APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The essence of this appeal is whether a judgment creditor of an estate should be permitted to intervene in a marital/familial matter.

'This is an appeal by Gerald W. Smith (“Plaintiff”) under T.R.A.P. Rule 3 alleging error in the Trial Court’s granting Summary Judgment to Defendants/Appellees, Harriman Utility Board (“HUB”), HUB General Manager Richard A. Hall (“Hall”), and the City of Harriman, Tennessee (“Harriman”). Plaintiff was an employee of HUB, and after his employment was terminated filed suit for breach of contract, procurement of breach of contract in violation of T.C.A. 2 § 47-50-109, retaliatory discharge, and promissory estoppel. The Circuit Court for Roane County entered summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Appellant leased equipment to United American Bank (“UAB”) for a seven year term. Three years into the lease, UAB was closed by the Tennessee Commissioner of Banking and FDIC FILED February 9, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk 2 was appointed as receiver. Appellant filed a claim with FDIC seeking recovery of the full amount due on the lease. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to FDIC, thus upholding the constitutionality and applicability of T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b), which provides that lessors can recover a maximum of two months’ lease payments after a Tennessee bank fails and is closed. In this appeal, lessor contends that T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions by treating lessors differently from other contract claimants and that the application of the statute results in an unconstitutional taking of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In this divorce action the wife has appealed and raises issues as to the amount of the alimony award and the division of marital property. The husband objects to an aw ard o f alimony in futuro and the Order requiring him to pay $2,047.20for the w ife’s atto rney’s fees.

Leslie A. Lewis filed a detainer warrant in the General Sessions Court of Shelby County against John S. Muchmore and Virginia Muchmore alleging forcible entry and detainer (FED)1 or unlawful detainer. The court entered judgment for possession only and the Muchmores appealed to circuit court where the Muchmores brought a counter-complaint for specific performance of a real estate contract. Following a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, Leslie A. Lewis, restoring her to possession of the subject premises and dismissing the countercomplaint. This appeal resulted.

This case deals with in personam jurisdiction under the Tennessee Long Arm 1 This Court originally denied the application for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appellant’s T.R.A.P. 11 application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this Court for a review on the merits. 2 Also named as a defendant is Jeff L. Walker, but he is not involved in this interlocutory appeal. 2 Statute and comes to this Court as a T.R.A.P. interlocutory appeal.1 Defendants, Jo Bursey (Bursey), Jack L. Moore (Moore), Ocean Inn, Inc. (Ocean Inn), and Dimension III Financial, Inc. (Dimension III)2, appeal the order of the trial court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Lamb, Lee, Lofton, and Bailey (“Plaintiffs” or “Phoenix”) brought suit alleging breach of contract and fraudulent inducement in the Chancery Court of McNairy County, Tennessee. MegaFlight, Rosenberg, and Noel (“MegaFlight”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because a forum selection clause in the contract specified that any action must be brought in the courts of Orange County, Florida. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. Based upon the following, we reverse the lower court’s grant of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

This is a third appeal in this divorce action which was filed more than six years ago between plaintiff (“husband”) and defendant (“wife”).

This an appeal of a Roane Chancery Court order which enjoined Appellants, Joe Parker, Mary Lynn Parker and Tiger Haven, Inc., from maintaining any Class I, wild or exotic animals, on certain parcels of land in Roane Count, and from expanding theoperation of Tiger Haven, Inc., except upon proper applicatin and approval by the County. While not as exactly stated by the parties, the issues raised on appeal aare whether (1) Appellant's refusal to rezone Appellant' property was arbitrary and capricious, (2) Appellants' use of parcel 22.06 is a pre-existing nonconforming use which may be expanded by Appellants, (3) Appellee's affirmative respresentations to Appellants and its failure to enforce its zoning ordinance for over six years estops it from now enforcing the zoning ordinances, (4) the A-2 zoning regulations are unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad (5) the A-1 zoning regulations and Appellee's actions in not rezoning Parcel 29.01 work an unreasonable discrimination against Appellant's property, and (6) the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's motion asking that the judgment be altered or amended or a new trial had based on evidence discovered after the trial. For the reasons herein stated, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is a dispute between adjoining property owners over a tract of land which the Chancellor determined was owned by plaintiffs.

This is an appeal from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s finding of criminal contempt against Dewayne Rogers, Shanie Rogers and Billie Jean Ritchie Jones. Mrs. Jones, Defendant-Appellant, raises the following issue, which we restate: Whether the Appellant was improperly convicted of criminal contempt solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice?

This is a suit wherein the Plaintiff Barbara Brunum, inter alia, seeks to set aside a conveyance by her mother, the Defendant Corrine W. Akins--who held certain real property in trust for her--to her brother, Defendant Melvin L. Akins. The basis of the suit is that her mother violated her fiduciary duty by conveying the property to her brother and that he was guilty of fraud and conspiracy in accepting the transfer. The only consideration for the transfer was the assumption and payment of a prior secured indebtedness against the property in the amount of $29,392.25. The Trial Court found in favor of the daughter against the mother, awarded damages in the amount of $34,607.75, plus pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum, beginning April 28, 1998, the date our opinion in a prior appeal of this case was filed. The Chancellor dismissed the claim as to the brother. The daughter appeals insisting the Trial Court was in error in not setting aside the transfer. We are of the opinion that the Trial Judge acted properly and affirm the judgment entered.

This appeal involves a father’s obligation to pay support for a non-marital child. Fifteen years after the child’s birth, the Tennessee Department of Human Services, acting on behalf of the child’s mother, filed suit in the Montgomery County Juvenile Court seeking to establish paternity and to obtain past and future support from the father. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order establishing paternity and ordering the father to pay $542.50 per month in child support. The juvenile court also awarded the mother $50,000 in back child support. The father now takes issue with the amount of the award for back child support. We have concluded that the evidence does not support the amount of the award for back child support and accordingly remand the case for further proceedings.

The Chancery Court for Dickson County terminated a mother’s parental rights to three young children and allowed the foster parents to proceed with the adoption of the children. Because we find that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence upon which to base the termination of the mother’s parental rights, we reverse.
 

The plaintiff repeatedly cursed and insulted the defendant’s attorney during a taped deposition. The attorney played portions of the tape during the trial. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s utterances constituted criminal contempt. We affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute over the surname of a child born to unmarried parents. The biological father (“Father”) of the minor child, seeks reversal of the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to change the child’s last name. Over the objections of the mother (“Mother”),1 Father sought to change his son’s last name to his own to reflect his paternity. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand.2

This case involves a dispute over custody of two children upon their parents’ divorce. The trial court awarded custody to Lynn Rose Watson (“Mother”) with visitation to Ferris E. Watson (“Father”). Father appeals, claiming he is comparatively the better parent. We affirm the award of custody to Mother.

This appeal involves a contract dispute between a manufacturer of automobile parts and one of its suppliers. After the manufacturer complained repeatedly about the quality of its parts, the supplier informed the manufacturer that it would no longer supply the parts even though two years remained on its contract. The manufacturer rejected a portion of the supplier’s last shipment of parts and contracted with another supplier to take over the manufacturing of the parts. The original supplier then filed suit against the manufacturer in the Chancery Court for Sumner County for the balance due on its last shipment, and the manufacturer counterclaimed for breach of the supply contract. The trial court heard the case without a jury and determined that the supplier had breached the supply contract but was also entitled to a set-off based on its last delivery of parts. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the manufacturer a $133,542.66 judgment against the supplier. On this appeal, the supplier takes issue with the judgment on three grounds: that the parties modified their original contract; that the manufacturer waived its breach of contract claim; and that the trial court did not employ the proper measure of damages. We have determined that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the supplier breached the contract but that the trial court incorrectly calculated the damages. Accordingly, we reduce the manufacturer’s     judgment against the supplier to $18,953.

The appellants have asked the court to rehear this appeal because we did not address the facial conflict between the definitions of Class II and Class III wildlife, leaving the public without any guidance as to what species are in Class II. Since the possession of Class II wildlife without a permit is a crime, and no permit is required for the possession of those species in Class III, the determination of what is included in Class II is the critical determination. And a person of ordinary intelligence must be able to make it. State v. Thomas, 635 S.W.2d 114 (Tenn. 1982).

This is a case involving breach of contract. Plaintiffs/appellants, Carl Scott and Alma Scott (referred to herein as “the Scotts”) appeal from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant/appellee, Rogers Group, Inc.