APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Mack, of first-degree premeditated murder and tampering with evidence for which he received an effective sentence of life plus three years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issues in this appeal arise from protracted litigation in three courts involving several property owners (“Plaintiffs”) who contend the Town of Morrison, Tennessee, (“the Town”) is estopped, for various reasons, from collecting property taxes on their properties. Although the dispute initially involved a challenge to whether the Town lawfully annexed Plaintiffs’ properties, it is no longer disputed that the Town annexed the properties with the passage of Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02 on second and final reading on November 5, 2001. The genesis of the dispute occurred in 2017 when Plaintiffs were cited to the Municipal Court for violating the Town’s zoning ordinances. During the hearing, the Town was required to establish that Plaintiffs’ properties had been annexed. To prove it had annexed the properties, the Town erroneously relied upon Ordinance 01-03, instead of Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. The Municipal Court found that the Town had not lawfully enacted Ordinance 01-03 to annex Plaintiffs’ properties; therefore, the court dismissed the citations. The Town did not appeal that decision. Two years later, the Town filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court, arguing that it had properly annexed the subject properties. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition concluding that the Town was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue because “the relevant issue was litigated and determined by the Municipal Court . . . , [which] was a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore, this Chancery Court will not disturb that Court’s findings.” The Town appealed the Chancery Court decision; however, it voluntarily dismissed the appeal. Nevertheless, the Town continued to send delinquent tax notices to Plaintiffs. As a consequence, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a declaration that their properties had not been properly annexed by the Town. In its Answer, the Town asserted, for the first time, that it had annexed Plaintiffs’ properties in 2001 pursuant to Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. Although Plaintiffs argued that the Town was collaterally estopped from relying on these ordnances, the chancellor ruled otherwise. Specifically, the chancellor held that Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02 were not at issue in the Municipal Court proceedings and because the issues raised in that proceeding were not identical to those raised in the prior court proceedings, collateral estoppel did not apply. Further, the chancellor ruled that the Town had lawfully annexed the properties in November 2001 pursuant to Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. However, the chancellor also ruled that the Town was equitably estopped from collecting delinquent taxes owed prior to 2022. This appeal followed. We have determined that the Municipal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Town had lawfully annexed Plaintiffs’ properties; therefore, the judgment of the Municipal Court is a null and void judgment that may not constitute a basis for collateral estoppel. For this and other reasons, we affirm the chancellor’s decision to deny Plaintiffs’ Petition for Injunctive Relief. However, we reverse the chancellor’s ruling that the Town is equitably estopped from collecting delinquent property taxes from Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff filed a petition to have a New York confession of judgment enrolled as a judgment in Tennessee. Defendant claimed the Tennessee circuit court had no jurisdiction because the confession of judgment was not permitted by Tennessee law, violated Tennessee public policy, and was fraudulent and usurious. The trial court enrolled the judgment. Defendant appealed. We affirm.

As a result of a traffic accident, a Metropolitan police officer issued a driver a Metropolitan traffic citation. The general sessions court found that the driver violated a traffic ordinance, and on appeal, the circuit court also found that the driver violated the ordinance. The driver challenges the jurisdiction of the courts, the legality of reporting the violation to the Tennessee Department of Safety and the severity of the penalty he may receive from California. We affirm.

The Appellant takes issue with the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself from the litigation assigned to him pursuant to designation by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an amended final decree of divorce entered by the Circuit Court of Hamilton County (“trial court”) on December 20, 2021. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the parties a divorce pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129(b), divided the parties’ marital assets and liabilities, and awarded transitional alimony to the wife in the amount of $1,200.00 per month for two months. Both parties subsequently filed motions to alter or amend the court’s ruling. The trial court entered an amended final decree, incorporating by reference a memorandum opinion wherein the court altered the percentages awarded to each party of certain items of marital property in its marital property distribution. The wife timely appealed. Following review, we affirm the trial court’s determinations concerning valuation and classification of the parties’ assets. We vacate, however, the portion of the trial court’s amended decree wherein the court altered the percentages awarded to each party, and we remand this issue to the trial court for further findings, explanation, and determination. By reason of this unresolved issue concerning the trial court’s marital property distribution, we likewise vacate and remand the trial court’s determinations regarding alimony and attorney’s fees for reconsideration following the court’s equitable division of marital property. The trial court’s amended final decree is affirmed in all other respects. The parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal are denied.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the trial court found that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of the statutory abandonment ground of failure to support, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to this ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the father’s parental rights.

This is an appeal from a final order of absolute divorce. The trial court granted the divorce based on a finding that both parties committed inappropriate marital conduct. The wife appeals. We dismiss the appeal.

Mother appeals the trial court's decision to award equal parenting time after making no findings regarding her allegations of abuse by Father. Because the trial court stated that there was no evidence of abuse in the record despite the plethora of relevant testimony by both parties, we are unable to ascertain the trial court's reasoning.  We therefore vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further findings.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal involves an action brought by the State of Tennessee for alleged violations of Tennessee’s statutes regarding the unauthorized practice of law and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The State of Tennessee claimed that the defendants improperly solicited clients who were in the process of making funeral arrangements for their recently deceased children. Following a trial, a jury returned a verdict unanimously finding in favor of the State of Tennessee and assessing civil penalties against the defendants. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment against the defendants. The defendants appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Kyndra Abernathy (“Petitioner”) petitioned the trial court for an order of protection against Icker Derek Barile (“Respondent”), alleging that he sexually assaulted her. After a hearing at which each party proceeded pro se, the trial court issued a one-year protective order, finding that Respondent engaged in sexual penetration without Petitioner’s consent and continued after she told him to stop. Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by considering irrelevant and inadmissible evidence and that its decision was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights, arguing that it erred in denying her motion to continue the trial and in considering hearsay evidence in its best interests analysis. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's order terminating mother's parental rights.

After counsel for the plaintiff partnership filed a claim for attorney fees in the counsel’s firm’s own name, limited partners of the partnership sought a right of intervention to oppose the firm’s claim. The trial court denied the limited partners’ efforts to intervene. We reverse the trial court’s conclusion that intervention was not appropriate, vacate the award giving relief to the firm, and remand the case for further proceedings with the limited partners’ participation as intervening parties.

A loan was secured by a deed of trust on the borrower’s real property. When the borrower repaid the loan in full, the bank paid a fee to record a deed of release. The bank then sought reimbursement of the fee from the borrower. The borrower filed a putative class action suit, alleging that Tennessee law prohibited the bank from seeking reimbursement of the recording fee. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that federal regulations preempted the borrower’s claims. We affirm.

In this custody case, Appellant/Mother asserts that the trial court erred in its best interest analysis by failing to consider the preference of the minor child under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a)(13). As such, she contends that the trial court erred in designating Father/Appellee the primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a long-standing and highly contentious custody matter. Upon competing petitions to modify the existing parenting plan, the trial court determined that it was in the best interest of the child for Mother to remain the child’s primary residential parent. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court did not properly weigh the best interest factors as it pertained to the child in reaching its decision. Finding no error, we affirm.

The trial court awarded the estate of Mona Small (“the Estate”) a judgment in the amount of $26,515 against appellants Kevin J. Elliott and Heather R. Elliott, based on its finding that the Elliotts converted that amount when Ms. Small was residing with them. Because the Elliotts’ brief was untimely filed and wholly fails to comply with the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal. We also grant the Estate’s request to find this appeal frivolous, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal to be awarded to the Estate.

This appeal involves matters of alimony and valuation of marital property upon the divorce of the parties, who were married for twenty-four years. Following its valuation of certain marital assets, the trial court distributed the parties’ substantial marital assets in near-equal shares. The trial court awarded to the wife rehabilitative alimony and alimony in futuro based on its determinations that the wife had demonstrated a need for alimony and that the husband had the ability to pay. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s spousal support award in its entirety. We also affirm the trial court’s value placed on the husband’s medical practice. Exercising our discretion, we decline to award attorney’s fees to the wife on appeal.

Plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident with Defendant and allegedly sustained personal injuries. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Shelby County General Sessions Court but were unable to get personal service on Defendant. Ultimately, Plaintiffs issued service by publication. Defendant, having never been personally served, did not appear for trial in the General Sessions Court, and Plaintiffs obtained a judgment against her. The General Sessions Court judgment was not timely appealed and became final. Plaintiffs made a demand on Defendant's insurance carrier to pay the judgment. Counsel purporting to represent Defendant on behalf of her insurance carrier subsequently filed a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court. Plaintiffs objected to counsel's standing to appear on behalf of Defendant, but the Circuit Court granted the writ of certiorari and later granted counsel's motion to dismiss the case, finding that counsel had standing to litigate on behalf of Defendant pursuant to the court's interpretation of a contract of insurance that was not in evidence. We conclude that the trial court's conclusion as to standing was erroneous. Accordingly, we vacate the orders entered by the trial court in the proceedings and dismiss the writ. Tenn.

Keith Lamont Farmer (the “Petitioner”), an inmate in the West Tennessee State Penitentiary (“WTSP”), filed suit against Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC” or “the State”) after Petitioner received a disciplinary infraction. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Lauderdale County (the “trial court”) seeking review of the disciplinary proceedings. The State filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Petitioner’s case was barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812. The trial court granted the State’s motion, and Petitioner appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.