APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State of Tennessee sought the enforcement of a prior administrative order against the Appellant related to the Appellant’s violations of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977, requesting civil penalties, damages, and injunctive relief. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Appellant sought a continuance based on parallel criminal proceedings. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment to the State. On appeal, the Appellant asserts that the chancery court and administrative tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction and that the chancery court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. We conclude that any challenge to personal jurisdiction has been waived and that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The notice of appeal filed by the appellants, Nathan Lynn Bryant and Melissa Bryant, stated that appellants were appealing the judgment entered on September 27, 2022. Inasmuch as the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A father petitioned to change the primary residential parent and for immediate physical custody of his child based on the mother’s allegedly inappropriate behavior. The court granted Father an ex parte order of immediate physical custody. At the show cause hearing, the court determined that the mother had engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse of the father and the child such that her parenting time should be limited. After a final hearing on the father’s petition, the court found a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest to modify the permanent parenting plan. The court then adopted a modified parenting plan that named the father the primary residential parent and limited the mother’s parenting time. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

A congregation within the Presbyterian Church sought to disaffiliate from its presbytery while retaining ownership of its real property. The presbytery argued that the congregation did not own the real property outright but rather held it in trust for the benefit of the national body of the Presbyterian Church. Following a hearing on competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the congregation owned the property outright. Thus, it denied the presbytery’s motion and granted the congregation’s motion. The presbytery timely appealed to this Court. Following careful review, we reverse.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal more than thirty days from the date of entry of the
order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not
timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is an eminent domain case in which the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department
of Transportation (“the State”) condemned two portions of the defendant’s eighteen-acre
property in Shelby County. Prior to a jury trial to determine the fair market value of the
condemned property, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of or reference
to a prior sale of a portion of the defendant’s real property to a neighboring fireworks
business. The State argued that the previous sale was not an arm’s-length transaction or a
comparable sale. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine, excluding the prior
sale from the jury’s consideration. The defendant has appealed. Determining that the
defendant has failed to properly cite to the record in its appellate brief or provide us with a
sufficient record on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has waived its challenge to the
trial court’s exclusion of evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order.

This is a wrongful-death health care liability action against a skilled nursing facility, the Tennessee State Veterans’ Home in Clarksville (“TSVH-Clarksville”), which is owned and operated by the State of Tennessee. The claimant, Linda Black (“Claimant”), is the surviving spouse of Robert Junious Black, deceased, who was a resident of TSVHClarksville from December 16, 2016, through January 9, 2017. Claimant asserted that TSVH-Clarksville proximately caused Mr. Black’s death by failing to monitor and report his symptoms under the applicable standard of care. In particular, Claimant alleged that the staff at TSVH-Clarksville (1) failed to follow Mr. Black’s care plan for risk of dehydration; (2) failed to prevent Mr. Black from developing a urinary tract infection; (3) failed to notify Mr. Black’s physician of a significant changes in his clinical status; and (4) failed to properly assess Mr. Black. Following a two-day bench trial, the Claims Commissioner found that Claimant failed to establish a health care liability claim because, inter alia, the State complied with the applicable standards of care and Claimant failed to establish causation. This appeal followed. We affirm.

A juvenile appeals the decision to re-commit him to DCS custody for treatment and
services. We conclude that this appeal is moot in light of post-judgment facts.

Husband and wife appellants, acting pro se, appeal the trial court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil of husband’s construction company to hold husband individually responsible for the corporation’s breach of contract, as well as the judgment against both husband and wife for contemptuous conduct. We do not reach the merits of the case due to the appellants’ failure to comply with the briefing requirements set out in Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee and dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises out of a third-party complaint asserting claims arising from the sale of real property. The trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the thirdparty defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Afterward, the third-party plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to his remaining claim, which was then dismissed without prejudice by the trial court. The third-party plaintiff appeals. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a juvenile court’s determination of a permanent parenting plan, in which the trial court found all best interest factors to be equal between the parents, granted Mother and Father equal parenting time, and designated them as “Joint Primary Residential Parents.” Mother raises several issues. Generally, she contends that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s findings that all applicable best interest factors were equal between Mother and Father and that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting the permanent parenting plan. We find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning two of the best interest factors. We also find that the court erred, as a matter of law, by designating the parties as joint primary residential parents in the absence of an agreement to do so. In accordance with these findings, we designate Mother as primary residential parent, affirm the trial court’s parenting plan in all other respects, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.

This appeal arises out of a dog bite incident that occurred at a dog park within an apartment complex. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant who owned the dog that bit her. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff s complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to dismiss its class action allegations against two defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that while a prior determination that Appellant was not entitled to class action certification was not a final judgment on the merits, due to a dismissal of that case without prejudice, the ruling was “sufficiently firm” to have preclusive effect, citing the Restatement (Second) Of Judgments. Because Tennessee law requires a final adjudication on the merits for a judgment to be entitled to preclusive effect, we reverse.

The owners of certain real property sought a prescriptive easement over the parking lot of an adjacent neighbor. The trial court granted the prescriptive easement over the entirety of the neighbor's parking lot. The neighbor appealed. Discerning that the record contains clear and convincing evidence of all the requirements for a prescriptive easement, we affirm. We modify the trial court's judgment, however, by limiting the scope of easement to the route followed when the route was first established. 

This is a health care liability case. George Gary Ingram ("Ingram") filed a health care
liability action in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County ("the Trial Court") against, among
others, Dr. Michael Gallagher ("Dr. Gallagher') and Chattanooga-Hamilton County
Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System ("Erlanger") ("Defendants,"
collectively). Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint naming Dr. Gallagher as the sole
defendant. He thus removed the other defendants, including Erlanger, from the lawsuit.
Dr. Gallagher then filed an answer asserting, as a defense, that his governmental employer,
Erlanger, was not made a party to the action. Consequently, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter
or amend the Trial Court's order of dismissal as to Erlanger, which was denied. Plaintiff s
claims were dismissed. In Ingram v. Gallagher, No. E2020-01222-COA-R3-CV, 2021
WL 3028161 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2021) ("Ingram I"), we reversed the Trial Court,
holding that the Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiff s motion to revise the order of
dismissal. We pretermitted all other issues. The Tennessee Supreme Court then reversed
this Court, holding that Erlanger was removed from the lawsuit when Plaintiff filed his
amended complaint and that the order of dismissal had no legal effect so there was no order to amend. Our Supreme Court remanded for us to address the remaining issues. We hold, inter alia, that the savings statute is inapplicable as the Governmental Tort Liability Act
("the GTLA") is implicated; that the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Erlanger for lack
of pre-suit notice and a certificate of good faith; and that the Trial Court did not err in
granting summary judgment to Dr. Gallagher as his governmental employer, Erlanger, was not made a party. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child
upon the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds
of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by failure to visit,
abandonment by failure to support the child, abandonment by wanton disregard for the
child’s welfare, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the
child.1 The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Prior to the marriage, the parties signed an antenuptial agreement that included a provision whereby Husband’s son from a prior marriage would be entitled to one-fourth of the value of the marital property upon divorce. During proceedings in the trial court, Husband filed a petition to hold Wife in criminal contempt. The trial court dismissed Husband’s petition for contempt, granted Husband a divorce on the uncontested ground of adultery, found the provision regarding Husband’s son to be unenforceable, and equitably divided the parties’ marital property. The trial court also declined to award Husband his requested discretionary fees. Primarily based on Husband’s failure to follow briefing requirements, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on all issues.

The circuit court, finding that Father committed twenty-one counts of criminal contempt,
imposed a jail sentence and awarded Mother attorney’s fees. Father appeals, arguing that
the court’s holding violates the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the evidence is
insufficient to support thirteen of the counts, and that the court erred in awarding attorney’s
fees. We conclude that double jeopardy is not implicated in the findings of contempt and
that Father has not presented an argument entitling him to relief regarding the attorney’s
fees award. However, because the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of
contempt on Counts 9, 16, 36, and 40, we reverse the circuit court’s finding of contempt
on these counts. In addition, we conclude that Count 12 must be vacated because the
factual predicate of the trial court’s findings appears to potentially rest upon an unsupported
basis. The remaining 16 counts are affirmed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.

Citizens sought to stop the construction and operation of a soccer stadium at The Fairgrounds Nashville. The plaintiffs advanced a plethora of legal theories in support of their claims that the soccer development violated the Metro Charter. After a month-long trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiffs raise two issues: (1) whether the trial court’s orders were final; and (2) whether the court erred in ruling that the Metro Charter did not require a public referendum before any demolition and new development could occur at the Fairgrounds. We conclude that the court’s orders were final. But, because the challenged demolition and construction have already happened, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

In 2012, Robert and Elizabeth Ann Lewis created a revocable trust and transferred thereto
their rental property business as well as real estate. Several years later, after Robert was
deceased and Elizabeth had become incapacitated, one of the Lewis’ sons, acting as
Elizabeth’s attorney-in-fact, created a new trust with terms different from that of the
original. A different Lewis sibling, Kim Williams, disputed the son’s authority to create
the second trust pursuant to both the terms of the original trust and his power of attorney.
Kim Williams claimed, inter alia, that the son breached several fiduciary duties in creating
the second trust. Following discovery and an unsuccessful mediation, the Chancery Court
for Rhea County (the “trial court”) denied Ms. Williams’ motion for summary judgment
and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Ms. Williams appeals.
Having reviewed the record and arguments of the parties, we conclude that the trial court’s
ruling is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the case remanded for
further proceedings.

In this post-divorce dispute, the wife filed a petition for criminal contempt. After testimony was heard, the parties announced in broad terms that they had reached a settlement. Thereafter, the parties could not agree on the terms of the settlement. At a hearing on the husband’s motion requesting approval of his proposed order, the court dismissed the petition on grounds of double jeopardy. We have determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the case and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from an order requiring a trustee to provide an updated accounting to a beneficiary at the beneficiary’s expense. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on January 17, 2023, in the Knox County
General Sessions Court (“Trial Court”). The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant
incorrectly sought review in this Court instead of the circuit court. Furthermore, the Notice
of Appeal was not filed until May 12, 2023, more than ten days after entry of the Trial
Court’s judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal
was untimely and was filed in the wrong court, we have no jurisdiction to consider this
appeal. We also determine that transferring the appeal to the correct court would be futile.

This case concerns claims of negligence against several people and entities for allegedly serving alcohol to and/or failing to protect a 20-year-old man who died in a car accident while intoxicated. John D. Benbow (“Plaintiff”), individually and as next of kin to his son, Jacob N. Benbow, deceased, filed a wrongful death action in the Sumner County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”) against the defendants, L&S Family Entertainment, LLC d/b/a Strike & Spare (“L&S”); JPZ, LLC d/b/a Silverado Rivergate Sports Bar & Grill (“Silverado’s”); 1 Rancho Cantina, LLC (“Rancho Cantina”); Jody D. McCutchen; Brandi McCutchen; and Brenon D. McCutchen (“the McCutchens”). Certain of the defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted summary judgment for Rancho Cantina, L&S, Brandi, and Jody. 2 However, the Trial Court denied summary judgment for Brenon.3 Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Jody because Plaintiff failed to create any genuine issue of material fact that Jody took charge of Jacob. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s grants of summary judgment to Rancho Cantina, L&S, and Brandi, as genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against those parties. We observe that the standard is comparative fault, not contributory negligence. Whether Jacob was at least 50% at fault for comparative fault purposes is a question not properly resolvable at this summary judgment stage under the facts of this case. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part. We remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.