APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is apparently a case of first impression. The appellant, W. Jess Waltman, filed a petition in the trial court seeking to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Gloria Eleanor Franklin ("the decedent"). The will, dated "July 7 93," directs that the appellant and his wife, Terry Waltman, are to receive the decedent's estate "in case I die on my way to & from Jersey." The trial court held that the will was not eligible for probate because it was a conditional will and the specified condition or contingency, i.e., Ms. Franklin's demise "on the way to & from Jersey," had not occurred. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a motorcycle rider who was seriously injured when his motorcycle crossed metal plates covering a portion of the highway surface that was under construction. After voluntarily dismissing his first suit, the rider filed a second suit in the Circuit Court for Lincoln County against the corporation he believed to be responsible for placing the metal plates across the highway. The rider insisted on proceeding against this corporation even after he was informed that he had sued the wrong party. The corporation moved for a directed verdict at the close of the motorcycle rider's case-in-chief, asserting that he had failed to prove that it was responsible for the road construction. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the rider's complaint. The rider now challenges the directed verdict on two grounds. First, he asserts that he presented enough evidence of the contractor's responsibility for the construction to take the case to the jury. Second, he asserts that the corporation should not be permitted to argue that he sued the wrong party because it had not specifically identified or described this party in its answer as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. We have determined that the corporation's denial of involvement with the construction project at issue was was not asserting an affirmative defense governed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 and that the trial court properly granted the directed verdict. Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the motorcycle rider's complaint.

This case involves a dispute over the scope of the right of the defendant to use the plaintiffs' property as a means of ingress and egress to various sections of the defendant's property. The deed to defendant's 1,600 acre tract, which surrounds plaintiffs' 151 acre tract on 3 sides, included a 26 foot wide north-south easement over plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant refused to confine his activities within the easement, thereby trespassing and committing waste upon their land. The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to use the 26 foot wide easement running in a north and south direction on the Conatsers' property and a second 20 foot wide route of ingress and egress branching off of the 26 foot easement in a northwesterly direction. The court rejected defendant's claim that he was entitled to a third easement along another east and west direction route and awarded plaintiffs $2,500 in damages for trespass. We affirm the trial court's rulings on the scope of defendant's easement and modify the damages to the $5000 originally awarded by the trial court.

This appeal arises from the trial court's granting of a motion of summary judgment. The court ruled that Shop had violated an Agreement which incorporated in its entirety a previous lease of certain property. As a result, Owner was awarded the repair costs for certain repairs that Shop had been responsible for under the lease. Owner was also awarded attorney's fees and expenses. Shop appealed, arguing that certain material facts were in dispute and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. We affirm in part and reverse in part.