APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Stephen Cobb (“petitioner”) filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court of Lake County against Joseph Vinson, Chairman of the Lake County Regional Correctional Facility disciplinary board (“LCRCF”); Billy Compton, warden of LCRCF; and Donal Campbell (“commissioner”), commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (collectively “respondents”) seeking court review of actions taken by the prison disciplinary board, prison warden, and department commissioner. Due process violations resulting therefrom were also alleged. The trial court granted respondents’ motion for dismissal for improper venue and petitioner has appealed. On appeal, a single issue was presented for our review: whether the trial court erred in granting respondents’ motion to dismiss for improper venue. For reasons state hereinafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This is a suit to establish a resulting trust and to recover for the breach thereof. Plaintiff/Appellee Rovene Lowe (Lowe) brought suit alleging a resulting trust and seeking damages arising from an alleged breach by Defendants/Appellants Winnie Sue Sanders Cannon  (Mrs. Cannon) and Robert Cannon (Mr. Cannon).  Charles Sanders died in 1990. The trial court found that Lowe had proven the existence of a resulting trust and that the Cannons had breached the trust. Consequently, the trial court awarded Lowe $15,840 in damages. The Cannons appeal.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Plaintiff, The Oak Ridge Boys, Inc., appeals the order of the trial court which affirmed the decision of the Board of Review of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security to award benefits to Steve Sanders.
 

Plaintiff Carver Plumbing Company, Inc. (Carver Plumbing), appeals the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of Carver Plumbing’s former attorney, Defendant/Appellee Martha Cone Beck (Beck). We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Carver Plumbing’s action against Beck is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions.

This is an appeal from a divorce decree in which the only issue is which parent should have principal custody of Luke, the minor child of the parties who was born July 13, 1993. The divorce decree of the Trial Court granted principal custody to the father, and the mother appealed to this Court. Her sole issue on appeal is: The Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiff/Appellant primary custody of the minor child of this marriage.

This is an appeal of two cases consolidated for trial. Both cases originated in the General Sessions Court of Maury County, Tennessee and are styled as follows:

Ken Hopkins and wife Pam Hopkins,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Jim Bonner, Individually and d/b/a
EZA Aquaglass Pools,
Defendant.
___________________________________
Kerry Garland,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Jim Bonner, individually and d/b/a
EZA Aquaglass Pools,
Defendant.

This is a will contest case involving a succession of wills, disputes as to the testamentary capacity of the testator at the time of the making of each of the wills, and the standing of the contestants. At the present stage of the proceedings, the contestants are in the position of plaintiffs, because they initiated the contest.

This is a post-divorce child custody suit. Joseph Weibel III (“father”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against Jacqueline Brewer (“mother”) seeking to have custody of the parties’ minor child, Joseph Weibel IV, (“Joey”) changed from mother to father. Mother had primary  physical custody of the parties’ child pursuant to a consent order calling for joint custody. Following a hearing, the chancellor awarded father sole custody, with mother having extensive visitation. The court also ordered father to pay mother’s attorney fees and expenses in connection with the litigation. Mother has raised two issues by this appeal. First, whether the evidence preponderates against the finding of the chancellor that it was in the best interest of the parties’ child to award custody to father. And  second, although father was directed to pay mother’s attorney fees and litigation expenses in connection with the trial below, mother as appellant herein raises the issue of whether the chancellor abused his discretion in directing father to pay mother’s attorney fees. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the award of custody to father and reverse the award of  attorney fees to mother.

This is a breach of contract case involving the enforcement of an arbitration clause. We find the arbitration clause applicable, reverse the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for
arbitration.

This appeal is from the action by the trial court on a contempt citation by the Appellant, hereinafter “Wife,” and a Petition to Modify the original Divorce Decree and a motion under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., brought by the Appellee, hereinafter “Husband.”

This is a premises liability case under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant governmental entity. We affirm.

I concur with the Court’s decision on the ground that the summaries of Harold L. Jenkins’s financial records indicate a lack of trustworthiness because of their method of compilation and their incompleteness.

Plaintiff Patty M. Richards appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants/Appellees O’Connor Management, Inc., and Russ Hackett.In entering summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, the trial court dismissed Richards’ claims for outrageous conduct and false imprisonment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant Harriet C. Upton, now known as Harriet Cathey, appeals the trial court’s final judgment awarding Plaintiff/Appellee James B. Oliver the sum of $15,225.66, continuing in effect the lis pendens filed against the subject property pending Cathey’s satisfaction of the judgment, denying Cathey’s request for attorney’s fees, and assessing forty percent (40%) of the costs against Cathey. We affirm the judgment in part (with modifications), reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This somewhat protracted litigation began in August 1993 when Brian Keith Feather (Husband) filed for divorce from Dolly deKrafft Feather (Wife). A divorce decree was entered by the chancery court in September 1994, which, inter alia, dissolved the fifteen year marriage of the parties and determined custody of their four minor children. Separate orders pertaining to the case were entered by the trial court in August and October, 1995, respectively. Both parties appealed therefrom, but this Court in April 1996, determined that the parties’ respective appeals were from a nonfinal judgment. Litigation thereafter continued due to the parties’ filings of various petitions for contempt, to rehear and to modify custody. After additional hearings, the trial court entered its final judgment in December 1996 from which both parties have appealed.1 The primary issues before us concern the trial court’s decisions regarding child custody and classification and division of the marital estate. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm as modified.

In this divorce case, the defendant-counter claimant husband has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing the husband’s counterclaim; granting the wife a divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct, $750 per month alimony until her death or remarriage, and $10,000.00 attorneys fees; and dividing the marital estate.

The defendants, Robert and Deborah Koch, have appealed from a non jury judgment that plaintiffs, Joseph and Gloria Gannon, have a private easement from their land across the land of
defendants for access to the public way.

I agree with the majority’s analysis in this case. However, I concur separately to emphasize
that our review, under either the common law writ of certiorari or the statutory writ, should be
limited to hearing the petitioner’s claims regarding “the illegality of acts taken by the disciplinary
board.” Williams v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, No. 02A01-9503-CV-00046 1995 WL 575142
(Tenn. App. Oct. 2 1995). Even if the requirements of a statutory writ of certiorari are met, our
review should not include the substance of the disciplinary proceeding, i.e. whether the petitioner
actually committed the acts with which he was charged.