APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Wife appeals from the trial court’s decision to dismiss a complaint against the car dealership managed by her estranged husband for claims associated with the use of a demonstrator vehicle. We affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Father appeals from a trial court’s termination of his parental rights. Due to the lack of a sufficiently complete record on appeal, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for a new trial.

This appeal stems from a divorce proceeding, in which the Shelby County Circuit Court (“Trial Court”) found that two billboard marketing agreements for billboards located at 5871 Poplar Avenue and 0 Ricky Bell Cove were property belonging to the corporation, St. Charles Place, Inc., a corporation owned solely by Husband. The Trial Court found that the parties’ marriage was short-term in nature and distributed the marital property, awarding Dawna Divine Boone (“Wife”) 60% of the marital estate and Charles Price Boone (“Husband”) 40% of the marital estate. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court in all respects.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, a mother seeks review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge.  She contends that statements the trial judge made at a hearing present a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality or could only stem from an extrajudicial source.  We conclude that they do not.  So we affirm. 

Appellant’s brief in this case fails to substantially comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit alleging that a number of Presbyterian church entities were negligent regarding the sexual abuse of minors by a Presbyterian clergyman. John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 (“Plaintiffs”) , members and/or attendees of Woodland Presbyterian Church (“Woodland”) in the 1990s, sued former pastor James B. Stanford (“Stanford”) and a host of Presbyterian institutional defendants for negligence in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). The institutional defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were granted by the Trial Court. Plaintiffs appeal arguing, among other things, that the statute of limitations was tolled due to fraudulent concealment. They argue further that the Trial Court erred in dismissing their claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from certain of the institutional defendants allegedly releasing Plaintiffs’ names to the media in 2019. We affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), A Corporation and Evangelical Presbyterian Church for lack of personal jurisdiction. However, we hold further, inter alia, that in view of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012), the Trial Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint at the motion to dismiss stage based upon the statute of limitations when Plaintiffs alleged that efforts were made by certain of the institutional defendants to hide the sexual abuse and a “whitewash” ensued. As Plaintiffs successfully alleged fraudulent concealment, we reverse the Trial Court with respect to the statute of limitations issue. We also reverse the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against Woodland and Presbytery of the Central South, Inc. We, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

A wife and husband obtained a “Final Decree of Divorce.” The wife then remarried. Her first husband claimed their divorce was not final, and thus filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that her second marriage was bigamous. The declaratory judgment action was ultimately dismissed. The wife and her new husband filed a defamation action against the first husband, claiming that he had falsely accused them of bigamy. The trial court dismissed the defamation action. Because the first husband’s allegedly defamatory statements are entitled to the absolute litigation privilege, we affirm.

This case arises from a single-vehicle motorcycle accident at the intersection of State Route 1 and State Route 36 within the city limits of Kingsport, Tennessee. The cyclist contends the accident was caused by the failure of the State of Tennessee and the City of Kingsport to properly maintain the state highways; specifically, he alleges that their failure to repair a pothole caused the accident. The plaintiff filed a claim against the State with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration, and shortly thereafter he commenced this action against the City in the Sullivan County Circuit Court. The claim against the State was later transferred and consolidated with the action against the City. Both the State and the City claimed immunity and moved for summary judgment. The State asserted that it had immunity because the City contractually agreed to maintain the highways where the accident occurred. The City asserted that it had immunity because the State owned the highways where the accident occurred. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City upon the finding the City had immunity because it did not “own” the state highways; however, it denied the State’s motion because “[t]o hold that both the State and the City [were] immune from suit would be against public policy.”

This is an appeal by Mother from the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. Mother contends that her actions were not willful such as to warrant termination, while also arguing that termination is not in the best interest of the child. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court’s termination.

This appeal involves the consideration of several issues contested among family members, including those pertaining to the fiduciary duties owed by a son who served as a trustee of trusts created by his parents. The trial court granted significant monetary relief to the son’s sisters following a bench trial, including for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, but it rejected other aspects of the sisters’ requested relief. The son presently maintains that he should be absolved of liability for his breach of fiduciary duties, whereas his sisters complain that the trial court did not award them sufficient relief. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a cornplaint for divorce filed in 2018. The multi-faceted litigation of this matter included three interspousal tort claims tried together with the divorce action, the adjudication of a motion for an order of protection and a petition for a restraining order, two contempt proceedings, two motions to recuse, interlocutory appeals to this Court, the denial of permission to appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Proceedings in the trial court also precipitated two federal court actions. Following a six-day trial in 2020 and a stay of proceedings pending the Supreme Court's order on Wife's application for a writ of certiorari, the trial court entered final judgment in the matter in November 2021. Wife appeals the trial court's classification, valuation, and division of property. Wife also appeals the trial court's denial of her second motion to recuse. Discerning no evidence of bias, we affirm the trial court's denial of Wife's second motion to recuse. The trial court's classification, valuation, and division of property is reversed in part, and affirmed in part as modified.

This consolidated appeal involves citizen challenges, via the common law writ of certiorari, to the procedure by which the Dickson County Planning Commission and Dickson County Commission approved a settlement agreement negotiated with Titan Partners, L.L.C.  Specifically, the Petitioners allege that they were entitled to notice that the settlement agreement was going to be discussed at the regularly scheduled meetings of the Planning Commission and County Commission.  They further allege that executive sessions were improperly utilized to discuss the settlement agreement in violation of the Open Meetings Act.  The trial court found no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirmed the actions of the Planning and County Commissions.  Upon our review of the record, we agree that there was no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirm the trial court in all respects.

This consolidated appeal involves citizen challenges, via the common law writ of certiorari, to the procedure by which the Dickson County Planning Commission and Dickson County Commission approved a settlement agreement negotiated with Titan Partners, L.L.C.  Specifically, the Petitioners allege that they were entitled to notice that the settlement agreement was going to be discussed at the regularly scheduled meetings of the Planning Commission and County Commission.  They further allege that executive sessions were improperly utilized to discuss the settlement agreement in violation of the Open Meetings Act.  The trial court found no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirmed the actions of the Planning and County Commissions.  Upon our review of the record, we agree that there was no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirm the trial court in all respects.

Consumers discovered negative information on their credit reports.  Believing that the information was false, the consumers filed a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim against the bank that furnished the information.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.  On the bank’s motion, the court summarily dismissed the action because the consumers were unable to prove an essential element of a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim.  The court also denied the bank’s request for an award of attorney’s fees.  Both sides appealed.  Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude that the bank was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the Fair Credit Reporting Act claim.  We also conclude that the bank did not prove that it was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.  So we affirm.

This is an Open Meetings Act case regarding the Dickson County Planning Commission’s approval and subsequent denial of a site plan for the construction and operation of a fuel terminal. A non-profit and two Dickson County residents filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Planning Commission acted in violation of the Open Meetings Act when it held an unpublicized meeting and initially approved the site plan. The trial court found the case was moot because the Dickson County Planning Commission overturned its approval of the site plan at a subsequent meeting. We agree and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case as moot.

In this certiorari review of the decision of a board of zoning appeals upholding the zoning director’s interpretation and application of the zoning resolutions to permit the building of a fuel terminal, the appellants challenge the decision as being arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence.  The trial court concluded that ample material evidence existed to support the decision of the director. Upon our de novo review, we agree and accordingly affirm the decision of the trial court.

A husband appeals a final decree of divorce in which the trial court classified the marital residence as marital property and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Because the husband failed to file either a transcript or statement of the evidence, we conclusively presume that the record would have supported the trial court’s decision, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of this cause of action on the basis that it was filed by a deceased plaintiff and therefore a nullity that could not be corrected via amendment. We affirm. 

An inmate filed this case alleging that he sustained injuries while in the county jail after slipping on water in his cell. The trial court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the county lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. Because we conclude that the inmate submitted sufficient proof to create a dispute of material fact as to the county’s actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition, we reverse.

This interlocutory appeal arises from a health care liability action. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiff invoked the discovery rule and argued that his claim was timely filed after he learned the identity of the defendant. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit of counsel in an effort to detail the due diligence undertaken by the plaintiff to ascertain the identity of the defendant. Upon considering the affidavit, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. However, the trial court granted permission for the defendant to seek an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the defendant’s application. We now affirm the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning an express ingress/egress easement that provides access via The Garden Inn at Bee Rock in Monterey, Tennessee, to a neighboring natural landmark owned by the Town of Monterey, Tennessee. After years of public use of the easement to access the landmark, The Garden Inn took steps to physically hinder the public’s use of the easement. As a consequence, the Town of Monterey and others commenced this action against The Garden Inn, LLC, to declare the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties. After years of litigation, The Garden Inn contended that a conservation foundation was an indispensable party. In doing so, The Garden Inn contended that failure to add the conservation foundation, which holds a conservation easement by which it may prohibit certain uses of the landmark property, would subject The Garden Inn to multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. The trial court disagreed, holding that the conservation foundation “has no interest in the fight with respect to the interpretation of this easement for ingress and egress.” Thereafter, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town of Monterey concerning the scope and uses of the easement. The Garden Inn appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that the conservation foundation was not an indispensable party. We affirm.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a hearing with respect to the mother’s request to relocate to Ohio with the parties’ minor child, a request which the father opposed.  Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order permitting relocation and modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan to provide the father with more co-parenting time.  The trial court also granted an award of attorney’s fees to the mother.  The father has appealed.  Based on the trial court’s failure to render sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning its award of attorney’s fees to the mother, we vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the basis for its decision to award attorney’s fees to the mother and the reasonableness of the amount awarded.  The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.