APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se Petitioner, Ronald Hudson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that he should be afforded counsel and an evidentiary hearing because his petition was timely. The State agrees there is some evidence that the petition was timely but notes that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was clearly untimely. Because the notice of appeal is untimely and we find nothing that warrants the waiver of the timely notice of appeal requirement, we dismiss the appeal.

A Sevier County Jury found Defendant, Stephanie Brown, guilty of reckless homicide. The trial court imposed a sentence of four years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted testimony about the hydrostatic or float test performed on the baby’s lungs; (2) whether the trial court properly admitted Defendant’s confession and denied her motion to dismiss the indictment; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for reckless homicide; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced Defendant. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darron Rogers, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession with intent to deliver, Class E felonies; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective term of four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify that she knew him by the nickname of “Weed.” After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tina Nichole Lewis, was charged with one count of second degree murder through the unlawful distribution of fentanyl and amphetamine and one count of delivery of fentanyl and amphetamine. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges on the basis that the indictment was duplicitous because it charged a single count of each offense by listing two Schedule II drugs, fentanyl and amphetamine. The State appeals the dismissal of the homicide charge. We conclude that the indictment, which charged one single offense of homicide, was not duplicitous, and we accordingly reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the charge.

The pro se Petitioner, Christopher H. Martin, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition without a hearing to determine whether due process dictates the tolling of the statute of limitations. The State concedes that the
post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing to address the Petitioner’s tolling argument. We agree. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations.

Eric Bernard Howard, Movant, filed a pro se “Motion to Correct Judgment Pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1” (the Rule 36.1 Motion). The trial court found that the Rule 36.1 Motion failed to state a colorable claim and summarily denied the Rule 36.1 Motion. We affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jimmy M. Cruse, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Madison County Jail. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In a sealed indictment, the Defendant-Appellant, Michael Wright, was charged by a Davidson County grand jury with alternative counts of first-degree premeditated murder and murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery of Gregory “Pee Wee” Johnson (counts one and two), and first-degree premeditated murder of Daresha Cole (count three). A petite jury convicted the Defendant as charged of felony murder in count one and first-degree premeditated murder in count three, for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers (ICD); (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to sever offenses; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s social media posts; (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; and (5) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Reynolds, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the Defendant and other individuals were gang members in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (3) exculpatory evidence, namely the victim’s gunshot residue test and a photograph referenced by the gang report, were improperly withheld by the State; (4) the trial court erred by failing to compel the State to produce the above-referenced gunshot residue test and photograph; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient relevant to premeditation and that some of the evidence relative to gangs was improperly admitted. We remand for a new trial on one count of second degree murder, in which some gang evidence shall be excluded.

The petitioner, Cuben Lagrone, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Christopher Bailey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of rape of child and sentenced to twenty-five years at one-hundred percent. Petitioner contends on appeal that the
post-conviction court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to file a pre-trial motion in limine; (2) failing to object when the State asked the victim to testify about other times in which Petitioner forced the victim to perform oral sex; (3) asking the victim’s stepsister about her opinion of Petitioner’s character for truthfulness; (4) asking the victim why she slept downstairs; (5) failing to object when the State asked the victim about counseling and her medication; and (6) failing to argue during the Rule 412 hearing that Petitioner should be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual behavior. Petitioner further argues: that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants post-conviction relief; that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request for funding for an investigator; and that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request to call the prosecutor as a witness at the post-conviction hearing. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Charles Bernard Griffin, appeals his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and possession of a firearm while having a prior felony conviction involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of seventy-five years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of his motion to bifurcate the trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Reginald McWilliams, acting pro se, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief for failure to prosecute on the part of the Petitioner. Because the record does not establish an abuse of process, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion

The Appellant, Adonis Reynolds, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to two counts of burglary of a vehicle, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, two counts of theft, and one count of evading arrest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The trial court granted the Appellant judicial diversion and placed him on supervised probation for three years. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and his judicial diversion and ordered that he serve his effective three-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and judicial diversion. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Mario Johnson, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, Samuel McAlister, entered a partially open guilty plea in case number 18-501 for possession of marijuana, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia; and in case number 18-956, for driving on a revoked license, failing to illuminate his license plate, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Lester Haven, was convicted pursuant to a bench trial of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his stepchildren, and he received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, he asserts that the State failed to establish venue, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, that the State improperly failed to elect the factual bases of the convictions, that the trial court improperly considered evidence of other bad acts included in the forensic interviews, that the forensic interviewer was not qualified under statute, and that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors to his offenses. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the State failed to establish venue for the aggravated sexual battery conviction in Count 4, and we reverse this conviction and sentence and remand for any further proceedings. The Defendant has not demonstrated that he is entitled to any other appellate relief, and we affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Samantha Darlene Brewer, and ordered confinement for her sentence. On appeal, Defendant alleges the trial court abused its discretion and requests split confinement and furlough to substance abuse and mental health treatment courses. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Juan Ramon Chaves-Abrego, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the admission of the victim’s forensic interview into evidence violated his right to confrontation, that the trial court erred by allowing proof of other bad acts, that cumulative error requires reversal of his conviction, and that his sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, that the Appellant’s sentence is not excessive, and that his remaining issues have been waived because his motion for new trial was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Palikna Tosiwo Tosie, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Precious Briana Horton, of two counts of aggravated robbery, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued under $500. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State exercised its preemptory challenges in a discriminatory manner; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded testimony regarding the Defendant’s mental health; (3) the trial court prohibited her from offering to the jury her pretrial, out-of-court statement; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain one of her aggravated robbery convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Shawn Dallas Owen, pled guilty to one count each of burglary, identity theft, credit card fraud, forgery, simple possession of marijuana, and driving on a revoked license. The Petitioner was given a total effective sentence of fourteen years to be served on supervised probation. Upon being served with a warrant alleging the Petitioner violated his probation, he subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief from his guilty plea, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because of the failure to properly advise the Petitioner regarding the grading of the credit card fraud offense to which he was pleading guilty. The Petitioner appeals the postconviction court’s denial of relief. Following our review, we affirm.

A Shelby County Jury found Defendant, Rodney Miller, guilty of rape of a child, aggravated statutory rape, and aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty-six years for rape of a child, four years for aggravated statutory rape, and ten years for aggravated sexual battery to be served consecutively in confinement. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child; (2) whether the trial court properly admitted the victim’s medical history provided during her SANE examination; (3) whether the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars; (4) whether the trial court erred by failing to merge Defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual battery into his conviction for rape of a child; (5) whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences; and (6) cumulative error. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Thomas Mitchell, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for burglary, for which he is serving a ten-year, Range III sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims that (1) counsel failed to object and to request a mistrial when a witness testified that a police officer knew the Petitioner by name, (2) counsel failed to impeach a witness with prior inconsistent statements, (3) counsel failed to call a police officer as a witness, (4) counsel stated in closing argument that a witness had given a statement to the police in which the witness said the Petitioner entered one of the buildings from which the Petitioner was alleged to have removed wiring, (5) counsel failed to state explicitly in closing argument that the jury should consider lesser included offenses, and (6) the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance in multiple instances deprived the Petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.