since "assistant principals" are statutorily the same as "principals" and, under the holding in Marion County Board of Education v. Marion County Education Association, 86 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), the director of schools has the authority to transfer principals unrestrained by locally negotiated agreements. Mr. Johnson and the association appealed, claiming that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 49-2-303 does not apply to assistant principals and that the director of schools must comply with their agreement in making transfer decisions. We agree that the arbitration provision is not enforceable, but for a different reason. We hold that there was no meeting of the minds as to the procedure to be used as the final step in the grievance procedure. Consequently, there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.

Reginald Smith ("the Decedent") died when the exposed metal edge of a device known as a "Guardrail Energy-Absorbing Terminal" ("the crash cushion") penetrated the window of the cab of his moving overturned tractor-trailer and cut him nearly in half. His son, Reginald Denard Usher ("the plaintiff"), filed this action in the trial court against Charles Blaylock & Sons, Inc. The plaintiff also filed a claim against the State with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The essence of the claims is that the crash cushion was negligently placed at the end of a series of concrete barriers that served to separate traffic entering on and exiting from the roadway connecting to the temporary end of Interstate 140 in Blount County. The alleged negligence was the failure to install a "transition panel" between the last concrete barrier and the crash cushion. Such a panel is designed to cover the otherwise exposed edge of the crash cushion thereby preventing vehicles from "snagging" the exposed metal edge. Eventually, the claim against the State was joined with the claim against Blaylock. The case was tried to a jury with the circuit judge sitting as the Claims Commissioner; the jury was utilized by the trial judge in an advisory capacity with regard to the claim against the State. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The jury found that the plaintiff's total damages were $2,000,000. It apportioned fault 25% to the Decedent, 37.5% to the State, and 37.5% to Blaylock. Acting as the Claims Commissioner, the trial court went against the advice of the jury and dismissed the claim against the State. The court found (1) that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof with respect to the applicable standard of care for installing crash cushions; (2) that the plaintiff failed to prove a breach of duty; and (3) that, in any event, the Decedent was at least 50% at fault for speeding through a construction zone in foggy conditions. Later, the trial court granted Blalock's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment in its favor. The court held (1) that Blalock was not responsible, as a matter of law, for leaving off the transition panel because the State's inspector on the scene "directed" Blalock to leave it off; (2) that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proving, by expert testimony, what a reasonably prudent contractor would have done under the circumstances; and (3) again, that the Decedent was at least 50% at fault. The court, acting as 13th juror, conditionally granted Blalock a new trial in the event the judgment in its favor was vacated or reversed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment in favor of the State. We vacate the judgment in favor of Blalock and remand for a new trial as to that defendant.

This appeal involves legal insurance. The defendants have sold legal insurance for many years. The plaintiff law firm provided legal services to policyholders pursuant to the defendants' legal insurance policies. After Tennessee began to regulate legal insurance, the defendants were required to obtain State approval of their insurance rates and plans. The defendants submitted plans to the State. The plans included proposed rates and anticipated claims expenses, consisting primarily of the fees paid to the plaintiff law firm. The State informed the defendants that the initial filings did not reflect a sufficient loss ratio, that is, ratio of expenses to premium rates. The defendants revised the State filings to reflect an increase in the compensation paid to the plaintiff law firm. At the same time, the defendants presented the plaintiff law firm with a contract that required the plaintiff to pay the defendants for certain administrative services. The amount to be paid to the defendants essentially equaled the amount by which the defendants increased the plaintiff's compensation rate. Years later, the plaintiff discovered facts that caused it to conclude that the contract was a subterfuge to allow the defendants to recoup the increased compensation to the law firm while appearing to comply with the State's loss ratio requirement. The plaintiff informed the State of these facts and of its suspicion that the purpose of the arrangement was to circumvent the loss ratio requirement. After receiving this information, the State took no adverse action against the defendants. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit seeking restitution, asserting that the contract with the defendants was fraudulently induced and that it was void and unenforceable as against public policy. The plaintiff also asserted a claim under the filed rate doctrine, seeking to recover the difference between the pay rate that the defendants filed with the State and the rates actually paid to the plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claims of fraudulent inducement and violation of public policy, finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to those claims. We affirm the trial court's decision on all remaining claims.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, equitably divided the parties' property, and awarded the wife alimony in solido. We affirm.

Landowners filed suit to determine ownership of that portion of Ann Wilson Road that crosses their property. Defendants sought and were granted summary judgment based on the running of several statutes of limitations. Landowners appealed. We affirm.

This suit was filed in Circuit Court after first being filed and then voluntarily non-suited in Chancery Court. After multiple discovery abuses, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.

This is the second appeal from a parenting plan entered by the trial court. The only issue in both appeals involved the necessity of a "paramour provision" in the parenting plan. On remand from the first appeal, the trial court was directed by this Court to determine whether a paramour provision was in the best interests of the children. After a hearing, the trial court determined that it was in the best interests of the children to have a paramour provision in effect. Mother appealed. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring a paramour provision as the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the paramour provision is in the best interests of the children. Reversed.

Thomas M. Gautreaux ("Gautreaux") filed a petition pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act for access to a settlement agreement involving Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority ("the Hospital" or "Erlanger") in a previous lawsuit. The Hospital denied the request, claiming that the document was privileged under the Tennessee Peer Review Law. Gautreaux then filed a petition for a show cause hearing. After the hearing, the trial court determined that the settlement agreement was exempt from disclosure under the Peer Review Law. Gautreaux appeals. We affirm.

This case concerns a complaint for review by writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The initial action was a personal injury suit, arising from an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Charles D. Stechebar's vehicle was allegedly hit by a tractor-trailer owned by Defendant Deere and Company ("Deere") and driven by Defendant John Doe, an unidentified employee of Deere. The personal injury suit was dismissed with prejudice in the general sessions court when the plaintiff failed to appear for the initial trial date. The record reflects that twelve days before the initial trial date, the plaintiff had filed an amended civil summons and obtained a new trial date. Fifty days after the dismissal, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the circuit court, asserting that he had not been notified of the dismissal in time to file an appeal within the ten-day window required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 27-5-108(a)(1). The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed the complaint for review by statutory writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the writ on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for which review could be granted. We hold that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief under statutory writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The trial court's judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Approximately 29 months after the parties' divorce became final, Lara L. Battleson ("Wife") filed a motion in the trial court asking that Dean L. Battleson ("Husband") be held in contempt because of his failure to pay child support. Wife served a copy of the motion and notice of hearing on Douglas R. Beier ("Counsel"), the attorney who had represented Husband in the divorce action. Counsel filed a motion to dismiss supported by an affidavit stating that he no longer represented Husband and that his mail to Husband had been returned undeliverable. The trial court found that service on Counsel was sufficient. As a consequence of this ruling, the court denied Counsel's motion to dismiss; it also granted the motion for contempt. Husband appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment of contempt and remand for further proceedings.