APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Ronald Cauthern (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Gibson County Circuit Court, alleging that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition after concluding that the petition was untimely. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of coram nobis relief. Upon review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s determination that the Petitioner’s claim regarding an unedited videotape is time-barred. However, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court as to the Petitioner’s claim regarding lab bench notes and remand for the coram nobis court to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling on this claim.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Lamont Harshaw, pled guilty to two counts of attempted first degree murder, Class A felonies; three counts of aggravated assault, Class B felonies; reckless endangerment by firing into an occupied habitation, a Class C felony; two counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, Class D felonies; and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies. He received an effective sentence of thirty-six years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner also argues that the criminal gang enhancement statute, which was applied to increase his aggravated assault convictions from Class C felonies to Class B felonies, is unconstitutional. Upon review, we conclude that pursuant to State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), the criminal gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional; therefore, we must reverse the judgments for the aggravated assault convictions in counts three, four, and five in case number 100379; vacate the criminal gang enhancements in those convictions; and remand for entry of judgments reflecting that each aggravated assault conviction is a Class C felony with a sentence of fifteen years. The Petitioner's total effective sentence remains the same. The judgments of conviction are affirmed in all other respects.

John Hudson (“the Defendant”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting that he was entitled to relief because the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it revoked the Defendant’s probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Spencer Peterson (“the Defendant”) appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion.

The Defendant, Clyde Hobbs, appeals as of right from the Grundy County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and order of confinement for eight years.  The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the Defendant had violated specialized conditions of his probation.  Additionally, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking the Defendant’s probation without considering possible alternatives.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Earl Vantrease, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of aggravated robbery in 2003 and received a sixteen-year sentence as a Range II offender.  Thirteen years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence.  The trial court summarily dismissed the motion.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tony Wolfe, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition on the basis of newly discovered scientific mental health evidence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion without conducting a hearing on the merits. Because the Petitioner has no appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to reopen and did not follow the procedure required for seeking permission to appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, William Crayton, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Carl Hall, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion stated a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Troy Love, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2014) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2014) (aggravated sexual battery). He was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty-five years each for the rape of a child convictions and to a concurrent term of ten years for aggravated sexual battery, for an effective sentence of fifty years to be served as a Violent Offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (2) the court erred in denying the Defendant‘s pretrial motions relative to interaction between the victim and State agents and for a "taint hearing" to determine the victim‘s reliability, (3) the court erred in failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to corroborate the reliability of the Defendant‘s pretrial statements, (4) the court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict and for judgment of acquittal, (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (6) the court and the prosecutor improperly referred to "Count 8" despite the fact that only three counts were submitted to the jury, (7) the court erred in its jury instructions, (8) the sentence is improper, and (9) due process requires relief due to the existence of cumulative error. We affirm the rape of a child convictions, and we reverse the aggravated sexual battery conviction and remand for a new trial.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Kelley Elizabeth Cannon, of first degree premeditated murder and a life sentence was imposed.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence.  State v. Kelley Elizabeth Cannon, No. M2010-01553-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5378088, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 30, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 9, 2013).  The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel, asserts that the post-conviction court erred by preventing her use of trial exhibits for a demonstration and challenges the validity of the search warrants in this case.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Christopher Lee Williams, was convicted of reckless endangerment, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault.  Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether dual convictions for aggravated kidnapping resulting in bodily injury and domestic assault based on bodily injury are proper, and (2) whether the trial court failed to consider a statutory mitigating factor in fashioning Defendant’s sentence.  After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After pleading guilty to one count of aggravated child abuse, Petitioner sought unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty plea.  Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things.  The post-conviction court denied relief, and Petitioner appeals.  After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Cedric Watkins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree premeditated murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Christopher L. Smith, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault, all Class C felonies, in exchange for an effective sentence of six years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement, which the defendant now challenges.  After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tehren Wilson, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a written request for a jury charge on fraudulent use of a credit card as a lesser-included offense of identity theft. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Terrance Lavar Walker, pleaded guilty to delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine with an agreed upon Range I sentence of nine years, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the nine-year sentence.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and ordered that the Defendant serve nine years in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Joe Edward Daniels, of first degree (premeditated) murder.  The Defendant was also convicted of certain collateral crimes and traffic offenses, including tampering with evidence, a Class D felony; abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony; failure to give notice of an accident, a Class C misdemeanor; leaving the scene of an accident, a Class C misdemeanor; driving on the wrong side of the road, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to use due care, a Class C misdemeanor.  The Defendant appeals his murder conviction, asserting that the State failed to prove premeditation and that the State’s proof regarding the chain of custody of the corpse should have preceded the medical examiner’s testimony.  The Defendant also claims error in the jury instructions, including the trial court’s decision not to charge attempt; the trial court’s decision to charge flight; the trial court’s inclusion of a charge regarding criminal responsibility and lack of notice regarding that charge; and the trial court’s failure to charge facilitation.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffery Keith Toone, Jr., pled guilty to two counts of extortion, ten counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, and two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor and received an effective four-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation after service of two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. As a condition of his guilty plea, Toone sought to reserve several certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), generally arguing that the transfer of his case from juvenile court to circuit court was improper. Because Toone's certified questions are overly broad, the appeal is dismissed.

 The Defendant, Jason Erik Redden, pleaded guilty to two counts of official misconduct,Class E felonies, in exchange for concurrent sentences of two years each. See T.C.A. §§39-16-402 (2014). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine themanner of service and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, theDefendant contends that the court erred by denying (1) judicial diversion and (2) alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lavar Jernigan, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of six counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, Class B felonies.  SeeT.C.A. § 39-17-1005 (2010) (amended 2013).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for each count and ordered partial consecutive service, for an effective sentence of thirty years at 100% service.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) admitting in evidence a notebook containing text messages exchanged between the Defendant and the victim, (2) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, and (3) denying his motion for a bill of particulars.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Petr Pompa, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing inadmissible opinion, character, and hearsay testimony at trial; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s motive to fabricate the allegations against the Defendant; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to remain in the courtroom following her testimony; (4) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to counts five and six; and (5) the Defendant’s sentence was unlawful.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Starbrough Jones, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner concedes that the petition was untimely but maintains that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations because he was never “official[ly]” informed that counsel was withdrawing after this court filed its opinion on direct appeal and because counsel did not advise the Petitioner of his right to seek postconviction relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Odell Wisdom, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief, alleging that his separate convictions for contempt and failure to appear violate double jeopardy principles. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief and, therefore, affirm the summary dismissal of his petition.

After the trial court denied an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State sought an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court granted the State's application. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence seized from Defendant because the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest him for a felony drug offense and search him incident to that arrest. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.