APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant appeals the judgment entered against him by the trial court, ordering him to pay Appellee unpaid wages. We affirm.

This appeal involves the calculation of post-judgment interest applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121. The trial court calculated
post-judgment interest utilizing the statutory interest rate that was applicable when the judgment was entered without modifying the interest rate when the statutory rate subsequently changed. Discerning no error, we affirm. We also deny the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death lawsuit.  James Williams (“Plaintiff”), individually as next of kin and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Granville Earl Williams, Jr., deceased (“Decedent”), sued Smyrna Residential, LLC d/b/a Azalea Court and Americare Systems, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”).  Decedent was a resident of Azalea Court, an assisted living facility.  Plaintiff alleged his father died because of Defendants’ negligence.  Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into by Decedent’s daughter and durable power of attorney Karen Sams (“Sams”) on behalf of Decedent when the latter was admitted to Azalea Court.  Notably, the durable power of attorney (“the POA”) did not cover healthcare decision-making.  The Trial Court held that Sams lacked authority to enter into the Agreement and that, in any event, the wrongful death beneficiaries would not be bound by the Agreement even if it were enforceable.  Defendants appeal.  We affirm.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a computer teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole.  The Tennessee Board of Parole denied the inmate parole in March 2020.  The inmate’s administrative appeal was also denied.  Thereafter, the inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the chancery court.  However, the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice due to outstanding costs in prior civil cases.  The inmate then filed a second petition with the chancery court.  The chancery court dismissed the second petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not filed within sixty days of the Tennessee Board of Parole’s final decision in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102.  The inmate appeals.  We affirm.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, the school principal at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). With respect to her NIED claim, the principal alleged that by breaching its duty to keep the students safe, the employer foreseeably caused her severe emotional distress. As to her RIED claim, she averred that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving, despite receiving numerous warnings, disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss as to both claims, finding that the principal’s allegations satisfied the pleading requirements to sustain the claims. Employer appeals. We conclude that the principal did not allege the type of relationship to the injured or deceased party required for a plaintiff who did not witness the injury-producing event to recover under a NIED claim. The principal’s allegations also failed to show conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to both issues and remand the case for dismissal of the action against the employer.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff developer objected to the defendant town’s enforcement of a new energy code after the developer received preliminary plat approval.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant town.  We affirm. 

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court determined that both the husband and the wife had proven their grounds for divorce and declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129(b). The trial court also (1) declined to adopt the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, (2) determined that the separate assets she contributed to the marriage had become marital property through transmutation, and (3) declined to award attorney’s fees to her as alimony in solido. The wife has appealed, and the husband seeks attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, characterizing the wife’s appeal as frivolous. We affirm the trial court’s final order of divorce but modify the order to prohibit the husband from consuming alcohol during his co-parenting time. We decline to award the husband attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Woodmore’s school secretary sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The school secretary alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the school secretary had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the school secretary sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the secretary is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, an educational assistant at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The educational assistant alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused him serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the educational assistant had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that he had met all other pleading requirements to sustain his RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the educational assistant sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the educational assistant is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a fourth grade math and science teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This appeal involves an award of attorney fees after a remand from this Court.  The appellant argues that the statute authorizing such fees is inapplicable by its terms and also unconstitutional as a violation of her right to access the courts.  We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Because appellant failed to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B with regard to filing a recusal appeal, and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a decision by a city’s planning commission. The petitioner contends that the planning commission’s approval of modifications to a site plan for a planned unit development district were not minor, such that the proposed amendments should have been referred to the city’s council for consideration. The trial court ultimately determined that the modifications were minor and did not require referral to the council; accordingly, it dismissed the petition. We concur in the conclusion of the trial court and affirm its judgment.

In this divorce case, Husband contests the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of alimony to Wife. We affirm. 

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her four children on grounds of abandonment by failure to support, persistence of conditions, and failure to demonstrate a willingness and ability to assume physical custody or financial responsibility. We affirm. 

This case involves the purchase of a parcel of real property pursuant to an installment contract for deed.  After entering into the contract, the purchaser discovered the existence of a natural gas pipeline easement on the property.  The purchaser subsequently brought suit against the seller, arguing an anticipatory breach of contract and a breach of the warranty of title for failure to inform him of the easement.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller based on its finding that the easement was properly recorded and discoverable through the exercise of ordinary due diligence.  On appeal, we affirm. 

A grandfather commenced this action for grandparent visitation after his daughter and two granddaughters moved out of his house. While the action was pending, the trial court entered an agreed order that granted temporary visitation to the grandfather. When the mother refused to comply with the agreed order, the grandfather filed a motion for civil contempt. Following several delays, the petition for grandparent visitation and the motion for contempt came on for hearing on the same day. After the final hearing, the trial court denied both the petition for grandparent visitation and the motion for civil contempt. The court found that the grandfather failed to prove that losing his relationship with the children would create a risk of substantial harm to the children. The court also found that the mother’s failure to comply with the agreed order was not willful because she had been coerced into the agreement by her former attorney. This appeal followed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition for grandparent visitation. With regard to the motion for civil contempt, we find the issue is moot because the grandfather no longer had any right to visitation after this petition was dismissed. Thus, the contempt issue is pretermitted on the basis of mootness.

In this post-divorce action, Douglas Patrick Hoering (“Husband”) petitioned for a modification of his periodic alimony payment to Marlita Dapar (“Wife”), alleging that “she is no longer suffering from a financial disadvantage, as she has obtained housing and support from her paramour for some time.” The trial court ordered a reduction in Husband’s monthly spousal support payment from $1,200 to $600, in a judgment containing no findings of fact. Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that Husband failed to demonstrate a substantial and material change of circumstances that would warrant decreasing his payment of alimony in futuro to Wife. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This personal injury action arose following a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff timely commenced an action in which she sought $1 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. After the defendant was served but failed to file an answer to the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted as to liability only, leaving open the amount of damages to be awarded. The case remained dormant for seven years until the plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint that increased the request for compensatory damages from $1 million to $2 million. The amended complaint, however, was never served on the defendant. Thereafter, a final judgment was entered in which the plaintiff was awarded the monetary damages she sought in the amended complaint, that being $2 million for compensatory damages and $1 million for punitive damages. Seventeen months later, and after paying $30,000 toward the $3 million judgment, the defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) motion to set aside the default judgment on the ground the judgment was void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff opposed the motion arguing, inter alia, that the Rule 60.02(3) motion was untimely and that it should be denied based on exceptional circumstances as recognized in Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2015). Following a hearing and finding the motion timely, the trial court determined (1) that the defendant had not been served with the amended complaint, (2) that the judgment was void, and (3) that the plaintiff had not proven the requisite exceptional circumstances to deprive the defendant of Rule 60 relief due to the plaintiff’s failure to establish another person’s detrimental reliance on the void judgment. We affirm.

In this case involving a petition for grandparent visitation, where the minor child’s parents had divorced and the mother had been admitted to an inpatient rehabilitation facility, the maternal grandparents asserted that the minor child’s father had prevented them from visiting with the child once the father had obtained full custody of the child. The trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently granted to the grandparents monthly visitation with the child plus additional time during school breaks and holidays. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We decline, however, to grant an award of attorney’s fees to the grandparents on appeal.

In a parentage action, the juvenile court adopted a permanent parenting plan and determined the father’s child support obligation.  The court also declined a request to change the child’s name.  On appeal, both parents take issue with the parenting plan, and the mother claims that the father’s income was higher than found by the court.  Despite their differences, the parents agree that the court’s order contains insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We vacate in part and remand.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Father appeals a default judgment entered against him as a sanction that: 1) modified the parties’ parenting plan and decreased his child support obligation based on the emancipation of one of his children and 2) awarded Mother a monetary judgment in the amount of $7,635 ($2,000 as reimbursement for half of the middle child’s vehicle; $500 for sanctions not paid; and $5,135 for attorney’s fees and court costs paid by Mother).  Father filed a motion requesting the trial court to set aside the default judgment, asserting he did not receive proper notice of Mother’s motion for default.  The trial court summarily denied Father’s motion without holding a hearing.  We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

In this healthcare liability action, a decedent’s estate and her son sued a nursing home and the county that owned the nursing home, alleging that the nursing home was negligent in the care of the decedent. The nursing home and the county filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the certificate of good faith filing requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. The trial court denied the motion, finding that an exhibit attached to the complaint satisfied the certificate of good faith filing requirement. Because the exhibit did not contain all of the information required for a certificate of good faith, we reverse and remand.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Brenda F.1 (“Mother”) and David F. (“Father”) to their three children who were then minors. As grounds, DCS alleged: (1) abandonment by failure to visit one of the children, Orian F.; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home for the children; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; (5) incompetency of the parents to provide care and supervision of the children; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The trial court found that DCS established all six grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Although the parents have appealed only the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and the trial court’s best interest findings, we have reviewed all of the alleged grounds, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.