APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Randall W. Swift, from the decision of the Cheatham County Circuit Court dismissing his appeal from the general sessions court. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

This interlocutory appeal involves a boundary line dispute between neighbors who live along Wilmouth Creek in Cannon County. Following inconclusive litigation between two of their neighbors, the owners of one of the tracts filed a boundary line action in the Chancery Court for Cannon County against the owners of one of the adjoining tracts that had been involved in the earlier litigation. The defending landowners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the decision in the earlier litigation was res judicata as to the plaintiff landowners’ claims. The trial court denied the motion but grante permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the application for permission to appeal and now affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss because the parties in this case and the former case are not the same.

This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Pig Improvement Co., Inc., from a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissing Pig Improvements’s complaint against defendants/appellees, Curt Reaver and Richard Alan Tracey, Jr. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

The purchaser of a subdivision lot sued his agent and the sellers’ agent because the lot could not be approved for a septic tank. His complaint stated causes of action for fraud, negligence, and a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Chancery Court of Sumner County granted summary judgment to both agents. We reverse the simple negligence claim as to the purchaser’s own agent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael George Long, from that portion of the trial court’s judgment which awarded alimony in futuro to his former wife, Diana Sue Long, who was the plaintiff below.

This appeal involves a woman who broke both ankles in a fall at church. The woman and her husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Williamson County against the church and others. The trial court granted the church’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and the joint enterprise rule.The woman and her husband perfected this appeal after obtaining post-judgment relief from an inappropriate interlocutory appeal. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the post-judgment relief but erred in summarily dismissing the complaint.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael George Long, from that portion of the trial court’s judgment which awarded alimony in futuro to his former wife, Diana Sue Long, who was the plaintiff below.

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Mary Jane Bohlen Duggan, from the decision of the trial court modifying the child support obligation of respondent/appellee, Frederick Louis Bohlen, III, and interpreting the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and a later amendment to the MDA. The court concluded Mr. Bohlen was not in contempt and required him to pay $860.00 per month for the parties’ youngest child, $250.00 per month for each child over eighteen and under twenty-two provided the child is receiving a postgraduate education, andone-half of the children’s postgraduate education expenses. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Williamson County Chancery Court. Plaintiff/appellant, Susanna Gregg, claims the chancery court erred when it denied her claim to attorney’s fees, and defendant/appellee, Steven D. Graham, claims the chancery court erred when it failed to dismiss the claim as outside the statute of limitations. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows: Defendant and his ex-wife, Lori G. Graham, entered into an agreement with Plaintiff and her husband, Donald Kanatack, for the lease/purchase of a piece of real estate. Defendant executed a note and a deed of trust in favor of Plaintiff and her husband on 15 March 1986. In exchange for the note, Plaintiff and her husband gave Defendant and Ms. Graham $10,477.17, which they used to pay real estate commissions and to set up an escrow account for repairs. The note listed the date of maturity as “on or at closing,” and the lease/purchase agreement listed the date of closing as 17 February 1988. Both the note and the deed contained provisions allowing Plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees if Plaintiff had to file suit to recover under each agreement. At the time of execution, however, the parties modified the note by drawing an “X” over five consecutive paragraphs. One of these paragraphs included the provision allowing the note holder to recover costs and expenses under certain circumstances.1 The parties failed to pay the note on 17 February 1988. The parties extended the original lease/purchase agreement for an additional year by executing an addendum on 27 May 1988. The new closing date passed without incident and both parties continued as they had in the contract for two additional years. A fire occurred on the property in 1990 while Plaintiff still occupied it.  After the insurance company paid the settlement to Defendant, he evicted Plaintiff from the property.

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1 In this case, the decedent, Ora Sloan Blankenship (“Blankenship”), 84 years old, died on June 24, 1994. Subsequently, a petition was filed to probate Blankenship’s alleged holographic will. The purported holographic will named one of Blankenship’s sisters, Kathryn Braden (“Braden”) and Blankenship’s nephew, Steve Sloan (“Sloan”) as co-representatives of the estate.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory ruling which the Trial Judge rendered final as provided by TRCP Rule 54.02. The controversy on appeal is between St. Paul Insurance Company, a/k/a Economy Fire and Casualty Company, (hereafter St. Paul), and Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance  Company (hereafter Tennessee Farmers). The plaintiffs have filed a brief in support of their interest in the disposition of the appeal.

This controversy arose as a result of a contract entered into between Robert E. Leonard and his wife, Vickie J. Leonard and Butler Markland. The contract provided that Mr. Markland would build a house on a lot owned by the Leonards at a total cost of $96,000.

This is an action for breach of an employment contract and deprivation of civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff employee. We
reverse.

The question in this case is whether a state employee protected by civil service has a right to be heard before being reclassified to the unprotected executive service. The Chancery Court of Davidson County held that the employee had a right to grieve the reclassification. We affirm.

This medical malpractice suit arises out of surgery performed on Sandry Scott's freet by Dr. Gerald Calia on May 17, 1989. Ms. Scott contends that Dr. Calia was negligent in his medical care of her. She insists on appeal that the Trial Court was in error in directing a verdict against her at the close of her proof.

The question in this case is whether the alimony set by the court was subject to modification.  The trial judge terminated the alimony upon the wife’s remarriage.  We affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on two grounds: (1) probable cause and (2) damages -- neither of which is presented with  much clarity in the briefs. But the issues are of such importance to the practice of law in this state that I feel they should be addressed.

In this action for separate maintenance, the trial court awarded Ann Elizabeth 2 Dudenhoeffer (“Wife”) a decree of separate maintenance and dismissed George Daniel Dudenhoeffer’s (“Husband”) counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court ordered Husband
 to maintain Wife as an insured on his medical insurance policy until Wife reaches age sixty-five and ordered Husband to maintain his three preexisting life insurance policies designating Wife as the sole irrevocable beneficiary. Wife was awarded the following: the marital residence, an automobile, Wife’s IRA account, Husband’s IRA account, one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits, the remaining balance of Husband’s 401-K account, a certificate of deposit, eighty-eight shares of Tenneco stock, the proceeds from a savings account, all savings bonds in Wife’s possession, two burial plots, an annuity, and the parties’ jointly owned personal property and household goods which Wife had in her possession. Husband was awarded the personal property which he had in his possession, a truck, a bass boat, a motor, a trailer, boating accessories, and proceeds previously withdrawn by him from his 401-K account. The trial court awarded Wife $6,638.50 as alimony in solido to aid Wife in paying her attorney fees and alimony in futuro in the following amounts:
$2,000.00 per month beginning 10/1/95 and ending 12/31/95;
$1,800.00 per month beginning 1/1/96 and ending 12/31/96;
$1,500.00 per month beginning 1/1/97 and ending 12/31/98;
$1,200.00 per month beginning 1/1/99 and ending 9/5/2001,

Wife’s sixty-fifth birthday; and $600.00 per month from 9/2001 until Wife’s death or remarriage.

In this case involving a breach of a real estate contract, the appellant asserts that the evidence preponderates against the amount of damages found and the award of prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.