APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Willis Holloway, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary, and the trial court imposed an effective forty-four year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. See State v. Charles Jackson and Willis Holloway, No. W2010-01133-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 543047, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 17, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 22, 2012). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied relief. Willis Holloway v. State, No. W2014-02444-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 6122155, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 16, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 23, 2016). The Petitioner then filed a “Petition for Extraordinary Relief,” the subject of this appeal, asserting: (1) his sentences were void for duplicity; (2) his indictments were void because the charges were vague; (3) two of the indictments were defective; (4) the trial court constructively amended the indictments; and (5) trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective. The postconviction court, treating the petition as one for post-conviction relief, found that the Petitioner’s claims had either been previously determined or waived because the Petitioner failed to raise them in his earlier appeals and denied relief. After review, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant guilty of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce proof from a portion of a surveillance video that was not preserved for trial; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify regarding hearsay evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a photograph lineup that had not been introduced as evidence to be taken into the jury deliberations room; (4) the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated robbery; and (5) the length of his sentence is excessive. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Nicholas Zamarron, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine and to three counts of possession with the intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2014). He received a total effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Campbell County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Christopher Lee Smith, of driving under the influence (DUI), 5th offense; DUI, per se; driving on a revoked license; and violating the financial responsibility law. The trial court merged the DUI convictions and sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of three years, to be suspended after service of 150 days in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) he should have been tried on the original indictment, not the amended indictment; (2) the trial court should have granted a mistrial after the State informed the jury that the Appellant acted “feloniously,” thereby informing the jury that the Appellant had prior DUI convictions; and (3) the proof was insufficient to sustain his DUI convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove that he acted “feloniously” as alleged in the indictment. Upon review, we note that the judgment of conviction in count one incorrectly reflects that the charged offense was DUI, 3rd offense; accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the charged offense in count one was DUI, 5th offense. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Marlon McKay, of felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life plus six years. This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments on appeal. State v. Marlon McKay, No. W2010-01785-CCA-MR3C, 2011 WL 5335285 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 4, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2012). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged, as relevant on appeal, that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) not challenging his forty-eight hour hold when his arrest was not supported by probable cause; and (2) not timely filing a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Clinton Austin, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2014 conviction of aggravated sexual battery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Christopher Osteen, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant complains that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences based upon judicially determined facts in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Additionally, he asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to the aforementioned Blakely violation. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Juan LaSean Perry, appeals from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2005 conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Darrell Tate, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas to initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failure to appear, for which he is serving a sixteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Gdongalay P. Berry, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The jury imposed sentences of death for the murder convictions, and the trial court ordered an effective fifty-year sentence for the remaining convictions, which was to be served consecutively to the death sentences. Subsequently, the post-conviction court vacated the Appellant’s death sentences and ordered a new sentencing hearing for the murder convictions. After the new hearing, the trial court resentenced the Appellant to consecutive life sentences. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing for the murder convictions because the trial court failed to give “meaningful” consideration to his rehabilitation during his twenty-one years in prison. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The posture of this matter is that, as the Defendant arrived in the trial court to enter his plea of guilty and be placed on probation, the trial court announced to the parties that the court wanted to be “educated” as to the workings of the PSA, to which the Defendant would be subject. As the majority opinion in this matter explains, the practical effect of the PSA is that certain alleged infractions of the probation requirements would not go to the court but, rather, would be handled by a probation officer. Subsequently, a hearing was held in this matter at which a probation officer testified regarding the general workings of the PSA. The Defendant, having not yet pled guilty, was not yet subject to the PSA provisions; and defense counsel had not questioned its constitutionality. One week later, the trial court filed its lengthy and detailed order, finding that the constitutionality of the PSA was ripe for the court’s consideration, and concluding that, were the Defendant subject to its provisions, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law would be violated.

Petitioner, Daetrus Pilate, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his confession was coerced and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in Case No. 11-05220. After appointment of counsel, an amended petition was filed claiming that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in Case No. 11-05220 and in Case No. 12-01054. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

The defendant, Robert Taylor, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, claiming that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of second degree murder, and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Martin Dean “Cub” Meeks, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition seeking to overturn his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was deficient in failing to obtain expert evidence, but he did not present any expert testimony at the post-conviction hearing. Because the Petitioner has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, William Shannon Gresham, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury for one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of rape of a child, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court dismissed one count of rape of a child upon motion of the State at the close of the State’s proof, and the trial court dismissed one count of aggravated sexual battery at the close of the defense’s proof. The jury found Defendant not guilty of aggravated sexual battery, and Defendant was convicted on one count each of the lesser-included offenses of sexual exploitation of a minor and child abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to four years’ incarceration for sexual exploitation of a minor and two years’ incarceration for child abuse, to be served concurrently. Following a hearing on Defendant’s “Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and/or New Trial,” the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal on Defendant’s sexual exploitation of a minor conviction, concluding that the photographs of the victim did not depict “lascivious exhibition” as defined in State v. Whited, 506 S.W.3d 416 (Tenn. 2016). In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for child abuse and the trial court’s denial of probation. Following a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This consolidated appeal comes to us following the passage of the Public Safety Act (“the PSA”), which, as relevant here, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-301,-306, changed how non-criminal or “technical” violations of probation are handled in Tennessee. These provisions require the Tennessee Department of Probation and Parole (“the department”) to develop, among other things, a single system of graduated sanctions for technical violations of community supervision and an administrative review process for objections by the probationer to imposition of such sanctions. Prior to accepting the Defendants’ guilty pleas, the trial court expressed concern regarding the implementation of the PSA, as these consolidated cases were the first in its district to which the graduated sanctions of the PSA would apply. The Defendants then objected to the imposition of the PSA as a mandatory condition of their probation and “request[ed] that the Court find certain of the provisions of T.C.A. § 40-28-301 through § 40-28-306, relative to sentences of probation, to be facially unconstitutional, and, therefore, decline to incorporate them within the judgment.” Specifically at issue are the provisions (1) mandating trial courts to include as a condition of probation that the department supervising the individual may impose graduated sanctions for violations of probation; and (2) the extent to which the department’s administrative process to review graduated sanctions contested by supervised individuals complies with principles of due process. After a hearing, the trial court issued an extensive order finding these sections of the PSA violated the separation of powers doctrine and principles of due process and equal protection. It is from this order that the State appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I fully concur with Judge McMullen’s opinion. I write separately in order to elaborate on some of the details on the Public Safety Act of 2016 (“Public Safety Act”) which this court concludes violates the Tennessee Constitution. I do not take any pleasure when, after a thorough review of the statutes, the Tennessee Constitution, and applicable case law, I am compelled to conclude that statutes passed by the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor violate provisions of our state’s constitution. I do not doubt the good intentions of the executive and legislative branches of our state government in establishing Section 14 of the Public Safety Act. Only the portion of the Public Safety Act found presently in T.C.A. § 40-28-301-306 pertaining to probation is deemed unconstitutional by this court. The provisions are contained solely in Section 14 of ch. 906 of the 2016 Public Acts.

A Monroe County jury convicted the Petitioner, Sterling Davis, of possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years, and this court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Sterling Jerome Davis, No. E2012-01398-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6047558, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 14, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 13, 2014). In a petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner raised multiple issues not relevant to this appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) the State failed to disclose facts that would be classified as Brady material; (2) the State willfully omitted facts which would have invalidated the search warrant in this case; and (3) the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it quashed a subpoena. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, William H. Young, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion. The Defendant was convicted following a bench trial of criminally negligent homicide, and he was sentenced to eighteen months of supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by relying solely on the circumstances of the offense in its decision to deny judicial diversion to the exclusion of other supporting factors. According to the Defendant, the trial court’s decision to deny his request for judicial diversion was based on the offense that he was convicted of rather than the applicable factors. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I write separately for the sole purpose of reiterating my belief that a prosecutor’s error in arguments to a jury should not be designated as “prosecutorial misconduct” or other words of similar import. See State v. Timothy McKinney, No. 2016-00834-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1055719 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2018), Woodall, dissenting.

A Williamson County jury convicted Petitioner, James Michael Naive, of the first degree premeditated murder of his sister. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. James Michael Naive, No. M2012-00893-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4505395 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2013). Petitioner filed a postconviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel’s defense strategy was unlikely to be successful, and trial counsel failed to advise Petitioner that his testimony was essential to his defense. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Marlon Boyd, was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life without parole plus 30 years. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the count of the indictment alleging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from the other charges; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to use Defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes; and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon our review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Allen Booker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he failed to receive due process at his trial or in the post-conviction evidentiary hearing and the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Maurice Baxter, of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued more than $1,000, and he received an effective sentence of fifty-eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that his DNA profile was in the CODIS database, that the trial court erred by allowing the defense’s DNA expert to testify for the State, and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its rebuttal closing argument. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the defense expert’s testifying for the State constitutes reversible error. We also conclude that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct and that the cumulative effect of that error further warrants reversal. Accordingly, the Appellant’s convictions must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Michael A. Flippen, Jr., entered a guilty plea to second degree murder, with the length of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the Defendant received a twenty-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in applying certain enhancement factors. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.