APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

As part of a divorce decree, the trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan for three minor children.  The court’s plan provided for substantially equal parenting time and joint decision making for major decisions.  The plan was expressly conditioned on the parents remaining within the children’s current school district after the divorce.  The father argues that neither equal parenting time nor joint decision making were appropriate based on the evidence presented.  And he maintains that the court lacked authority to include a residency requirement in the plan.  He also contends that the court failed to address some of his claims.  We conclude that the court, either expressly or implicitly, resolved all claims between the parties.  And because the court did not abuse its discretion in establishing the parenting plan, we affirm.

Following the return of his seized property under the forfeiture statutes, claimant asked the administrative law judge to award him attorney’s fees under two separate statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The administrative law judge awarded fees under only the former statute. Upon review by the chancery court, the decision to award fees under section 4-5-325(a) was reversed; the chancery court also ruled that claimant’s request for fees under the federal statute was waived or abandoned. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that claimant is not entitled to fees under section 4-5-325(a). We remand to the trial court for consideration of the previously pretermitted claim for attorney’s fees under section 1988(b). 

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined the petition must be summarily dismissed due to numerous and substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B section 2.02, including the failure to file a copy of the motion for recusal, supporting documents filed in the trial court, and a copy of the trial court’s order denying recusal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association concerning the scope and applicability of restrictive covenants. Two restrictive covenants are at issue. One is a covenant contained in the neighborhood’s 1984 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions that limited usage of the homes to residential use as “a residence by a single family.” The other is a covenant contained in a 2018 Amendment that relaxed the 1984 residential use restriction by authorizing short-term rentals of no less than 30 consecutive days, subject to specific criteria. The plaintiff, who purchased a home in the development in 2015 and has been leasing it on a short-term vacation rental basis to third parties as a business venture, seeks a declaratory judgment that he may lease his home for rentals as short as two days. For its part, the homeowners’ association seeks to enforce the restrictive covenants in the 1984 Declaration as well as the 2018 Amendment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association on both issues. In doing so, the court held that restrictions in the 1984 Declaration prohibited non-residential renting. The court also held that Plaintiff’s current use of his property is subject to the 2018 Amendment, which authorized short-term leasing subject to stipulations including that “[t]the length of the lease must be for a minimum of 30 consecutive days.” The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The juvenile court terminated on grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for her children. The court also determined that termination was in her children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

This is an action to set aside a change of beneficiary on a term life insurance policy under Tennessee’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“the TUFTA”), Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 66-3-301 to -314. The challenged event was the change of beneficiary from the wife of the insured/owner to two of their adult children, the form for which was executed by the wife as the attorney-in-fact for the insured/owner and transmitted to the insurance company the day before the insured/owner died. In pertinent part, the complaint alleged that the defendants—the wife and two adult children of the deceased insured/owner of the insurance policy—“devised and orchestrated” a “fraudulent scheme . . . to eliminate assets owned by [the insured’s wife] in the event that Plaintiffs obtain a judgment against her” in a separate civil action. The complaint further alleged that “[t]he transfer of the beneficiary interest in the . . . insurance policy was a fraudulent transfer under T.C.A. § 66-3-305(a)(1) because it was made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiffs as creditors defined under the Act.” The trial court dismissed the action under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted under the TUFTA. We affirm.

A guest sued a landlord for negligence after the guest was injured by a vicious animal while visiting the landlord’s tenant.  The landlord filed a motion for summary judgment that the trial court granted.  Because the undisputed facts establish that the landlord did not breach any duty owed to the guest, we affirm.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, denial of the husband’s request for alimony in futuro, grant to the wife of sole decision-making authority over the parties’ minor child, and grants to the wife of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. The husband, who received disability benefits for a prior mental health diagnosis, also appeals the trial court’s finding that he was voluntarily unemployed and the court’s denial of his motion to strike certain expert witness testimony. Having determined that an unspecified portion of the discretionary costs awarded to the wife for fees related to three expert witnesses, one vocational rehabilitation consultant and two psychiatrists, were not allowable under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), we vacate the trial court’s award of discretionary costs as to the fees for these three experts’ work with the exception of $2,070.00 in demonstrably allowable fees paid to the vocational consultant. We remand for a specific determination of the fees for these three experts allowable, if any, as an award of discretionary costs to the wife under Rule 54.04(2). We also modify the trial court’s award of discretionary costs to the wife for court reporter fees to reduce them slightly pursuant to Rule 54.04(2). We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment. We deny the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

On May 1, 1992, Barbara Matthews Law (“Wife”) and Halbert Grant Law, Jr. (“Husband”), executed a prenuptial agreement. They married the following day. Wife filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County in December of 2017. The parties disputed, inter alia, the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, as well as the classification and division of several assets. Trial was held over multiple days in 2019 and 2020, and the trial court entered its final decree divorcing the parties on July 31, 2020. The trial court held that the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, classified the parties’ assets, and divided the marital estate. Wife was awarded the parties’ family home and $4,500.00 per month in alimony in futuro. Husband appeals, challenging the classification of the parties’ home as marital property, as well as the classification of one bank account. Wife cross-appeals, challenging the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and the classification of several assets. Wife also requests increased alimony. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the parties’ prenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable. We reverse the trial court’s classification of three assets – the parties’ home, a checking account, and an investment account. We vacate the trial court’s decision as to those three assets and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In light of the changes in classification of several major assets, we also vacate and remand the trial court’s award of alimony for reconsideration.

This appeal concerns a claim of legal malpractice.  Xingkui Guo (“Plaintiff”) filed a lawsuit for legal malpractice in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against his former attorney Jon David Rogers (“Defendant”).  Defendant filed an answer denying Plaintiff’s allegations as well as a counterclaim alleging that Plaintiff failed to pay him in full pursuant to the terms of their agreement.  Defendant later filed motions for summary judgment as to both Plaintiff’s complaint against him and his counterclaim against Plaintiff.  The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motions for summary judgment.  Plaintiff appeals.  We hold, inter alia, that there is no genuine issue of material fact necessitating trial.  The undisputed material evidence shows that Plaintiff’s loss in the underlying lawsuit was not due to negligence in Defendant’s representation.  The undisputed material evidence shows further that Plaintiff breached his retainer agreement with Defendant by failing to pay him in full pursuant to the terms of the agreement.  We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal involves an employment termination case in which an employee of the City of Memphis witnessed the signing of a will, but after the decedent’s death, the probate court determined that the will submitted to probate did not bear the genuine signature of the decedent. Following an administrative appeal, the Civil Service Commission for the City of Memphis unanimously affirmed the decision of termination. The employee filed a petition for judicial review with the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the termination of the employee finding that the Civil Service Commission’s decision to sustain her termination was arbitrary and capricious. The chancery court reinstated the employee with full backpay and benefits. The City of Memphis appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action to recover personal property. The plaintiff, who is the former fiancé of the defendant, claimed the defendant retained some of her personal property after he forced her to vacate the premises where they previously resided. This action was initiated with the filing of a civil warrant in the general sessions court. After the general sessions court awarded the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $7,500, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. Following a trial, the circuit court awarded the plaintiff a judgment of $4,745.30. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

A gunshot victim filed a tort action against a county, alleging misconduct on the part of a sheriff’s deputy.  The plaintiff asserted that the county was liable under both the Governmental Tort Liability Act and Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302.  The county moved to dismiss the complaint.  The county argued that it was immune from liability under either the discretionary function exception or the public duty doctrine.  The trial court dismissed the complaint.  We conclude that, because the deputy sheriff’s actions as alleged in the complaint were operational in nature, the county is not immune from liability under the Governmental Tort Liability Act.  The complaint also contains sufficient factual allegations of reckless misconduct such that the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine could apply.  So we vacate the dismissal.

In proceedings between ex-spouses long after the entry of their final divorce decree, the trial court concluded that it lacked authority to order the division of service-related disability benefits.  The court also declared void a portion of the divorce decree that divided military retirement as marital property.  As a result of the rulings, one of the parties sought relief from the divorce decree, arguing that she should be awarded alimony.  The trial court denied relief.  We affirm with modifications. 

The plaintiff challenges the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s cause of action with prejudice. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion both as a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment despite stating in its order that it had not excluded extraneous evidence presented by the defendant and that it would treat the motion as one for summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion as a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss after having considered extraneous evidence and that the trial court erred by failing to include in its order the legal grounds for its decision to grant the defendant’s motion as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to file a proposed amended complaint in the trial court, we are unable to address the issue raised concerning the motion to amend the complaint. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and Rule 56.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court following the denial of a motion that sought the disqualification of the trial court judge. As explained herein, because we conclude that concerns contributing to an appearance of partiality necessitate the trial judge’s recusal, we reverse. In addition, we vacate an order on substantive matters that was signed by the trial judge while the recusal motion was pending.

A juvenile entered a best interest plea to and was adjudicated delinquent for the offense of sexual battery. The juvenile was placed on probation under the supervision of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. He sought relief through a
post-conviction petition in the trial court. The State moved to dismiss the petition. Pursuant to the juvenile’s concession that no valid claims could be brought, the trial court dismissed the petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a husband’s petition to terminate his alimony payments to his former wife.  The trial court declined husband’s request and instead found that there was a substantial and material change in wife’s circumstances such that an increase in alimony was necessary.  Because we conclude that this appeal was not timely filed, we are without subject matter jurisdiction and therefore dismiss the appeal.

This appeal involves termination of the parental rights of two parents who severely abused their child. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that one ground for termination existed based on a prior adjudication of severe child abuse and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights, focusing solely on the issue of best interest. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services presented clear and convincing proof of both grounds for termination and that the child’s best interests would be served by the termination of both parents’ parental rights, we affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, filed by John Kirk Tarver (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the judge in this case involving post-divorce matters. Following our thorough review of the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, we discern no error and therefore affirm.

This appeal involves a payment dispute among several companies, including a construction company, a concrete company, and a fabricator company, that ultimately centered on a question of alter-ego status. The trial court found that the concrete company and the construction company were one and the same, and therefore were alter egos of each other. The trial court granted the concrete company enforcement of its lien and awarded it the funds that were deposited in the clerk’s office for the work performed on a building project. The trial court also denied the fabricator company’s cross-claim against the construction company for breach of contract for subcontracting work to the concrete company. The concrete company appeals. We affirm.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

After expiration of the maximum sentence imposed for a non-violent felony conviction, a petitioner sought full restoration of his citizenship rights. The trial court restored all of the petitioner’s rights, except for his firearm rights. Discerning that the trial court erred in limiting the restoration of the petitioner’s rights, we reverse and remand.

This appeal relates to a healthcare liability action. The Claims Commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimants’ failure to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. We reverse the trial court and remand for dismissal.