APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a petition to probate a handwritten instrument as a codicil to the decedent’s last will and testament. The parties stipulated that the purported holographic will was in the handwriting of the decedent and that she was of sound mind and disposing memory at the time the purported holographic will was written. Additionally, the trial court found that the writing expressed a testamentary intent on the part of the decedent. Nevertheless, the trial court denied the petition, holding that the writing did not satisfy the signature requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-105 because, inter alia, the decedent’s name, Micki D. Thompson, was not subscribed to the writing. Instead, she merely identified herself within the writing in the third person as “Micki.” The court found the word “Micki” was not the decedent’s signature. The petitioner appeals, contending the handwritten instrument satisfies Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-105 because a testator’s name need not be “subscribed” as long as the name, or a portion thereof, is “inserted in some part of [the writing]” and the other requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-105 are satisfied. We agree because the decedent’s name was inserted in the writing, it was established that she was of sound mind and disposing memory, and the writing expresses a testamentary intent on the part of the decedent. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to admit the handwritten instrument to probate as a codicil to the decedent’s last will and testament.

This appeal concerns post-divorce residential parenting schedule matters and findings of criminal contempt. Corey L. Choate (“Father”) and Amanda Kay Choate (Ralston) (“Mother”), parents of daughter BC and younger son RC, divorced in 2015. Some years later, Father filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”), seeking to modify the most recently entered permanent parenting plan and to have Mother found in criminal contempt. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order regarding the children’s custody and Mother’s criminal contempt. As relevant, Father was granted complete custody of RC.Mother was found guilty of 573 counts of criminal contempt in connection with her failure to follow the parenting plan. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that she lacked adequate notice of the criminal contempt charges because the Trial Court failed to read the charges aloud to her in open court upon her request. We find, inter alia, that Father’s detailed Second Amended Notice of Criminal Contempt, as well as the Trial Court’s written order entered before trial specifically finding that Mother was on notice of the charges, reflect that Mother received adequate notice of the criminal contempt charges against her. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety and remand for an award to Father of his reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding filed by Wife in Tennessee.  Husband objected to the trial court’s divorce jurisdiction and any custody determination concerning the parties’ minor children.  Ultimately, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce, as well as any custody determinations.  In connection with granting the parties a divorce, the trial court awarded Wife an equalizing distribution of the marital assets and attorney’s fees.  The trial court also found Husband to be in contempt due to his alleged violation of the statutory restraining order set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d) and his failure to return one of the parties’ minor children to Wife’s custody following summer visitation.  Husband now appeals numerous aspects of the trial court’s findings.  Upon our review of the record before us, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

In this healthcare liability action, the plaintiff sued several medical professionals and facilities. Following an amended complaint, which had removed multiple parties from the action, the remaining defendants filed their answer to the amended complaint that included allegations of comparative fault against a doctor that the plaintiff had removed as a party to the action in the amended complaint. The defendants did not file a certificate of good faith in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122, which is required when a defendant alleges comparative fault against a “non-party.” Following a motion by the plaintiff, the trial court entered an order striking the defendants’ allegations of comparative fault. The trial court further found that the defendants had not demonstrated good cause to support an extension of time to file a certificate of good faith. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant challenges the chancery court’s order dismissing his petition for a declaratory judgment enjoining the State of Tennessee Attorney General, District Attorney General for the Tenth Judicial District, and an assistant district attorney general from enforcing his 2004 criminal convictions, which the appellant claimed had resulted in an illegal sentence. The chancery court dismissed Mr. Frazier’s petition because, inter alia, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. We affirm the chancery court’s order of dismissal.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. In addition to disputing the grounds for termination and best interest, Mother argues on appeal that she should have been appointed counsel in the termination proceeding and that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-401. We conclude that the record demonstrates that Mother expressly waived her right to counsel and failed to show that the waiver was ineffective. We further hold that section 33-6-401 was inapplicable in this case. Finally, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Following a divorce, a husband appeals the trial court’s division of his military retirement benefit. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order.

This case involves a same-sex divorce and the resultant child custody issues regarding two children born during the marriage through artificial insemination. The sperm donor intervened in the divorce proceeding requesting the court establish him as the children’s legal father and award him parenting time. The trial court denied his request to be named the children’s legal father based on its interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-306, Tennessee’s artificial insemination statute. The sperm donor appeals, challenging the court’s refusal to name him as a parent or award him visitation. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. The appellant was a firefighter and paramedic and was terminated from his employment after he was involved in a physical altercation at a political rally. After a hearing, the Board upheld his termination. The appellant then sought judicial review in chancery court. After reviewing the administrative record, the chancery court likewise upheld termination. On appeal, this Court concluded that the decision upholding the appellant’s termination should be reversed due to a violation of his due process rights. The Tennessee Supreme Court found no due process violation and reversed the decision of this Court, remanding for consideration of alternative arguments raised by the appellant that were deemed pretermitted in our previous opinion. Having carefully considered the appellant’s alternative arguments, we affirm the chancery court’s rulings on some issues but ultimately must vacate in part the decision upholding termination and remand for further proceedings before the Board.

Tennessee’s Department of Health (“TDH” or “the Department”) sought reciprocal revocation of a registered nurse’s Tennessee license after her registered nurse license was revoked in California.  After a hearing on the matter, which the nurse did not attend, the Tennessee Board of Nursing (“Board”) entered a default judgment against the nurse and revoked her Tennessee license.  The nurse appealed to the chancery court and brought an action for damages against the Board.  The chancery court affirmed the Board’s decision and dismissed the nurse’s action for damages.  The nurse then appealed to this Court. We affirm the chancery court in all respects.

When negotiations over the sale of a boat broke down, the prospective seller and buyer sued each other. Before their claims came to trial, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss their claims without prejudice and to try mediation. The agreement provided that, if mediation failed, claims must be refiled within one year of the effective date of the agreement. The buyer refiled his claims against the seller just over one year after the effective date of the agreement but within one year of the dismissal of the original case. The trial court granted the seller’s motion to dismiss, concluding the buyer’s claims were time-barred under the parties’ agreement. We affirm. 

In this divorce case, Richard E. Davis, Jr. (“Husband”) challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate, the award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to Kacy Collums Davis (“Wife”), and the trial court’s designation of Wife as primary residential parent. Wife asserts that the trial court erred in its division of the marital estate, in declining to award her 100% of her attorney’s fees, in denying her motion to disqualify the guardian ad litem, in awarding the parties equal parenting time, and in calculating Husband’s income for child support purposes. We modify the division of the marital estate (1) to correct a miscalculation, agreed by the parties to have been a clerical error in the trial court’s order, counting Wife’s retirement account twice; and (2) to reflect that Wife shall be responsible for the debt for her first attorney’s fees, which is secured by a lien on the marital residence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

A tenured teacher appealed his dismissal for unprofessional conduct and insubordination. He contended that the decision of the Board of Education lacked sufficient evidentiary support. The teacher also contended that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. Upon review, we conclude that the teacher received pre-termination notice of the charges and evidence against him. And the Board complied with the procedural framework in the Tenure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512 (2020). The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that the teacher was guilty of unprofessional conduct and insubordination. We further conclude that the teacher failed to establish that the Board’s decision was arbitrary or in violation of statutory or constitutional rights. So we affirm.

This appeal involves a contract issue concerning a purported addendum to a land purchase and sale agreement. The trial court granted the seller’s motion for summary judgment holding that there was no mutual assent on at least one material term: whether the modification would include a new date-certain deadline for the diligence period or be openended. The buyer appeals. We affirm.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court awarded a judgment in the amount of $13,835.17 to the father, representing the mother’s retroactive child support obligation. When calculating the mother’s child support arrearage, the trial court declined to include the father’s inheritance as income for child support calculation purposes because the father had used the majority of his inherited funds to pay private school tuition for the parties’ two children. The court further awarded to the father attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $18,394.00 related to a previous child custody modification action. The mother has appealed. Discerning reversible error, we vacate the trial court’s child support award and remand the child support issue to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether a modification was warranted and if so, the appropriate amount of child support to be awarded pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). We also vacate the trial court’s determination concerning civil contempt and remand that issue to the trial court as well.

This is the second action in which the petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”), seeks good sentence credits and prisoner performance credits. The trial court dismissed the present action, filed in 2019, in accordance with Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, determining that res judicata barred the suit. The decision was based on the following findings: the petitioner did not assert that the Davidson County Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case in the prior action, filed in 2005, “the same parties were involved in both . . . suit[s],” both cases “arose out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions” between the same parties, and “the [prior] suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits . . . .” We affirm. 

This appeal concerns a police officer’s termination. Kodi Gail Knight (“Knight”) was a police officer for the City of Fairview, Tennessee (“Fairview”). After an August 2019 incident in which Knight struck a handcuffed woman (“the Arrestee”) in the face, Fairview police chief Zack Humphreys (“Chief Humphreys”) submitted a request to City Manager Scott Collins (“the City Manager”) that Knight be terminated. The City Manager sent Knight a termination letter. Knight requested, and was granted, a pre-dismissal hearing before the City Manager. Following this hearing, the City Manager affirmed the decision to terminate Knight. Knight filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court affirmed Fairview’s termination of Knight. Knight appeals, arguing among other things that his procedural due process rights were violated because the City Manager both drafted his termination letter and presided over his pre-dismissal hearing. We find that Knight was an at-will employee who lacked a property interest entitling him to procedural due process protection. We also find that the City Manager’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Issues regarding an award of attorney fees remain pending, so the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights. The child was placed into the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in May 2019. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in the Hamblen County Juvenile Court (“Juvenile Court”). Following trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights to the child, upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that the father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the child, that returning the child to the father’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child’s psychological welfare, and that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This case concerns an alleged contract for the sale of real property. Although a prior written offer regarding the property expired pursuant to its stated terms when it was not timely accepted, the trial court held that there was an oral agreement to extend the expiration date for acceptance and concluded that the Statute of Frauds did not serve as an impediment to enforcement of the parties’ alleged contract when the plaintiffs, the appellees herein, filed suit to enforce it. The trial court also concluded that no damages should be awarded under former Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-21-108 to the defendants, who had asserted a slander of title claim in the trial court. The defendants now appeal, challenging both the trial court’s contract law analysis and its decision to not award them statutory damages. Although we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, we affirm its refusal to award the defendants statutory damages for the reasons stated herein.

This appeal involves a reimbursement limitation that TennCare imposed on “non-emergent” medical services provided by emergency department physicians. TennCare informed its managed care organizations of the reimbursement limitation via email without engaging in rule-making procedures outlined in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). The trial court concluded the reimbursement limitation was a “rule” subject to the rule-making requirements of the UAPA and invalidated the reimbursement limitation. We hold that the reimbursement limitation falls within the internal management exception of the 2009 version of the UAPA and was therefore not subject to the UAPA’s rule-making requirements. The ruling of the trial court is reversed.

This is an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief that challenges the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-142, which criminalizes the publication of false statements opposing a political candidate. The complaint was filed by a political campaign committee that engages in direct advocacy for and against political candidates. The defendants, the Tennessee Attorney General and the District Attorney General for the 20th Judicial District of Tennessee, contended the action should be dismissed, inter alia, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the campaign committee lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The trial court found that the committee had standing because it faced a credible threat of prosecution and, acting upon the campaign committee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-142 contravenes the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. The court also awarded the campaign committee its attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) as the prevailing party. We have determined the campaign committee failed to establish that it had standing to challenge the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-142; therefore, we hold that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on the matter. For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the trial court, including the award of attorney’s fees to the campaign committee, and remand with instructions to dismiss.  

This termination of parental rights case focuses on Elijah H. (“the Child”), the minor child of Amanda H. (“Mother”) and Kevin W. (“Father”).  In March 2019, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father in the Wilson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”).  The Child had previously been removed from Mother’s custody after he was born exposed to drugs.  Father was incarcerated prior to the Child’s birth and has remained so continuously since that time, awaiting trial for pending criminal charges, including first degree murder.  During a bench trial, Mother voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the Child. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child, finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by exhibiting wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare prior to Father’s incarceration and that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child.  The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.  Father has appealed.   Having determined that DCS presented insufficient evidence that Father knew of the Child’s existence at the time of his criminal behavior, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Father abandoned the Child by exhibiting wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.

This appeal concerns the administration of a husband and wife’s intestate estates, consisting of several tracts of real property that the husband and wife owned as tenants by the entirety. They were both found deceased in their home several days after they had died. The wife’s heir at law, her brother, filed a petition seeking a declaration that the husband died first, that the wife, as the survivor, owned the real property at her death, and it passed to her heir at law. The husband’s heirs at law responded to the petition, contending the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the couple died in any order other than simultaneously. The only witness at the trial was the medical examiner who conducted the autopsies. He testified that it was more probable than not that the husband died first based on the causes of death and medical histories of the spouses. After considering the expert witness testimony, the trial court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the husband and wife died otherwise than simultaneously. This appeal followed. Having determined that the trial court was not bound by the medical examiner’s speculative opinion as to who died first, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Appellant sought an injunction to stop foreclosure on real property. Appellees, the lienholder, the lienholder’s law firm, and the substitute trustee, filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. After Appellant filed this appeal, Appellee lienholder filed a release of its lien on the subject property. As such, Appellant’s appeal is moot, and the appeal is dismissed.