APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A father filed a petition to change the surname of his nonmarital child. After the trial court granted the father’s petition, the mother appealed. Finding that the father failed to meet his burden of establishing that a surname change was in the child’s best interest, we reverse.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights existed and that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this legal malpractice action, the trial court determined that any duty owed by the defendant law firm to the plaintiff ceased when the law firm undisputedly terminated its representation of the plaintiff more than five months prior to expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s underlying claim. The court found that the plaintiff had ample time within which to hire new counsel before the statute of limitations would have run on his personal injury claim. The court also found that the plaintiff had failed, within that timeframe, to obtain new counsel or inquire about the status of his claim such that any damages he suffered were due to his own inaction. The court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant law firm. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Following a single-vehicle accident on a road owned and controlled by the City of Shelbyville (the “City”), Tony Carrick and his wife, Linda Carrick (together, “Plaintiffs”), filed suit against the City alleging damages for personal injury, injury to property, and loss of consortium. The City moved for summary judgment on the basis that it retained its immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) because it had no actual or constructive notice of a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition on the road where the accident occurred. The trial court agreed with the City and granted its motion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the City had actual or constructive notice of the condition at issue. We reverse.

The Juvenile Court for Cocke County (the “trial court”) entered an order terminating the parental rights of Jose G.L. as to his minor child, Ahleigha C. (the “Child”). The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s rights should be terminated for abandonment and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Child. Father appeals. Because the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services failed to prove either ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse.

Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights. Based upon this Court’s decisions in prior cases, I believe that there was clear and convincing proof that Father has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.

This case involves a petition to modify a permanent parenting plan for two minor children. The children’s father filed the petition, alleging that there had been a material change of circumstances since the plan was entered and that, as a result, he should be designated as the children’s primary residential parent. The children’s mother denied that there had been a material change of circumstances and filed a counter-petition to modify the father’s child support obligation. After a hearing on the parties’ petitions, the trial court found that there had not been a material change of circumstances to justify modifying the plan. However, the trial court modified several aspects of the plan. The trial court further found that the father was voluntarily underemployed and that his child support obligation should be modified accordingly. Father appealed. We affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

This healthcare liability action was brought against a skilled nursing facility. The plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to multiple potential defendants prior to initiating the action. The plaintiff, however, failed to include as part of the pre-suit notice a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization as one of the six core elements was missing from the authorization. Following a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), the Trial Court granted the motion and dismissed the action against the defendant due to noncompliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 and as being untimely. The Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s request to compel discovery in this matter concerning whether the plaintiff had substantially complied with the pre-suit notice requirement. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred by not treating the defendant’s motion as a motion for summary judgment and by preventing the plaintiff from conducting discovery regarding the plaintiff’s compliance with Section 29-26-121, as well as the resulting prejudice to the defendant. Discerning no error, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all respects.

In this divorce case, the wife appeals the trial court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement and valuation of her speech therapy practice, as well as the overall division of marital assets. As appellee, the husband raises a number of issues, all of which are without merit. We vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment addressing the husband’s military retirement and remand for recalculation of the wife’s share in the same. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. 

This appeal arises from an action for breach of a promissory note. After granting the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his claim against one of the defendants, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine damages. Following the hearing, the court entered a judgment for $1,628,074.27, which included interest and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the defendant contends that, in accordance with the terms of the promissory note, the plaintiff is only entitled to recover the principal sum of $14,194.43 plus interest. We have determined that the defendant failed to properly raise this issue in the trial court; therefore, it is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of severe abuse by the mother and that termination was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother challenges whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s best interest determinations. In weighing the statutory best-interest factors, she contends the trial court did not properly consider her completion of permanency plan requirements and nearly fifteen months of drug-free tests. The mother also complains that she was denied contact with her children by court order shortly after their removal and, despite her progress, was thwarted in her efforts to reestablish contact. We affirm.

Property owners sued lessees for possession and back rent. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging anticipatory breach, fraud, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in conjunction with a purchase option. Property owners moved for summary judgment on their claim for possession, arguing that lessees never exercised their option to purchase. In response, lessees asserted anticipatory breach. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to property owners. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the remaining counterclaims. On appeal, lessees challenge both decisions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
 

This appeal arises from a school bullying lawsuit. Doug Zukowski and Aimee Zukowski filed suit in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) on behalf of their son Taylor Alexander Zukowski (“Alex,” who later joined the suit in his own right after turning 18) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) against the Hamilton County Department of Education (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs alleged that Alex was bullied while a student at Chattanooga’s Center for Creative Arts (“CCA”), a public fine arts magnet school, and that Defendant breached its duty of care to protect Alex. Plaintiffs appeal, raising a number of issues. We find that the record does not contain the requisite clear and convincing evidence necessary to overturn the Trial Court’s credibility determinations. We also find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Defendant’s employees responded appropriately when Alex reported to them that he was bullied. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

A patient died after a fall at a state-owned rehabilitation facility. The administrator of the deceased patient’s estate filed a monetary claim against the State of Tennessee for negligently creating or maintaining a dangerous condition on real property. The State moved for summary judgment arguing that the claimant lacked sufficient evidence of causation. The Claims Commission agreed and granted summary judgment to the State. Because the claimant lacked sufficient evidence that the State’s conduct more likely than not caused the patient’s fall, we affirm.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Acting pro se, the former husband fails to present an issue for this Court to review. Because his brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff Joseph Riccardi brought this action for negligent construction of his residence against Carl Little Construction Company (“Defendant”), builder of the residence, and the Bridgewater Condominiums Property Owners Association (“Bridgewater POA”). He alleged that Defendant negligently built the residence on non-compacted fill dirt, causing structural and cosmetic damages to the residence. Plaintiff alleged that Bridgewater POA was contractually responsible for repairs to the exterior of the residence. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant based on its finding that the statutes of limitation and repose had run. The court held that Bridgewater POA was liable for repairs to the porches and patios of the property, but not the foundation or the cracks in the interior. We vacate summary judgment against Defendant, finding that Plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to establish genuine issues of material fact regarding when Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and whether Defendant fraudulently concealed the defects in the residence. We affirm the judgment against Bridgewater POA.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Following a judgment in their favor in a personal injury action, the defendants were granted an award of discretionary costs in the amount of $3,499.81. Appellant appeals, raising several arguments in opposition to the costs awarded. Because many of Appellant’s arguments were not properly raised in the trial court, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the remaining issues, we affirm.

A police officer appealed his termination by the Town of Greeneville to the Greeneville Civil Service Board, which upheld it. Appellant then appealed to the trial court, which also upheld the termination. Because we conclude that the record lacks information necessary to conduct appellate review, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the Board for further proceedings.

The issues on appeal arise from a personal injury action commenced by two tenants of an apartment complex against the owner of the complex and the property management company. The complaint alleged that one of the plaintiffs fell through an inadequately supported floor vent in the master bedroom of their apartment. The plaintiffs asserted that the management company should have discovered the defective condition while conducting maintenance and repairs on the apartment. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint after finding the undisputed facts showed the defect was concealed and the management company had no duty to test the vent’s structural integrity. Prior to entry of a final judgment, the plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint based on negligence per se against only the management company. The plaintiffs asserted that a local building code established a minimum live load for apartment floors. The court dismissed the amended complaint after finding the building code did not apply. We affirm.

In this parental rights termination case, the trial court ruled that DCS proved five grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children: mental incompetence, persistence of conditions, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the children. The trial court also ruled that termination of Mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s rulings as to the grounds of mental incompetence and abandonment by failure to support. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that termination of Mother’s rights is in the children’s best interests.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Trial Court found the mother to be indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. The Trial Court conducted a trial and entered an order finding that two statutory grounds of abandonment existed for termination of the mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. There is no transcript or statement of the evidence included in the record to permit appellate review of the mother’s issues on appeal concerning the termination of her parental rights. As such, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights to the children and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.    

The defendant appealed to circuit court following a judgment against it in general sessions court. The plaintiff filed no notice of appeal, but amended its complaint to allege an additional claim. The plaintiff later filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking an award of attorney’s fees. Eventually, the defendant dismissed its appeal and asked that the general sessions court judgment be affirmed. The trial court affirmed the previous judgment from the general sessions court, but also granted the plaintiff an additional judgment for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. The defendant appeals the award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees, but affirm the award of discretionary costs.

This appeal arises from the court-ordered sale of real property to satisfy unpaid property tax owned by a living trust. After the property was sold, the trustee, acting pro se, moved to set aside the sale, asserting a violation of the trust’s due-process rights. The trial court dismissed the motion because the trustee was not a licensed attorney and was thus unqualified to represent the trust in a legal proceeding. For the reasons explained below, we have determined that the trial court correctly dismissed the motion because the
pro se trustee is not licensed to practice law in Tennessee. We also dismiss this appeal on the same ground because the trustee signed the notice of appeal on behalf of the trust, and a non-attorney may not represent a trust in our Tennessee courts. See ELM Children’s Educational Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014); see also Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and Old Hickory Eng’g & Machine Co, Inc. v. Henry, 937 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.