APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an uninsured motorist insurance case. Plaintiff/Appellant, Janice C. Young, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to the unnamed Defendant/Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm).

This is an unemployment benefits case. The claimant’s employment was terminated, based on alleged misconduct. His application for employment benefits was denied. After administrative appeals, the chancery court affirmed the denial of benefits. The claimant appeals. We affirm the decision of the chancery court based on the claimant’s failure to timely file his petition for a writ of certiorari.

This suit involves a commercial lease agreement entered into by Agmark Foods, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, with Ideal Products, Inc. Plaintiff-Appellee, for container chassis used in transporting commodities and bulk products. Agmark Contends that the Chancellor improperly granted a summary judgment in favor of Ideal.

This is an attack on the service of a summons. The Chancery Court of Davidson County refused to set aside a default judgment based on the sheriff’s return. We affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case where in Ronnie Dale Netherton, Jr., sustained severe brain injury incident to his birth at Baptist Hospital, Inc. The Trial Judge granted a partial judgment in favor of Baptist as to any negligence alleged against it in connectin with the post-natal care of Plaintiff Ronnie Netherton, Jr. Although the Trial Judge overruled themotion for summary judgment alleging negligence by Baptist preceding Ronnie's birth, the Trial Judge, when ruling on the Plaintiff's motino to reconsider his orfer of partial summary judgment, overruled the motion and made the partial summary judgment final pursuant to Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in this appeal.

In this Declaratory Judgment action, the Trial Judge entered summary judgment against Employers Mutual Casualty Company, in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring “[t]he defendant owes the plaintiffs a duty of defense of the action pending in the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee, captioned Devin Phillips v. Toby Barnes . . . and further owes indemnity coverage respecting such claim , pursuant to the policies of insurance in question . . .”. The judgment was entered pursuant to T.R.C.P. Rule 54.02, and the insurance company has appealed that decision to this Court.

Paul Farnsworth, a pro se inmate, has appealed the trial court’s dismissal of this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action that was brought against numerous individually named defendants. Based upon the following, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.
 

This is a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant physician caused
the death of the decedent in the course of childbirth. The jury found in favor of the defendant physician. The plaintiff appeals, asserting error in the jury instructions and juror misconduct. We
affirm.

This case tests the power of the trial court to order an adult, slightly handicapped child to visit his father. The Chancery Court of Rutherford County held that it was the duty of the court to require the visitation. We hold that under the circumstances of this case the court exceeded its jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a chancery decree awardingspecific performance to the purchasers of a tract of real estate and denying a counterclaim for rent. The lower court rendered the decree after a full evidentiary hearing on the merits. The appellant has not furnished this court with a transcript of the evidence heard at the trial.

This is an appeal from a reduction in ordered child support.

This case involves eligibility for environmental cleanup funds. The plaintiff landowner appeals the decision of the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Tank Board finding the plaintiff ineligible to receive reimbursement from the petroleum underground storage tank fund established in Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-215-110. Upon initial review in chancery court, the Board’s decision was reversed. The trial court subsequently reconsidered its decision and, based on recent Tennessee appellate decisions, affirmed the Board’s decision to deny assistance. We affirm.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether an amendment to T.C. A.50 -1-304, (commonly knownn as the Whistle Blower Statute), which brough employees of the State of Tennessee within its purview, should be given retrospective effect.

This is a personal injury slip and fall case. The plaintiff was injured when she fell in the defendant’s restaurant due to a tray negligently left on the floor. The defendant restaurant admits liability but asserts that the evidence does not support the amount of the trial court’s award and seeks a remittitur. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified.

In its eminent domain proceeding, the City of Lafayette (City) took a small strip of Mark and Ruby Hammock’s land along the City’s right-of-way for an existing street.

The controversy giving rise to this appeal had its genesis in a service contract for washers and dryers entered into between Plaintiff Bill Jennings and Defendant Lawler-Wood, Inc., which manageg Maple Oak apartments for the owners. 

The appellant, Charles R. Brown, appeals as of right from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) by a Blount County jury. The defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. He was ordered to serve forty-eight hours in the county jail before being placed on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-seven days. The defendant was also fined $350. In this direct appeal, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury.

The court has correctly affirmed the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Darnall’s Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 1998) claim. Even though I concur with the court’s decision, I have prepared this separate opinion to state my understanding of the elements of a Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 claim. I find this restatement necessary because of the Western Section’s reliance on Johnson v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) in Merryman v. Central Parking Sys., Inc., No. 01A01-9203-CH-00076, 1992 WL 330404 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1992) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from summary judgment granted to the Defendants in a complaint asserting retaliatory discharge with the action based solely upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304.

The appellant states the issue before this Court thus:

A single, narrow issue is presented for consideration in this appeal: Does material evidence within the meaning of Rule 13d, appear in the record which suports the jury’s verdict of $140 ,000.00 in compensatory damages, and, if so, did the trial court erroneously grant a new trial?

The case history demonstrates that this issue is not properly before the Court for consideration.