APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendants, Kalpesh Patel and Pratikkumar V. Patel, were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of solicitation to commit first degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-102, -103, -107. The trial court merged the solicitation convictions into the conspiracy convictions and sentenced each Defendant to fifteen years as Range I, standard offenders. On appeal, the Defendants raise the following issues: (1) both Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder; (2) both Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence retrieved during warrantless searches of their cell phones; (3) Defendant Kalpesh contends that the trial court erred by not sentencing him as an especially mitigated offender; (4) Defendant Kalpesh contends that a new trial is warranted based on newly discovered evidence impeaching the State’s primary witness; (5) Defendant Pratikkumar contends that the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and (6) Defendant Pratikkumar contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeanet Marie Covington, of aggravated arson, and the trial court sentenced her to serve fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant timely filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion, maintaining that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Maurice O. Byrd, Jr., of aggravated robbery, first degree felony murder, and premeditated first degree murder, and the Petitioner received an effective sentence of life. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. See State v. Maurice O. Byrd, No. M2010-02405-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5989817, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 29, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2013). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Raymond Deshun Ross, appeals the dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2005 Henderson County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated assault, carjacking, felony theft, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Upon the request of the Department of Safety, the State filed a petition to declare William Christopher Davis, the Defendant, a “habitual offender” pursuant to Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act (“the MVHO Act”). The trial court dismissed the petition after concluding that the MVHO Act was ambiguous regarding when the State had a duty to file a petition. On appeal, the State argues that it has an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) from the dismissal of its petition and that the trial court erred in dismissing its petition on the grounds that the MVHO Act was ambiguous and penal in nature. The Defendant argues that the State does not have an appeal as of right from the dismissal of its petition and that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the facts of this case and applicable case law, we conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right from the dismissal of a motor vehicle habitual offender petition, and thus we dismiss the State’s appeal.

The Defendant, Jonquarius Cunningham, was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of reckless endangerment, two counts of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Britton, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2015 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2011 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Because the petition was filed well beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Errol Johnson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the two aggravated child neglect convictions and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The trial court also merged the defendant’s convictions for criminally negligent homicide and sentenced him to two years. The defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated child neglect and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because aggravated child neglect is not an enumerated offense included in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(i)(2), the trial court erred in its applying the statute and sentencing the defendant as a violent offender at 100% release eligibility. Therefore, we remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

After a jury trial, the defendants, Leon Denton and Devan Denton, were convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendants assert the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, arguing the State failed to overcome the defense of duress. The defendants also claim their right to a speedy trial was violated. Independently, Leon Denton argues his convictions violate double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Elza Evans III, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and his effective sentence of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial and on appeal. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Larry A. Pullum, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition because it failed to state a cognizable claim. We affirm its judgment.

William Harold Smith, alias (“the Defendant”), was convicted of failure to appear after a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve three years with a thirty-five percent release eligibility in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and dismiss the charge.

The Defendant, Jabriel Linzy, alias, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant argues (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and (2) that evidence from social media posts was improperly admitted. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael Dean Sexton, was convicted of one count of theft over $10,000 and one count of vandalism over $10,000. He received concurrent sentences of nine years for each count to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) Whether the trial court properly discharged a juror (Defendant’s Issues I and II); (2) Whether the State was required to make an election of offenses and whether the trial court properly declined to issue a jury instruction (Defendant’s Issues III and IV); and (3) Whether the trial court erred by permitting the name of the co-defendant to be redacted from the indictment and whether the trial court refused to allow Defendant to introduce a copy of the unredacted indictment into evidence. (Defendant’s Issues V and VI). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Stewart County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark L. Watson, of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donald Ragland, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The Defendant has failed to present an appropriate argument under Rule 36; therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Sebastian Pegues, of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced him to life plus twenty years of incarceration. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Sebastian Pegues, No. W2014-00854-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3404736, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 27, 2015), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel ineffectively cross-examined the medical examiner. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Calvin Banks, of first degree premeditated murder and the trial court imposed a sentence of life. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence supporting his conviction is insufficient because the State failed to establish premeditation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Kristie Louise McLerran, entered a plea of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony, as a Range I, standard offender and to serve an eight-year term with manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a term of incarceration, finding that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing the Defendant to a term of imprisonment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carl Bond, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery. Over a year after this Court affirmed his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court subsequently denied the petition on its merits. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we conclude the petition was untimely, and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Defendant, Mario Bowles, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-three years at one-hundred percent for each count of aggravated rape, which the trial court merged, and twenty-three years at one-hundred percent for aggravated kidnapping. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another and consecutively with an unrelated case. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated rape. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcus Deangelo Lee, pleaded guilty in 1997 to escape from felony incarceration, and the trial court sentenced him to one year and ordered that his sentence run consecutively to a three-year sentence the Defendant received for drug-related and firearm convictions in 1995. Since that time, the Defendant has been arrested and convicted on other charges unrelated to this case. Almost seventeen years later, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 with regard to jail credits for his 1997 felony escape conviction. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it summarily dismissed his motion because the trial court improperly amended his judgment to reflect 103 days of jail credit, which he argues resulted in his sentences running concurrently rather than consecutively as mandated by statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Marquis Devann Churchwell, pled guilty to one count of robbery and two counts of assault with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years, eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of judgment forms for each count of the indictment in case number 2015-D-2352.