APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a detainer action. Lee Dodgson (“Dodgson”) sued Cheryl M. Williams (“Williams”) in the Knox County General Sessions Court (“the General Sessions Court”). The General Sessions Court ruled in Dodgson’s favor. Williams appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Circuit Court”). Dodgson, the plaintiff in this matter, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim. The Circuit Court granted Dodgson’s motion and dismissed Williams’ appeal. Williams appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that, while a motion for summary judgment might have been appropriate, a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was unavailable to Dodgson. We hold that Dodgson, as the plaintiff in this matter, could not use a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion as a means to dismiss Williams’ appeal. We vacate the Circuit Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for disqualification of the trial judge.  After carefully reviewing the record provided by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion.

The plaintiff in this personal injury action was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the defendant when an accident occurred after an animal purportedly ran into the roadway. Upon the defendant’s motion and following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of a trial judge’s recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B or, alternatively, a common law writ of certiorari. Such review is beyond the scope of Rule 10B. And a judge’s recusal may not be reviewed by a writ of certiorari. So we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns the purchase and sale agreement for a 98,094-square-foot, multi-use commercial development in Nashville, Tennessee, known as Houston Station. Before marketing the property for sale, the defendant-seller discovered that approximately 100 square feet of the building encroached on neighboring property owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. and sought a lease from CSX to cover the encroachment. But before it could reach an agreement with CSX, the seller agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff-buyer. The buyer deposited $3 million as earnest money, and the parties scheduled a closing. Before closing, however, CSX demanded $550,000 per year for the encroachment. The seller then informed the buyer that it could not meet its obligations under their agreement. Meanwhile, the seller breached the agreement by executing two new leases without the buyer’s approval. The buyer extended the closing several times to allow the seller to cure its defaults, but the seller refused to terminate the new leases and could not reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with CSX. The buyer then let the closing deadline lapse and sued for, inter alia, reformation of the purchase agreement, specific performance, and damages. The seller then moved for summary judgment and requested an award of the earnest money on the theory that the buyer waived its objections by allowing the closing deadline to lapse. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the buyer had constructive notice of the encroachment and then breached the purchase agreement by failing to buy the property. Accordingly, the court found the seller was entitled to the $3 million deposit as liquidated damages and an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses under the agreement as the prevailing party. The buyer appeals. Following a thorough review, we respectfully disagree that the buyer had constructive notice that the seller did not have good and marketable title. We also disagree that the seller had a right to terminate the contract and receive the earnest money. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a third promissory note constituted a novation of two earlier promissory notes. Following a bench trial, the court found the defendant “carried her burden of proof to establish that the third note was a novation and cancelation of the previous two notes.” Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

This appeal involves a petition for grandparent visitation filed by the paternal grandparents. The juvenile court granted the petition and the parents appeal. We reverse and dismiss the case.

Following the entry of a default judgment against a mother who failed to answer the petition to terminate her parental rights, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights to her child on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (3) persistence of conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother moved to set aside the default judgment. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned grounds for termination. However, we remand for the trial court to determine whether the termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child pursuant to the new statutory factors which became effective on the date the petition was filed.

This appeal is a landlord-tenant dispute involving issues of liquidated damages and material breach of contract. The landlord filed a civil warrant in general sessions court to recover an early termination fee and other related fees pursuant to the parties’ lease agreement. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the landlord finding that the early termination fee was reasonable and was not a penalty. The tenants appealed the judgment to the circuit court. The circuit court also entered a judgment in favor of the landlord finding that the early termination fee was reasonable and was not a penalty and that the landlord did not breach the lease agreement. The tenants appeal. We affirm as modified and remand to the circuit court for calculation of damages.

This appeal involves a multitude of challenges brought to the orders of the trial court in a post-divorce dispute involving minor children. We vacate the trial court’s decision to sua sponte order a new parenting plan, as well as to enter a temporary and permanent injunction against Mother. We also reverse the trial court’s decision to award Father discretionary costs for expert fees regarding an issue on which he did not prevail. Otherwise, we affirm the rulings of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a last will and testament, which provided for the creation of a trust. The decedent’s wife is the current income beneficiary of the trust, with the decedent’s son being a remainder beneficiary. The son requested an accounting of the trust financials, to which the trustees of the trust responded that the son was not entitled to receive them. The trustees filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to instruct the parties whether the son was entitled to the information he requested. The son subsequently filed a counterclaim asking that the trustees be required to provide him with the information he requested and alleging breach of trust by the trustees. The Trial Court granted the trustees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings after finding that the son was a remainder beneficiary and not a current income beneficiary of the trust and, therefore, was not entitled to financial information regarding the trust. The Trial Court found that the language in the decedent’s last will and testament was intended to override the reporting requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-813(a) and limit the trustees’ statutory obligation of reporting to qualified beneficiaries. In doing so, the Trial Court determined that the trustees were not required to provide the son with reports or other financial information concerning the trust. The Trial Court denied the son’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c).  The trial court dismissed two of the plaintiff’s three claims for relief pled in his amended complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), upon its finding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted on the two claims.  The third claim also was included in the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as well as arguments for improper venue and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all of which were denied by the trial court.  More than thirty days after a final judgment was entered, the defendant requested an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs.  In his supporting affidavit, the defendant’s counsel included attorney’s fees as relevant to the entire motion to dismiss instead of distinguishing the time spent regarding the claims that were dismissed pursuant to Rule 12.02(6).  The trial court awarded the defendant attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,000, which is the maximum amount of attorney’s fees a trial court can award under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c).  The trial court denied the defendant’s request for discretionary costs as untimely.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of discretionary costs, vacate the award of attorney’s fees, and remand for the Trial Court to reconsider the attorney’s fees award as consistent with this opinion and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Donovan v. Hastings, No. M2019-01396-SC-R11-CV, -- S.W.3d -- , 2022 WL 2301177 (Tenn. June 27, 2022).

This appeal concerns a penalty assessed against a company by the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“the Bureau”). The Bureau assessed a penalty against Jase Enterprises, LLC (“Jase”), a construction company owned by Jason Usery (“Usery”), for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage. After a contested case hearing, the administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) upheld the penalty assessment but modified its amount. Jase petitioned for judicial review in the Chancery Court for Henderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court upheld the ALJ’s decision. Jase appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that it was not afforded due process and that the decision to assess a penalty against it was arbitrary. In particular, Jase argues that the evidence did not establish that Joe Sheldon (“Sheldon”) was a Jase employee. We find that Jase was afforded due process; it received adequate notice and had an opportunity to be heard. We find further that the penalty assessment against Jase was supported by substantial and material evidence, including Sheldon’s deposition. We affirm.

The plaintiff was injured when his car was hit by an uninsured driver. The plaintiff was initially paid $5,000.00 from the medical payments coverage of his automobile policy. A jury then found the plaintiff’s compensatory damages to total $80,000.00. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier then paid the plaintiff $45,000.00, representing the policy limit of $50,000.00 less the prior $5,000.00 payment. The plaintiff then sought to compel the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the additional $5,000.00 owed under the uninsured motorist policy. The trial court agreed and ordered the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the plaintiff an additional $5,000.00, resulting in total payment by the carrier to the plaintiff of $55,000.00. The uninsured motorist carrier appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. 

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 28, 2022.  Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Cody W. Bales, Defendant, pled guilty to statutory rape in July of 2019 and received a six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation after the service of 12 months in incarceration. A probation revocation warrant was issued in April of 2021. After a hearing, the trial court revoked probation in full, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the father upon concluding that the petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit the child, (2) abandonment by failure to support the child, (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the father’s custody, (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child as a putative father, and (5) risk of substantial harm to the child’s physical or psychological welfare if returned to the putative father’s legal and physical custody. The father timely appealed. Upon review of the final order, we conclude that the trial court did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) due to its failure to include sufficient findings of fact in its written order. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for the expedited entry of sufficient written findings of fact. We deny the petitioners’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

Justin R. Allen (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s decision regarding custody of his two minor children. Because the order appealed from is interlocutory, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

In this premises liability action, the plaintiffs sued three local governments and a parks and recreation commission, jointly created by the local governments, to recover for injuries suffered by one of the plaintiffs when she stepped into a hole while attending a concert at a park maintained by the commission. The trial court dismissed the action as to the three local governments, concluding that they were immune under the state’s Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). Later, the trial court granted the commission’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the commission enjoyed immunity under both the GTLA and the state statutes known as the Recreational Use Statutes. We dismiss the appeal as to the three local governments, concluding we lack subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to timely initiate an appeal against them. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the commission retained immunity under both the GTLA and the Recreational Use Statutes.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan, calculation of child support, and classification of assets. We affirm the court’s decisions.

Appellant, Frances Diane Weeks Wright, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Probate Court (the “Trial Court”) that was entered on January 3, 2022. We determine that the January 3, 2022 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal.