APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant and his wife, Diane, alleging that defendant “entered into agreement with plaintiff for plaintiff to grade and excavate . . . in order to make said land usable”. Plaintiff further averred that he expended over $29,000.00 for heavy equipment and operators on excavation, and “purchased and installed piping at the cost of $3,604.00, for a total due in the amount of $33,530.09".

The plaintiff, Wade Spurling, D.C., appeals from the order of the trial court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) T.R.C.P. Spurling filed a complaint titled “Complaint For Deceit in Inducement to Contract, Promissory Fraud, Fraud, Intentional Interference With Performance ofContractual Obligations and Breach of Contract.” The complaint alleges that Plaintiff owned and operated Spurling Chiropractic Clinic (SCC). He entered into negotiations with Defendant Michael K. Plambeck (Plambeck) for Plambeck to purchase SCC.

In this contract action, the Trial Judge entered judgment for plaintiff against defendant in the amount of $50,431.29, and dismissed defendant’s counterclaim which had sought damages for plaintiff’s alleged breach of the distributorship agreement.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant made an intentional misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a tract of unimproved real property. Following a bench trial, the court found that the defendant, Dean Russell Carrico (“Carrico”), had fraudulently misrepresented a material fact, resulting in a judgment of $21,911.97 for the plaintiff, Dr. Robert W. Bagby (“Bagby”). The trial court also found that Carrico’s conduct violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, T.C.A. § 47-18-101, et seq. (“the Act”). Carrico appealed, raising three issues that present the following questions for our review:

In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on defendants’ premises, the Trial Judge granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R.C.P. 12.02(6), and plaintiff has appealed.

This is a post-divorce case. Paul William McGaffic filed a petition seeking to modify his child support and periodic alimony in futuro obligations. As pertinent to the issues on
this appeal, the trial court refused to modify its existing child support and alimony in futuro decrees. Mr. McGaffic appealed, raising issues that essentially present the following questions: 1. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its alimony in futuro award by either terminating it, or reducing it and/or converting it to an award of rehabilitative alimony? 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its child support award?

This is a suit for declaratory judgment. The petitioner, TRW Koyo Steering Systems Company (“TRW Koyo”), seeks a declaration that a document filed by the defendant, John D. Snavely (“Snavely”), in the Monroe County Register of Deeds’ office is a cloud on its title to real property in Monroe County. The trial court granted TRW Koyo summary judgment, decreeing that the purported lien filed by Snavely “is...of no legal effect and, thus, is lifted and removed from [TRW Koyo’s] title.” Snavely appealed pro se.

In this divorce action brought by Gloria E. Hill-Evans (Mother) against Bredell Michael Evans, Sr. (Father), the trial court awarded custody of the parties’ two minor sons to Mother with Father to have reasonable visitation. However, the trial court’s decree further provided that visitation be suspended “until both of the parties and the children have completed a counseling program which is satisfactory to the court, and the court has been furnished a report that the counseling course has been successfully completed. When the counseling process has been successfully completed, the court will consider the defendant’s visitation rights.”

This dispute arose out of the sale of a residence in Signal Mountain, Tennessee. The trial court found that the sellers, Thomas F. Cofer and wife, Cynthia H. Cofer, had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“the Act”) in connection with the sale of their five-bedroom, two and a halfbath residence to the plaintiffs, Theoren J. Murvin and wife, Melody S. Murvin. The Cofers appealed, arguing that the Act does not apply to this transaction, and that the evidence does not show that the Cofers “knowingly withheld information from the [Murvins] to constitute fraud.”

I concur in the result reached in Judge Todd’s opinion. My only reasonfor writing separately is to focus on what I perceive to be decisive in this case: the fact that the defendant did not violate a duty to the plaintiff. In that way, I avoid the nagging problem of the court apportioning fault in a case in which the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial.

This appeal involves the dissolution of a nineteen-year marriage. The wife filed suit for divorce in the Chancery Court for Sumner County but then suspended the proceedings while the parties attempted to reconcile. The efforts proved fruitless, and, following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the grounds of adultery. The trial court also awarded the wife custody of the parties’ two children, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife spousal support as well as additional funds for her legal expenses. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the financial aspects of the divorce decree, including the division of the marital property, the long-term spousal support award, and the additional award to defray the wife’s legal expenses at trial. While the trial court properly divided the marital property and awarded the wife funds for her legal expenses at trial, we modify the spousal support award to provide for rehabilitative alimony and for reduced longterm spousal support.

The plaintiff, Fredrika A. Steiner, has appealed from the summary dismissal of her suit against the defendant, The Parman Corporation, for damages for personal injury sustained in a fall on the premises of  defendant.

This appeal involves a prisoner’s medical malpractice suit stemming from the repair of an epigastric hernia. The prisoner filed a pro se complaint against the surgeon who had performed the surgery, the hospital where the surgery was performed, and a physician and physician’s assistant employed by the prison. The Circuit Court for Davidson County first granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the physician’s assistant and later granted the summary judgment motion filed by the hospital. The prisoner appealed from the order summarily dismissing his claims against the hospital. We have determined that the prisoner’s appeal must be dismissed because he has not complied with the mandatory requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f) and 4(a).

The plaintiffs, Ginger C. Snead and James D. Snead, sued the defendant, Lois A. Metts as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on July 22, 1994. It is undisputed that the car driven by Ms. Metts struck the car driven by Ms. Snead in the rear while the Snead vehicle was stopped at a stop sign. Ms. Snead sued for injuries and damages and Mr. Snead sued for loss of consortium.
 

This case involves a petition for the modification of alimony payments. The ex-husband
appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to reduce his alimony obligations to his ex-wife. We
affirm.

This appeal involves a trial court’s discretion not to employ the mechanisms in Title IV-D for the payment and collection of child support. In a post-divorce proceeding seeking changes in visitation and child support arrangements, the Circuit Court for Davidson County declined to order the obligor parent to execute a wage assignment or to pay child support through the trial court clerk. On this appeal, the Attorney General and Reporter, on behalf of the Title IV-D contractor who represented the custodial parent, asserts that the trial court was statutorily required to direct the non-custodial parent to pay child support through the trial court clerk. We agree. Even though requiring the child support to be paid through the trial court clerk will, in this case, extract an unnecessary five percent penalty from the noncustodial spouse, paying child support through the trial court clerk is statutorily required in Title IV-D proceedings.

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Antonio Sweatt, from an order of the Davidson County Chancery Court dismissing Appellant’s petition against respondents/appellees Robert Conley, William Calhoun, Dale Basham, Shelia Roberts, Hattie Moore, Edna Freeman, and Dr. Harold Butler. The chancery court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice after determining Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

This appeal involves a posthumous paternity dispute. While the decedent’s estate was pending in probate court, a person claiming to be the decedent’s son filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Van Buren County against the decedent’s estate and his widow seeking to establish the petitioner’s right to inherit part of the decedent’s estate. The trial court  heard the evidence without a jury and determined that the petitioner had presented clear and convincing evidence that he was the decedent’s  biological son. The decedent’s wife asserts on this appeal that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal presents a custody and visitation dispute. The parties were declared divorced in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County, and the wife received sole custody of the parties’ three minor children. Six months later, the wife moved to Mississippi, and the father petitioned for a change of custody. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the father custody of the children after concluding that there had been a material change of circumstances and that placing the children in the father’s custody would be in their best interests. The mother asserts on this appeal that the evidence does not support the trial court’s decision. We agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment.

This interlocutory appeal involves the right of a party to discover the appraisal report of a testifying expert in a condemnation case. The Circuit Court for Sumner County denied the property owners’ request for the appraisal report in order to prepare to depose the appraiser on the grounds that the report is “privileged, as work porduct [sic]” but granted the property owners permission to apply for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation in this case. Because the application and the response thereto fully set forth the parties’ positions and the material facts, we dispense with further briefing and oral argument and proceed to the merits in order to save the parties additional time and expense.1 We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case with instructions to enter an order compelling the production of the testifying appraiser’s reports.
 

This appeal involves a trial court’s authority to enter and enforce a child support award when proceedings involving the child were already pending in another court. After the Wayne County Juvenile Court gave custody of the child to the State in a dependent and neglect proceeding, the Department of Human Services filed separate petitions in the Chancery Court for Wayne County seeking to require the child’s divorced parents to pay child support. The trial court directed both parents to pay child support to the State. After the State’s repeated efforts over five years to require the mother to pay child support, she questioned the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction because the dependent and neglect proceeding was still pending in the juvenile court. The trial court denied the mother’s motion to dismiss, and on this appeal, the mother renews her claim that the trial court should have deferred to the juvenile court. We agree and, therefore, reverse the order denying the mother’s motion to dismiss.

This is a legal malpractice action. The trial court dismissed the action as time-barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.

This suit involves an action for the redemption of preferred stock. The trial court found that the stock could be redeemed even though the redemption would render the corporation unable to pay its debts in the normal course of business. We reverse and remand.

Defendant William Mark Yates (Husband) appeals the final divorce decree entered by the trial court which awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child to Plaintiff/Appellee Janice Blalock Yates (Wife), ordered the Husband to pay child support and alimony in solido to the Wife, and distributed the parties’ real and personal property. We affirm.