APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Police officers filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a municipal board’s decision to approve a monthly amount of pension benefits for each officer. The petitioners alleged that the municipal board erred in calculating their benefits and in failing to provide them with a hearing in compliance with the contested case procedures in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Upon the city’s motion, the trial court dismissed the petition as improperly filed and remanded the matter to the municipal board for a written determination after a hearing. Because the trial court erred in dismissing the petition, we vacate that portion of the judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.

Upon a petition for common law certiorari filed by a community organization comprised of several homeowners’ associations and individual homeowners, the trial court reversed a decision by the Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) affirming the Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission’s approval of the respondent developer’s neighborhood development plan. The trial court determined the BZA’s decision to be illegal upon finding that the development plan included an on-site wastewater treatment plant in violation of the applicable zoning ordinance. The trial court subsequently denied cross-motions to alter or amend the judgment. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his petition to quiet title based on res judicata and waiver. This is the fourth action between the parties, or their privies, involving real property the plaintiff lost in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in 2012. The first three actions were decided on the merits adversely to the plaintiff. Following the dismissal of the third action regarding the same real property, the parties entered into a settlement agreement wherein the plaintiff consented to the sale of the property to the defendant and waived all claims that had been or could have been asserted in relation to the real property. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action to quiet title to the same real property. Upon the motion of the defendant that had purchased the property, the trial court summarily dismissed the action. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action filed by an inmate, Allen C. Bond (“Petitioner”), against the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), concerning the calculation of Petitioner’s sentence and whether he had been awarded the correct number of pretrial credits.  The Trial Court dismissed Petitioner’s complaint for declaratory judgment upon its finding that TDOC had calculated Petitioner’s sentence in compliance with the criminal court’s most recent judgment.  Discerning no error, we affirm. 

This appeal arises from a health care liability action. Darryl G. Rush-Mack (“Decedent”) died while receiving care at Baptist Memorial Hospital (“the Hospital”). Alvin Mack (“Mr. Mack”), Kevin Mack, and Darwisha Mack Williams (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued the Hospital and Dr. Aaron Kuperman (“Dr. Kuperman”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. Thirty days from entry of the order passed without Plaintiffs filing a notice of appeal. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to set aside pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 asserting that the order was not stamped to be mailed until six days after it was filed and it went to a PO Box Plaintiffs’ counsel does not use for business. The Trial Court granted the motion and entered a new order of dismissal, from which Mr. Mack appeals. We find that Mr. Mack failed to meet the clear and convincing evidentiary burden necessary for Rule 60.02 relief; indeed, the Trial Court relied only upon statements of counsel rather than evidence. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ Rule 60.02 motion.

This divorce action concerns the trial court’s valuation and division of the marital estate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

A woman against whom the trial court granted an order of protection appeals the order of protection. The trial court granted the order based upon its finding that the woman, a former girlfriend of the petitioner’s husband, threatened the petitioner and her husband with physical violence through a series of videos. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff commenced the instant action by causing a detainer warrant to be filed against the defendant in the Shelby County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”) on September 23, 2019, alleging that the defendant had been unlawfully inhabiting the residence at issue. The general sessions court subsequently entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”) entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, determining that she had submitted sufficient proof to demonstrate superior ownership of the residence. The defendant has appealed. However, due to significant deficiencies in the defendant’s brief, we conclude that he has waived consideration of any issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

In this termination of parental rights case, the child was placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) because the child’s parents were incarcerated. The mother’s parental rights were later terminated based upon the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence regarding two statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A former county commissioner appeals the trial court’s decision finding him liable for defamatory statements made about a private individual during a county legislative meeting. Following a thorough review of the record, we reverse.

Appellants, purchasers of a residential property, filed an action against Appellees, sellers and owners of the residential construction company that built the subject property, for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”) and intentional misrepresentation for failure to disclose water damage and substandard repairs to the property. Appellants also sued a termite inspection company for negligently failing to disclose termite damage to the property. Appellants settled with the termite company for $45,000.00 but proceeded to trial against Appellees. Although the trial court found that Appellees intentionally misrepresented the condition of the property to Appellants, it found that Appellants were not “consumers” under the TCPA, and that the Act did not apply to this real estate transaction. The trial court awarded Appellants a $43,811.00 judgment against Appellees, for intentionally failing to disclose the water damage to the property, but found that Appellants had been fully compensated for their loss from the settlement with the termite company. As such, Appellants were not entitled to further compensatory damages from Appellees. We conclude the trial court erred in finding that Appellants were not consumers under the Act and that the TCPA was not applicable to this real estate transaction. We remand for a determination of whether Appellees violated the Act, and, if so, whether Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and treble damages. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

The husband in this divorce case failed to answer the wife’s complaint for legal separation or her amended complaint for divorce. The trial court awarded the wife a divorce, entered a permanent parenting plan, and divided the marital estate. The husband moved to set aside the judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. The husband appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

A woman against whom the trial court granted an order of protection appeals the order of protection. The trial court granted the order based upon its finding that the woman, a former girlfriend of the petitioner, threatened the petitioner and his wife in a series of videos. Finding no error, we affirm.

A vocational teacher sued his former employer, a county department of education, alleging that the department’s intentional failure to remediate mold contamination at the high school where he taught caused him to suffer long-term detrimental health effects and emotional distress. The trial court dismissed the teacher’s claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), finding that the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-101 et seq., provided the exclusive remedy for the acts alleged in the complaint and that the allegations therein failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the statutory framework. Upon our review of the pleadings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her children on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, and (3) persistence of conditions. The trial court also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Although we reverse one of the termination grounds, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports a finding of abandonment by willful failure to support and a finding of persistence of conditions. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the termination of the mother’s rights is in the best interest of the children.

Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order granting visitation to the grandfather in this case. At the outset, I emphasize that the scope of this appeal is very narrow. On appeal, Mother raised only the issues of whether she had opposed visitation and whether Grandfather had proven that severance of the relationship with the child would occasion substantial harm to the child.

This appeal involves several raised issues surrounding the ownership of the Hill Boren, PC law firm. Because the record transmitted to us on appeal evidences the lack of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of a health care liability action for failure to comply with a pre-suit notice content requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-29-121(a)(2). The trial court determined that the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant doctors and hospital with medical authorization forms that would permit pre-suit investigation of his claims. The plaintiff contends the dismissal was unwarranted because the medical authorizations substantially complied with the statute and the defendants already had the relevant records. The defendants argue that the forms were invalid because they lacked several required elements, including a description of the purpose for which the records could be disclosed and used. We affirm.

A father challenges the trial court’s decision terminating his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility. He further asserts that the trial court erred in finding that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. After reviewing the record on appeal, we have concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s decision in all respects.

A grandfather filed a petition to obtain visitation with his grandchild. The trial court granted the petitioner relief, and the child’s mother appeals. The grandfather did not allege, and the proof did not establish, that the mother had opposed or severely reduced the grandfather’s visitation before the petition was filed. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case.

After being injured in a car accident, a man filed a negligence lawsuit against several defendants, including the driver of the vehicle and the company that employed the driver. The insurance company that provided insurance coverage to the company in Alabama filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of whether the policy provided liability coverage for the company in the underlying tort action. After the insurance company and the plaintiff in the underlying tort action filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company based on respondeat superior principles. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurance company because, under Alabama law, the policy provided liability coverage for the company at the time the accident occurred.

This case involves a company’s claim for attorneys’ fees and expenses for the alleged breach of a non-compete agreement by its former employee. After a temporary injunction hearing, the trial court determined that the former employee breached the agreement and granted the company a temporary injunction. The court did not consolidate the hearing on the merits under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.04(7). Later, the claims were voluntarily dismissed, and the trial court awarded the company attorneys’ fees and expenses under the “Remedies” section of the parties’ agreement. The former employee appealed the trial court’s decision to grant the company attorneys’ fees and expenses. We reverse the trial court’s award and remand.

This appeal concerns a divorce. John Raymond Kautz (“Husband”) sued Doris Diane Kautz Berberich (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Polk County (“the Trial Court”). The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”), which the Trial Court approved in its final decree of divorce. Some years later, Wife filed a petition pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 seeking relief from the judgment on grounds that Husband failed to disclose certain assets. The Trial Court granted Wife’s motion. However, after a subsequent hearing, the Trial Court found that while Husband later hinted to Wife he had more assets than he disclosed, he actually had not concealed any valuable assets not already known to Wife. The Trial Court reinstated the MDA with certain amendments. Wife appeals. We decline to re-evaluate the Trial Court’s implicit credibility determinations, and the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Wife was aware of the valuable marital assets at the time the MDA was executed. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will. The will divided the testator’s residual estate into as many shares as the testator had children with the further instruction that the share of a deceased child would be divided among that child’s “issue then living.” The will stated, in pertinent part, that “‘issue’ . . . includes a person who has a parent-child relationship . . . with the person through whom this person claims benefits.” When she died, the testator had two surviving children and one deceased daughter. The deceased daughter was predeceased by one of her two sons, and the deceased son was survived by two children—the testator’s great-grandchildren. The petition to admit the will named the two surviving children and the deceased daughter’s living son as the beneficiaries of the estate but excluded the testator’s great-grandchildren, whose father had predeceased the testator. When the testator’s great-grandchildren filed a motion to be included with their uncle as “issue” of the deceased daughter, the estate opposed the motion, arguing that the great-grandchildren were not “issue” of testator’s deceased daughter because the petitioners did not have a “parent-child relationship” with the daughter, who was the petitioners’ grandmother. The trial court agreed and held that the only issue of the deceased daughter who could inherit was her living son—the great-grandchildren’s uncle. We respectfully disagree. The will’s plain language “includes” persons with a “parent-child relationship” to “the person through whom [the] person claims benefits,” but does not exclude those who do not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The trial court found that the minor child, Azhianne G. (“the Child”), was dependent and neglected in his mother’s care. The trial court also determined that the Child had been severely abused based upon his disclosures of sexual abuse perpetrated by his mother. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.