APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur i the resulst of the majority opinion, but would base that result on different reasoning.

In this divorce action, the wife appeals from the Trial Court’s Order of child support and the evaluation of the marital estate and its distribution.

In this divorce case, the appellant Etta Mechelle Parks argues that the trial court erred in awarding her former husband, Craig Dewayne Parks, custody of their two boys, ages seven and almost four. We do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s custody decree. See Rule 13(d), T.R.A.P.; Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in placing the children’s sole custody with Mr. Parks. See Grant v. Grant, 286 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tenn.App. 1954).

In this post-divorce case, the trial court denied the petition of Terri Lee Wooten, formerly Wolfe (“Mother”), seeking sole custody of the parties’ daughter, Kelsea Wolfe, age five and a half. In the same order, the court granted the counterclaim of Patrick Alan Wolfe (“Father”) by modifying Mother’s visitation rights. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to change the child’s custody. She also claims that the court erred in modifying the visitation schedule set forth in the divorce judgment.

Following the trial of this matter, the court ordered the parties, Leslie A. Hassell (Wife) and Thomas W. Hassell (Husband), to be entitled to a divorce pursuant to T.C.A . § 36 -4 -129 ( b ) . Husband was ordered to pay Wife $500 per month as alimony in futuro and that award is the sole issue presented by Husband to this court on appeal.

The Trial dismissed plaintiffs’ causes of action for personal injury on the basis that the statute of limitations had run before the action was properly brought, pursuant to Rule 3, T.R.C.P.

This case involves the possession of real estate after foreclosure proceedings. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that Appellees were entitled to possession of the real estate in question. We affirm.

This suit was initiated by Plaintiff-Appellant, Wendell Goodwin, against Defendants-Appellees, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, and a number of  other Defendants, seeking damages because of an illness Mr. Goodwin contracted -- specifically a stomach cancer known as peritoneal mesothelioma -- resulting from his occupational exposure to asbestos products manufactured and distributed by the Defendants, including Pittsburgh Corning and Owens-Corning. The Trial Court, in sresonse to the answers supplied by the jury through special interrogatories hereinafter set out, entered a judgment in favor of the Defendants because the Plaintiff's claim was barred by the applicable statute of repose, T.C. A . 29 -28 -103(a).

Samuel L. Banks, a doctor, and Cathy J. Stancil, a nurse, appeal a jury verdict rendered against them in favor of their former patient, Jacqueline Sue Rogers.  Ms. Rogers brought two actions of medical malpractice in the Hamilton County Circuit Court.  One action was brought against Dr. Banks, her treating  physician.  The other action was brought against Nurse Stancil.  Nurse Stancil performed the majority of the procedure in question. Judge Robert M. Summitt denied motions for directed verdict after Ms. Rogers presented her case and again after Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil presented their case.  Both actions were submitted to the jury.  The jury returned a general verdict against both Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil for $60,000.  Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil both filed motions for judgments not withstanding the verdict as well as motions for a new trial.  Judge Summitt overruled these motions and upheld the jury award.  We now reverse the judgment below and dismiss boith suits with prejudice.

This is a post-divorce decree proceeding to adjust the amount of periodic alimony. The wife has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court increasing the alimony from $1,000 per month to $1,350 per month.

The plaintiff, Ervin Smith, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court as to his rights in regard to an alleged public right-of-way on property adjoining plaintiff’s land.

In this construction contract dispute, the Chancery Court of Montgomery County granted a judgment plus prejudgment interest to Razorback Marble Manufacturing Company, Inc. On appeal, Roberts Construction Company, Inc. and D. D. Roberts, Individually, raise issues pertaining to the Contractor’s Licensing statutes and the Notice of Non-Payments statute. Razorback insists that it was due a larger judgment and a greater award of prejudgment interest.

This appeal involves another chapter in a lingering, acrimonious dispute between two Nashville lawyers stemming from a failed settlement of a case in federal court. After one of the lawyers abandoned his third-party complaint against the other lawyer for fraudulent misrepresentation, the other lawyer filed a malicious prosecution action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. When the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was premature, the prevailing lawyer sought Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against the lawyer whose malicious prosecution claim had been dismissed. The trial court declined to grant sanctions, and the lawyer seeking sanctions has appealed. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s decision not to award sanctions and, therefore, affirm the trial court’s decision.

I concur in Judge Todd’s opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendants. I write separately simply to emphasize the following points:

First, the bonus plan allowed the plaintiffs to purchase shares of the company at a price below the market price. When the plaintiffs left the company before the shares fully vested, they did not forfeit their investment; they simply lost the difference between what they had invested and the market value of the shares. The difference in the purchase price and the market value is what this controversy is about.

This appeal involves a dispute over a real estate commission on four retail properties in Memphis. After a former client leased these properties, a real estate broker filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a commission from its former client and the lessors of the four properties. The trial court granted the former client’s motion for summary judgment and, following a bench trial, dismissed the broker’s claims against the four lessors. On this appeal, the broker asserts that the trial court erred by granting his former client’s summary judgment motion and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s dismissal of his claims against the four lessors. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the summary judgment motion and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the four lessors.

This is a child support case. The Chancery Court of Wilson County set the mother’s obligation of support at $723.00 per month. The mother appeals and asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment below.

Mary Ardelle Gower died on August 11, 1995 in Wayne County, Tennessee at the age of 73. Her will was offered for probate by William Steven Jones, the executor therein named and the sole beneficiary of the will.

This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of a provision allocating the responsibility for paying legal expenses in the event of a default or breach of two leases. The lessee filed suit against the lessor in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration that the leases had expired and requesting its attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of the lease agreements. The trial court granted the lessee’s motion for summary judgment and declared that the leases had expired but denied the lessee’s claim for legal expenses. The lessee has appealed. We have determined that the trial court correctly interpreted the lease agreements and, therefore, affirm the summary judgment.

The question in this case is whether a purchaser of mortgaged property, who pays off the mortgage, takes an assignment of the note and deed of trust, and subsequently releases the deed of trust, can then sue the original mortgagee on the note. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the action. We affirm.