APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Quintavious Hill, as charged of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court imposed an effective eleven-year sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-210, 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), 39-17-1324(b). On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals from the post-conviction court’s order granting post-conviction relief to the Petitioner, Larry E. Rathbone, from his convictions for two counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an effective fifty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred in granting relief on the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to his trial attorney’s dual representation of him and the codefendant at their joint trial and related to counsel’s failure to obtain a severance. In cross-appeal issues, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in failing to grant relief on his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not challenge the competency of the child victim who testified at the trial and that he is entitled to plain error relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s lack of objection to the introduction of evidence of uncharged criminal conduct. We conclude that the post-conviction court erred in granting relief and reverse its judgment.

The Defendant, Jemel Johnson, was convicted by a Sumner County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class D felony, two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and assault by extremely offensive or provocative conduct, a Class B misdemeanor, for acts involving two foster children. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (attempt); -13-101(A)(3) (2010) (subsequently amended) (assault); -13-502 (2018) (aggravated rape); -13-527 (2018) (attempted sexual battery by an authority figure). He received a sentence of twenty-five years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by failing to produce a trial transcript sufficient to provide appellate review; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape; (3) the trial court erred by admitting the victims’ hearsay statements; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examination the Defendant’s wife about her blaming the victims; (5) the trial court erred by not allowing the victims’ school principal to testify about specific instances of conduct by one of the victims; (6) the trial court erred by questioning the Defendant’s wife in an argumentative manner, resulting in prejudice to the Defendant; and (7) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on sexual battery by an authority figure as a lesser included offense of aggravated rape. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts One and Two.

A jury convicted the Appellant, Jawara Jones, of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, driving on a revoked license, and tampering with evidence. He received a total effective sentence of fifteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he contends (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce proof of a prior unindicted sale of cocaine, (2) that the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Lavonta Laver Churchwell, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, David Eric Lambert, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions for unlawful photography and attempted sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-505, -13-605. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because then Code section 39-13-605 governing unlawful photography was unconstitutionally vague and because his conduct did not constitute a crime; (2) the admission of his statement at trial violated Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the eleven-month-andtwenty- nine-day sentences imposed in this case consecutively to each other and to the Defendant’s sentence in another case. Because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for unlawful photography, that conviction is reversed and the charge is dismissed. However, the Defendant’s conviction for attempted sexual battery is affirmed, the evidence being sufficient to support that conviction.

Dennis Freeny, Defendant, claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

Defendant, David Eric Lambert, appeals his conviction for attempted unlawful photography in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-605. Following his conviction, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six months in confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the unlawful photography statute is unconstitutionally vague and his conduct did not constitute a crime; 2) the admission of his statement violated Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; 3) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s requests for special jury instructions; 4) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on attempt as a lesser-included offense; and 5) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting Defendant’s statement to police, and the erroneous admission of the statement would entitle Defendant to a new trial. Because, however, the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction, the conviction is reversed and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

The Petitioner, Abraham A. Augustin appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on newly discovered evidence. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The Appellant, Cortez Bennett, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

In 2013, a Henderson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charlie Clark, of rape. The Petitioner was sentenced to serve twenty-five years as a Range III, persistent offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See State v. Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., No. 2014-00445-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7204525, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 17, 2014) no perm. app. filed. In November 2018, the Petitioner filed, pro se, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was improperly sentenced as a Range III offender without proper notice in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a). The habeas corpus court denied the petition because the Petitioner’s claim, even if true, would make the judgment voidable and not void. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he was not provided with proper notice of the State’s intent to seek enhanced punishment before sentencing. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The defendant, David Eric Lambert, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury conviction of unlawful photography, see T.C.A. § 39-13-605, arguing that (1) Code section 39-13-605 is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on grounds that his conduct did not constitute a crime, (3) the admission of his statement at trial violated evidence rule 404(b), (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (5) the trial court erred by ordering that the defendant serve the
11-month and 29-day sentence imposed in this case consecutively to the defendant’s sentence in another case. We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the defendant’s statement to the police, and the erroneous admission of the statement would entitle the defendant to a new trial. Because, however, the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, the conviction is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

Alfred Whitehead, Petitioner, appeals from the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. On appeal, Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s failure to object to “inflammatory and prejudicial statements” made by the State during opening statement and closing argument. We agree that the statements were improper and that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to object, but we hold that Petitioner failed to “show that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Keith Harris Pearson, Defendant, admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph E. Graham, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of two alternate theory counts of felony murder; one count of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; and five counts of attempted aggravated robbery, Class C felonies. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and there was insufficient evidence corroborating co-defendant Cheeks' accomplice testimony; (2) the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of co-defendant Cheeks and excluding relevant evidence; and (3) he is entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of co-defendant Cheeks' testimony at codefendant Shelton's trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rodney Darnell Robinson ("Defendant") was convicted in Davidson County Criminal Court of two counts of child abuse, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of rape of a child, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of rape, and one count of attempted rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty years' incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred by allowing trial counsel to proceed while "clearly ill"; (4) the trial court failed to remedy statements made during voir dire by a potential juror, thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in allowing cumulative testimony in the cross-examination of Defendant; (6) the trial court erred in allowing improper leading questions to a witness; (7) the trial court erred in the admission of certain evidence; (8) the trial court erred in the exclusion of certain evidence; (9) there was an appearance of bias from the trial judge that violated Defendant's due process rights; and (10) cumulative error requires a new trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Nemon Omar Winton, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping, fifteen years for aggravated kidnapping, and fifteen years for aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence for aggravated robbery for an effective forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a special jury instruction; and (3) that his sentence was excessive. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. We conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated kidnapping, reverse that conviction and dismiss with prejudice the charge of aggravated kidnapping contained in Count Nine of the indictment. That count is remanded for consideration of appropriate lesser-included offenses, if any, of aggravated kidnapping.

The defendant, Vintario Tate, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count 3.

Darrell Roby, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. As a result of the convictions, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty-two years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals his convictions. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Jason Collins, appeals his Henderson County Circuit Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by permitting the State to present a rebuttal witness, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by aligning the sentence imposed in this case consecutively to the sentence imposed in an unrelated case. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Shun M. Ramey, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The petitioner, Angela Smith, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding she received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A jury convicted Petitioner, Travis Tate, of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Petitioner’s convictions were upheld by this Court on direct appeal. State v. Travis Tate, No. 2014-02102-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7664764 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. After a reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Gordon Lynn Dunkin, Defendant, was indicted for theft of property “equal to or over” the value of $2,500.00, a Class D felony, and a jury convicted him of the lesser offense of theft of property in the value of more than $1,000.00, but less than $2,500.00, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court determined Defendant to be a Range I standard offender and sentenced him to two years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Markee Alston, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and asserts the trial court erred by: allowing testimony of his co-defendant’s nickname, allowing improper opinion testimony, denying his motion for a mistrial, and not severing his trial from his co-defendant’s trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.