APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this action for malicious prosecution, the Trial Judge granted the defendant summary judgment, and plaintiffs have appealed.

In this action the plaintiff sought extraordinary relief to prevent defendant from nterfering with plaintiff's use of a roadway, and for damages for past interference.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion filed by Appellant, Eastera Bell Porter, individually and as surviving spouse and next friend of Jasper D. Porter, deceased, under Rule 60 T.R.C.P., to set aside the summary judgments entered in favor of the appellees, Jesse McGee, M.D. and Methodist Hospitals of Memphis (Methodist). After review of the record, we find an absence of abuse by the trial court in this regard and affirm. We set forth our reasons below.

Defendant/appellant, the Board of Education of the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools ("Board"), appeals from the judgment of the Chancery Court for Davidson County which held that
the Board could not use an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to conduct a hearing on whether to dismiss plaintiff/appellee, James Morris, a non-tenured teacher in the Metro school system. The facts out of which this case arose are as follows.

The Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education and the teachers union are attempting to use this case as a vehicle to resolve whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-7- 105 (Supp. 1996) permits the board to use administrative law judges in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512 (1996) hearings concerning the termination of tenured teachers. The court has decided to address this issue on its merits even though the teacher involved in this case is non-tenured and is not entitled to a hearing before the board. I cannot agree that we should decide this question at this time. It would be more appropriate to delay addressing the issue until we are presented with a concrete case or controversy. The doctrine of justiciability prompts the courts to stay their hand in cases that do not involve a genuine and existing controversy requiring the present adjudication of present rights. State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. 534, 537, 347 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1961); Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). In accordance with the doctrine, our courts routinely decline to render advisory opinions, Super Flea Market of Chattanooga v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. 1984); Parks v. Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), or to decide abstract legal questions. State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. at 538, 347 S.W.2d at 48-49.

In accordance with the opinion of the Court filed herein, the petition to rehear filed by the appellees is denied at the cost of appellees..

The only issue in this slip-and-fall case is whether there is any material
evidence to support the jury’s finding of no fault on the part of the plaintiff. We affirm
the judgment of the lower court.

This case involves the interpretation of an insurance policy. After being struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Dana R. Mabe (“Mabe”), plaintiff Charles G. Miller (“Miller”) filed this personal injury lawsuit against Mabe and defendant The Glens Falls Insurance Company (“Glens Falls”). The trial court granted Glens Falls’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Miller was not covered by the uninsured motorist provision of the Glens Falls policy because he was not “occupying” the insured vehicle at the time he was injured. Miller appealed the trial court’s decision. We affirm.

The medical malpractice and outrageous conduct claims involved in this appeal stem from the hospitalization of an elderly patient for total hip replacement surgery. The patient,1 her two sisters, and her caretaker sued the hospital and its nursing staff in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that their lack of appropriate care caused the patient to enter a vegetative state and caused severe emotional stress to the patient’s sisters and caretaker. The trial court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court.

The appellant has filed a Petition to Rehear which we have considered and decline to grant. It is, therefore, ordered that the Petition to Rehear is overruled at the cost of the appellant.

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Nancy W. Adams (“Wife”), from a judgment of the chancery court granting Wife and plaintiff/appellee, David L. Adams (“Husband”), a divorce. Wife claims that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of child support and the amount of rehabilitative alimony and attorney's fees awarded to Wife.

The trial court granted the parties a divorce, and ordered the husband to pay the wife alimony in futuro. The parties were also granted joint custody of the teenage children, with the husband to have primary physical custody. On appeal, the husband challenges the nature and amount of the alimony award, and the trial court’s failure to order the wife to pay child support. We remand this case to enable the trialcourt to make the findings of fact in regard to child support that are required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1). In all other respects we affirm the trial court.

The Circuit Court of Hickman County granted the owner of a trailer park summary judgment on claims for personal injuries and wrongful death based on a breach of the lease and an oral warranty. We affirm.

This appeal involves an inmate’s attempt to obtain judicial review of the parole board’s decision to deny him parole. The Chancery Court for Davidson County dismissed the inmate’s petition for common-law writ of certiorari because it was not filed within the time required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 (1980). The inmate asserts on this appeal that he filed his petition within the required time after he received notice of the board’s decision to deny him parole. We affirm the judgment because the inmate’s underlying request that the parole board review its decision was not timely filed.

Appellant, Luther William Johnson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to set aside a consent order of paternity and support. The minor child in question, Andreyous Luther, was born on January 23, 1991 to the Appellee, Mary Helen Pearson Johnson (Mother). For reasons herein articulated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

We granted a Rule 9 appeal in this case to resolve an impasse between the Circuit Court for Blount County, Equity Division, and the Probate Court for Blount County -- whicy by Private Act is the General Sessions Court -- to determine which Court has jurisdiction to resolve the allegations of the complaint in this case.