APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pro se petitioner Sheila Mitchell appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary denial of relief. In this appeal, the State concedes, and we agree, that the petitioner stated a colorable claim in her petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel.

The defendant, Vanessa Rennee Pinegar, appealed her convictions of one count of facilitation of delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone and two counts of attempted delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, challenging the denial of her motion to sever the trial of the defendants, certain evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and her effective nine-year sentence.  This Court affirmed the convictions and sentence.  The defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to our Supreme Court.  The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of State  v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2016).  Upon reconsideration, we vacate the defendant’s enhanced sentences under the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Jarrod Reese Spicer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the trial court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the petitioner claims counsel was ineffective because he failed to fully assist the petitioner until receiving full payment for his services, failed to subpoena certain witnesses to testify at trial, failed to obtain a medical expert to rebut the medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death, and failed to obtain a mental evaluation. Following our review of the record and submissions of the parties, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Rawney Jean Taylor, of initiating a false report, a Class D felony; criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced her to three years, two years, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively.  The court ordered that she serve the three- and two-year sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of five years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that her three- and two-year sentences are excessive, that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing, that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion, and that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury found Eddie H. Pittman, the defendant, guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, aggravated criminal trespass, and reckless aggravated assault. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon conviction with the reckless aggravated assault conviction and imposed an effective sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions and argues the trial court erred when imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review of the record and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Walter Jr. Shegog, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

Defendant, Shane H. Bishop, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication. He appeals from his sentence of eleven years, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Because Defendant was ineligible for an alternative sentence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Westley A. Albright, pled nolo contendere to one count of soliciting a minor in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-528, a Class E felony, for which he received a one-year suspended sentence and deferred judicial diversion.  As a condition of probation, the defendant agreed to participate in therapeutic treatment for the duration of probation or until favorably discharged.  Prior to the conclusion of the one-year suspended sentence, the defendant’s treatment provider discharged him for failure to comply with the goals of his treatment program.  Following service of a probation warrant and a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s deferred diversion and extended his probation for six months to allow for the completion of treatment.  On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to advise him at the time he entered his nolo contendere plea that, as a condition of probation, he would be required to confess to the solicitation of a minor; (2) the trial court violated his due process rights by relying on a probation rule not referenced in the revocation warrant; and (3) the trial court erred when revoking his deferred diversion despite his completion of the objective requirements of the sex offender treatment program.  Upon review, we affirm the findings of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. The petitioner also calls on this Court to apply the doctrine of stare decisis and ignore the Tennessee Supreme Court holding of Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016). After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Jaleel Jovan Stovall, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of rape of a child and received a sentence of twenty-five years at 100% service. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to object to hearsay introduced by the State and for failing to argue that a letter allegedly authored by the Petitioner was not properly authenticated. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Tommy Lee Collins, Jr., was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, evading arrest, a Class D felony, and reckless endangerment, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1324 (2014) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-16-603 (2014) (amended 2016) (evading arrest), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-417(a)(4) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (possession of a controlled substance). The trial court merged the possession of marijuana convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his drug and firearm convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop and subsequent search of the car he was driving, (3) the prosecutor improperly challenged a juror on the basis of race, (4) the trial court erred by declining to order the prosecutor to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and (5) the Defendant’s dual convictions for reckless endangerment and evading arrest violated double jeopardy principles. Because we conclude a juror was improperly challenged, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The pro se Petitioner, Frankie Jason Cope, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Steffon Hodges, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was not advised of his rights before entering his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Robert E. Lequire, Jr., appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, in which he alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Walter Lee Hicks, was indicted for aggravated assault, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, driving on a revoked driver’s license, speeding, and making a false report. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesserincluded offense of assault, evading arrest, reckless endangerment, driving on a revoked driver’s license, speeding, and making a false report. The trial court imposed a 17-year sentence. A panel of this court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal, but the panel remanded the case for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the conviction for misdemeanor assault merged into the conviction for felony reckless endangerment. State v. Walter Lee Hicks, Jr., No. M2013-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2902277, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 26, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Oct. 22, 2014). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel omitted portions of a state trooper’s dash camera video when presenting that evidence at trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Blake Austin Weaver, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. Pursuant to a guilty plea, he was convicted of one count of theft of property valued more than $60,000 and eleven counts of forgery of a check in an amount greater than $1,000 and less than $10,000. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served on community corrections. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence after finding that the Defendant failed a drug screen, failed to pay restitution, and did not comply with orders to attend intensive outpatient therapy and enter a halfway house. After revocation, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence, contending that the trial court erroneously failed to consider his ability to pay restitution, relied on grounds outside the notice of violation, and acted too harshly in requiring him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment revoking the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

The Defendant, William Charles Burgess, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of one count of preventing or obstructing an arrest and two counts of obstructing or preventing service of process, Class B misdemeanors. See T.C.A. § 39-16- 602 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months, with all but ten days suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Because the Defendant’s conduct did not constitute a criminal offense, we reverse the judgments of the trial court, vacate the Defendant’s convictions, and dismiss the charges.

The Defendant, Mario Frederick, was convicted of two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony, two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor less than thirteen years of age, a Class C felony, and three counts of indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. He received an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the counts of the indictment and his motion for arrest of judgment. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Larsheika Hill, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence for selling or delivering cocaine and order that she serve ten years in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Felton Jackson, filed a petition in the Wilson County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief from his conviction of especially aggravated robbery.  The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to call alibi witnesses, coercing the Petitioner not to testify, and failing to investigate or present proof regarding the Petitioner’s “social, medical and mental health.”  The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, William Langston, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the second degree murder of his wife and received a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, Langston argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his request to enter a guilty plea to a pending indictment charging him with voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it accepted a police officer as an expert in the field of blood spatter analysis at trial; (3) the instructions in his case precluded the jury from considering the offense of voluntary manslaughter; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the date that the second degree murder conviction was entered following sentencing.

The Defendant, Shawn P. Bradley, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s order declaring him to be a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO). On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in declaring him to be a MVHO because the judgment forms for the qualifying offenses were facially invalid. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kalandra Lacy, appeals her Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of abuse of a corpse, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her bid for judicial diversion. Following a de novo review occasioned by the trial court’s failure to consider on the record all the factors relevant to the denial of judicial diversion as well as the trial court’s consideration of irrelevant factors, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to judicial diversion. We remand the case for entry of an order placing the defendant on judicial diversion under the same terms and conditions of her previously imposed sentence of probation.

The Defendant, Ronald Levon Cosper, was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2014) (felony murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt). He received concurrent sentences of life for the felony murder conviction and ten years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2) he was deprived of due process because the State introduced unreliable identification evidence of him as the perpetrator of the offenses. We affirm the first degree felony murder judgment of the trial court. We affirm the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction but vacate the judgment and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jacob Pearman, was convicted as charged by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and child abuse, and he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus five years. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), -102(a)(1), -15-401(a). On appeal, Pearman argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike a juror for cause; (3) the evidence is insufficient to show that he premeditated the victim’s killing; (4) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s statements pursuant to the state of mind hearsay objection; (5) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its rebuttal closing argument; and (6) the trial court failed to properly exercise its role as the thirteenth juror.1 We affirm the judgments of the trial court.