APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this case, the decedent’s grand niece, Candice Mathis, the petitioner, appeals the trial court’s finding that she failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence the lost or destroyed will of her grand uncle, Warren Brown. The trial court ordered that the administration of the estate proceed as an intestate estate. For the following reasons, we reverse.

This non-jury case involves the interpretation of a commercial insurance policy (“the policy”) issued by The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (Hartford) to Pruett Enterprises, Inc. (Pruett). Pruett, the owner and operator of a chain of grocery stores in Hamilton County, sued Hartford under the policy for “spoilage losses to various perishable items [caused] when electrical power to [two of Pruett’s] grocery stores was interrupted as a result of a heavy snow blizzard [on or about March 13, 1993].” Each of the parties filed a motion for summary judgment. Based upon the parties’ stipulation of facts, the trial court granted Hartford partial summary judgment, finding that the loss at 6925 Middle Valley Road, Hixson (“Middle Valley Store”) was not covered by the policy. As to the loss at Pruett’s store at 3936 Ringgold Road, East Ridge (“Ringgold Road Store”), the trial court found a genuine issue of fact and denied Hartford’s motion.

This is a negligent misrepresentation action in which the plaintiff filed suit against the
attorney responsible for transferring her mother’s assets into an irrevocable trust. The
plaintiff alleged that she approved the transfer because she was erroneously advised that
the terms of the irrevocable trust would require distribution upon her mother’s passing.
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissal in favor of the defendant attorney.
We affirm.

Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit.

This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's request for access to the Department's rules governing prisoner sentence credits. The Department responded by informing the prisoner that its policies governing prisoner sentence reduction credits could be found in the prison law library. Thereafter, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County complaining that he had been wrongfully denied access to public records. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Commissioner sought a summary judgment and supported his motion with affidavits asserting that the prisoner had already received all the information he sought. Based on these affidavits, the trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed the prisoner's complaint. We have determined that the Commissioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, reverse the summary dismissal of the prisoner's complaint.

The petitioner, who is serving a sentence for a federal court conviction, has filed two petitions attacking prior state convictions which were used to enhance the sentence for the federal conviction. These two petitions, called petitions for the writ of coram nobis or for habeas corpus, were dismissed by the trial court without a hearing on the basis that they were actually petitions for post-conviction relief and barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with the trial court.

This appeal stems from a post-divorce custody modification in which the father sought increased parenting time with his minor daughter, I.B. The trial court agreed with the father that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that a modification of the father’s parenting time was warranted. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00, or roughly half, of his attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court proceedings. The mother appeals the trial court’s decision. Because the father was, for the most part, the prevailing party at trial and proceeded in good faith, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father a portion of his attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to attorney’s fees. However, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s final judgment placing a price cap on the minor child’s therapy fees. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. Finally, we decline to award either party their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The plaintiff brought suit against a manufacturer of windows and doors for allegedly supplying defective products which allowed substantial leaks into her dwelling and caused rotting because of excessive moisture. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court denied the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act but awarded judgment to the plaintiff on her claim that the defendant supplied defective doors and windows. Based upon our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Finding that the plaintiff did not provide notice to the defendant of its allegedly defective product within the applicable statute of limitations, we reverse the award of damages to the plaintiff and dismiss her complaint.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to her two oldest
children. As grounds for termination the trial court found abandonment for failure to
provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume
custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of both children.
We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the
grounds for termination and the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff, Alton F. Dixon, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant, Nike, Inc. Nike is a manufacturer of sporting goods, footwear, and apparel, and Dixon was an at-will employee of Nike. Nike encourages its employees to actively participate in improving their work environment and in implementing ideas for new products on the market 2 through a program called “I Got It.” The program invites Nike’s employees to submit ideas that “eliminate waste, improve the way we work, increase productivity, prevent accidents, save time, money, or energy.” Employees can also submit ideas for new products or inventions. In a weekly bulletin for employees, Nike stated, “If what you are suggesting is an idea for a new product or invention, to protect you and NIKE, a letter of understanding will be sent for your signature stating, in essence, that NIKE will not use your product idea until a written contract is negotiated and signed.”