APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Benjamin Foust, was convicted of ten counts of felony murder, two counts of first degree premeditated murder, four counts of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated arson, and two counts of possession of a firearm while having a prior felony conviction involving the use of violence or force. The trial court’s merger of the various convictions resulted in two felony murder convictions, two especially aggravated robbery convictions, one aggravated arson conviction, and one firearm conviction. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus 105 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant the Defendant’s motion to sever or bifurcate the firearm charges; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s drug use; (4) the trial court improperly admitted several autopsy photographs; (5) the trial court provided an improper answer to a question from the jury posed during deliberations; and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. We conclude that the trial court erred in ordering the parties to stipulate to the Defendant’s prior felony convictions and that the error was not harmless as to the firearm convictions. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s firearm convictions and remand for a new trial as to those convictions. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Javonte Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree premeditated murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Karen Sarah Thomas, alias, appeals her jury convictions for aggravated stalking. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of an out-of-courtroom event that took place during the trial. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Carl Loverson, filed a pro se “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and/or Petition for Clerical Error, Ommission [sic] in Records,” alleging that, contrary to the trial court’s order, he was transported to the Tennessee Department of Correction instead of being released into a drug program. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely and for failure to state a colorable claim for relief. The Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Quincy D. Scott, appeals as of right from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s judgment revoking his probation. The State has filed a motion to affirm by memorandum opinion the judgment of the trial court. Following our review, we conclude that an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Krysten Renae Glover, entered an open guilty plea to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of the sale of methamphetamine in an amount less than 0.5 grams. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and imposed an effective nine-year sentence to be served in confinement. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her probation. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, and we affirm the judgments.

The Petitioner, James Ellison Rouse, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of first degree murder and two convictions of attempted first degree murder and resulting effective sentence of two terms of life without the possibility of parole plus forty-two years. The post-conviction court ruled that the petition was time-barred. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was timely because he filed it within one year of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), and Jacob Brown v. State, No. W2015-00887-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 1562981 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Apr. 15, 2016). Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anton Carlton, appeals the summary denial of his “Motion for An Amendment of the Judgment to Correct a Clerical Error.” He argues (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the corrected judgment of conviction entered on April 9, 2012, did not contain an oversight or omission, and (2) the corrected judgments of conviction entered on October 22, 2018, resulted in a material breach of his negotiated plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 6, 7, and 8 and for entry of an amended order of dismissal, wherein Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10 are dismissed.

The pro se Petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

Petitioner, Anthony Leslie, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Petitioner alleged that an amended judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court adding a provision requiring community supervision for life is void because it was entered after his sentence had expired. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court and grant habeas corpus relief to Petitioner. The amended judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court is vacated, and Petitioner shall not be subject to community supervision for life in Davidson County Criminal Court case number 99-D-2865.

James R. Wilson, Defendant, pled guilty to two counts of sale of more than five grams of a Schedule II controlled substance in case number 97-D-2596. Defendant received concurrent sentences of ten years with release eligibility after service of thirty percent of the sentence; Defendant was to serve one year in confinement and the remainder on community corrections. Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion and alleged that his sentences were illegal because he did not receive a Momon colloquy or sentencing hearing. The trial court found that the sentences had expired and summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. We affirm.

The petitioner, Tarence Nelson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to turn over certain firearms to law enforcement for testing, failing to request funds to hire a ballistics expert, and failing to request oral argument on direct appeal. Separately, the petitioner alleges numerous, additional errors of trial counsel amounted to ineffective assistance under the cumulative error doctrine. The petitioner also contends postconviction counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Antonio D. Idellfonso-Diaz, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioner, Fredrick Leon Tucker, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis based upon newly discovered evidence. We find that the error coram nobis court, in violation of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, failed to rule on Petitioner’s motion to recuse before entering an order denying the petition. Therefore, we vacate the order denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis and remand for consideration of the petition. Furthermore, in order to avoid even the possibility of an appearance of impropriety, the original error coram nobis judge is recused from further proceedings in this case.

The Defendant, Thorne Peters, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony drug offense, a Class D felony; possession of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the drug convictions and imposed an effective sentence of four years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony drug offense. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Martha Ann McClancy, appeals her Monroe County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress photographs of the scene taken by her co-conspirator Charles Kaczmarczyk, her motion in limine to exclude evidence of acts committed following the death of the victim, and her motion for a mistrial; that the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the victim taken during the autopsy; that the trial court’s making negative comments to and about her in front of the jury deprived her of the right to a fair trial; that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. The State concedes, and we agree, that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences in this case. Instead, because Code section 39-12-106 prohibits the imposition of dual convictions for two inchoate offenses designed to achieve the same objective, the trial court should have merged the defendant’s convictions. Thus, we affirm the jury verdicts, reverse the imposition of consecutive sentences, and remand the case for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting that the convictions are merged.

The Defendant-Appellant, Gregory Tyrone Dotson, appeals from his conviction of voluntary manslaughter by a Davidson County jury. In this appeal as of right, the sole issues presented for our review are whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction and whether the trial court properly imposed his sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the conviction of the trial court. However, we reverse and vacate the Defendant’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

Defendant, Kendrick Rivers, was found guilty of aggravated assault in concert with two or more other persons after an incident at Northwest Correctional Complex (“Northwest”) in Tiptonville, Tennessee, during which a correctional officer was attacked by several inmates. As a result of the conviction, Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to introduce another inmate’s conviction for the same offense, and that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dustin Michael Cathey, was convicted by a Crockett County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder and second degree murder. The second degree murder conviction merged into the conviction for felony murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in including language regarding criminal responsibility for the conduct of another in its jury charge, and he also argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted Brandon Robert Vandenburg, Defendant, of five counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of unlawful photography. On appeal, Defendant argues the following: (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment violated his right to due process and protection from double jeopardy and violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 8; (2) prosecution on the superseding indictment created a realistic likelihood of vindictive prosecution; (3) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Dr. J. Sidney Alexander; (4) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s request to question potential jurors about recent rape cases in national news and by failing to timely admonish prospective jurors; (5) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the June 27, 2013 interrogation and evidence obtained based on that interrogation; (6) the trial court erred in excluding Defendant’s voicemail on Joseph Quinzio’s cell phone; (7) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the requisite culpability for criminal responsibility and on “presence and companionship” as it relates to criminal responsibility; (8) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; (9) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (10) Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-605 is void for vagueness; (11) the trial court erred in ordering Defendant to serve an excessive sentence; (12) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to recuse; (13) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the co-defendants’ prior bad acts; (14) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 motion; and (15) the cumulative errors in Defendant’s trial warrant a new trial. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in counts one through four and six through eight. Although not raised by either party, we determine that Defendant’s conviction of aggravated rape in count five must be vacated. We modify the conviction in count five to attempted aggravated rape and remand to the trial court for sentencing in count five.

The Defendant, Brian Williams, was indicted for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and theft of property valued at $1000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -403. The Defendant pled guilty to the theft charge and was convicted by a jury of the aggravated burglary charge. The trial court later imposed a total effective sentence of four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Travis Capshaw, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel (1) failed to adequately utilize mental health issues as a mitigating factor in Petitioner’s first degree murder charge and (2) such failure caused trial counsel to erroneously advise Petitioner to plead guilty. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pro se Petitioner, Demarcus L. Gonner, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Darrell Dean Hochhalter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Joshua Terron Johnson, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2014 convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, unlawful possession of a weapon, and aggravated assault and his effective sentence of twenty-six years. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.