APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a suit for damages brought by Plaintiff Brian Wolney (“Wolney”), with his wife Melissa Wolney, against Defendants Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation (“WFA”) and Lisa M. Emmons (“Emmons”). Wolney sued for personal injuries he sustained in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Emmons, but owned by WFA. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of WFA, finding that Wolney’s tort claim against WFA was barred because Wolney was WFA’s statutory employee. The Wolneys appeal the grant of partial summary judgment. We affirm.

This is a will construction case. Respondent, Ikie Briggs, appeals from the order of the probate court construing the Last Will and Testament of Odessa V. Briggs in favor of the petitioner, Frances Duncan Briggs.

The petition for rehearing filed in behalf of the Appellants is denied.

In this medical malpractice action, the Plaintiffs, Joseph and Kathleen Chidester, 2 filed suit against the Defendant, Dr. L. D. Elliston, for failing to diagnose the Plaintiff’s malignant tumor. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment holding that the Plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the one year statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs’ have appealed the trial court’s order arguing that the statute of limitations does not bar this action because the Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until the Plaintiff’s malignancy recurred. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the judgment of the court below and remand.

This is an appeal from a Final Decree of Divorce entered January 5, 1996. Plaintiff, Sherry Denise Thearp Ervin (Wife), appeals from the order of the trial court granting her an absolute divorce from the defendant, Dale Edward Ervin (Husband). 1 In her first issue, Wife argues that the trial court should have awarded her the parties’ ski boat. We will consider this assertion with the second issue. 2 Wife appeals the trial court’s decision concerning the division of the marital property, the amount of child support, and the denial of an award of attorneys’ fees.

In this unemployment compensation case, James Mitchell (“Mitchell”) filed a claim 2 for unemployment compensation with the Tennessee Department of Employment Security (“TDES”). TDES approved Mitchell’s claim, and Mitchell’s employer, NOMA Outdoor Products, Inc. (“NOMA”), appealed TDES’ claim approval. On appeal, the Appeals Tribunal ruled that Mitchell was not eligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-7-303(a)(2) due to work-connected misconduct and declared that the $1,190.00 in unemployment benefits that Mitchell had previously received was an overpayment. Mitchell thereafter requested that TDES waive his $1,190.00 overpayment pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-7-303(d)(2). The Appeals Tribunal denied Mitchell’s request for a waiver of the overpayment, and Mitchell appealed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal to the Board of Review. The Board of Review adopted the findings of fact and decision of the Appeals Tribunal and denied Mitchell’s request for a waiver of the overpayment. Mitchell thereafter filed a petition to rehear which was denied by the Board of Review. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-7-304(i), Mitchell filed a petition for certiorari in chancery court seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court dismissed Mitchell’s petition for certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Board of Review, denying Mitchell’s request for a waiver of the overpayment. Mitchell appeals from the order of the chancery court arguing that the chancery court erred in admitting additional evidence and erred in not vacating or setting aside the decision of the Board of Review. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.
 

This is a child custody case. The trial court awarded Appellant William Thomas Winchester (“Husband”) and Appellee Glenda Rachelle Winchester (“Wife”) joint custody of the minor child of the marriage, which both parties appeal. We vacate the trial court’s award of joint custody and remand the case to the trial court to conduct further findings of fact concerning each party’s comparative fitness and to award custody to either Husband or Wife.

Johnny Glenn Hilliard (Father) appeals from the order of the trial court granting visitation rights to his son’s maternal grandmother. Father and Misty Lynn Hilliard (now Schrems) (Mother) married in 1992. Alexander Glenn Hilliard (Alex) was born in May 1993. The parents divorced in January, 1995 and temporary custody1 was awarded to Terry Minton, the maternal grandmother. At that time, Mother was living with her mother, Terry Minton. Mother currently resides in Florida with her present husband.

The captioned petitioner has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing his petition for certiorari from the action of the Board of Paroles denying hisapplication for parole from the custody of the Department of Correction.

This is a “slip and fall case” in which the jury awarded $173,250, and the defendant appealed.

The defendant/appellee has filed a respectful petition to rehear. It appears that a rehearing is appropriate, and same is hereby granted.

The captioned petitioner, an inmate of an institution operated by a private contractor for the Tennessee Department of Correction, has appealed from the summary dismissal of his petition for certiorari for review of disciplinary actions of the defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 11, Tenn. R. Civ. P., the trial court sanctioned the appellants and their attorneys. The appellants argue on appeal that they cannot be sanctioned under Rule 11 because they did not sign the offending pleading and that the facts do not establish a violation of the rule. We hold that a party may be sanctioned under Rule 11 without actually signing the pleadings, but we find that the facts of this case do not justify a Rule 11 sanction and that the proof fails to show any expenses incurred as a result of the alleged violation. Therefore we reverse the judgment against the appellants for sanctions.

The majority holds that the plaintiff cannot establish constructive notice. I am constrained to agree. However, I invite our Supreme Court to revisit this area of law.