APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the defendant, Thomas L. Dowlen, of first degree (premeditated) murder. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of guilt and that he is entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor’s remarks during opening argument. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Demarico Chalmers, of attempted aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life plus five years. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions. State v. Demarico Chalmers, No. W2011-01274-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3601626, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 22, 2012), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to obtain gunshot residue testing. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner's petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

Luis Castanon, the Petitioner, appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Because the motion failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Johnny Wilkerson, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

William Reynolds (“the Petitioner”) was indicted for sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams in a school zone, a Class B felony.  He entered a negotiated plea to sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender with release eligibility after service of 60% of the sentence.  The Petitioner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction which the habeas corpus court denied.  On appeal, the Petitioner claims that his judgment of conviction is void because the indictment was insufficient to support his plea to an increased amount of cocaine and that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.  After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Anthony L. Woods, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of driving on a revoked license and received an effective six-year sentence to be served on probation. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. The post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I write separately to express my opinion that the trial court erred in its attempted curative instruction to the jury during cross-examination of Defendant. As noted in the majority opinion in its analysis of the mistrial issue, the prosecutor asked Defendant, “And it’s true . . . that you never told any police officer that came to the scene any of this, right?” Defendant objected on the basis that the question violated his constitutional right to remain silent. The trial court sustained Defendant’s objection. However, in the trial court’s attempt to minimize damage caused by the prosecutor’s question, the instruction to the jury included that, “The defendant has a constitutional right against self-incrimination.”

Sedrick Darion Mitchell (“the Defendant”) was convicted offailure to appear after a jury trial.  The trial court sentenced him to serve six years at sixty percent release eligibility in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive and contrary to law.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Stephen Gerard Smith, the Defendant, filed a pro se Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in which he asked the trial court to either reduce his sentence or to grant a new sentencing hearing.  Because the Defendant was erroneously sentenced as a career offender rather than a persistent offender for Class C felony aggravated assault and because the sentence was entered as the result of an agreement between the State and the Defendant, the trial court granted a new sentencing hearing.  Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to thirteen years’ incarceration as a Range III persistent offender for Class C felony aggravated assault and to a consecutive sentence of twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender for Class D felony attempted aggravated assault.  The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the three domestic assault convictions to be served concurrently with each other and with the felony sentences.  The Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in allowing him to proceed pro se in the motion hearing and in the imposition of the sentences.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the trial court issued a written order finding the Defendant, Leroy Myers, Jr., not guilty of the charged offense, aggravated assault, but guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  On appeal the Defendant asserts that reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault under the facts of this case and that there was not an implicit amendment to the indictment to include reckless endangerment.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Jonathon Wayne Thompson, was convicted of theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1000. He received a sentence of one year and six months, with 90 days to serve in incarceration on consecutive weekends and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s decision to deny full probation. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bryant Jackson Harris, was convicted by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (2) (2014) (first degree murder), 39-14-402 (2014) (aggravated burglary). The Defendant received an effective life sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial, and (4) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for corrected judgments reflecting merger of the first degree felony murder conviction with the first degree premeditated murder conviction.

The Defendant, Kevin Dean Atkins, appeals the trial court’s order setting aside a plea agreement whereby the Defendant pled guilty to public intoxication and admitted violating the terms of his probation for a prior conviction.  The Defendant filed a motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and his motion was granted.  On appeal, the State concedes that the trial court’s order violated the Defendant’s double jeopardy rights.  We agree and accept the State’s concession.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, James Robert Wilson, of especially aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life in prison.  The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments.  State v. James Robert Wilson, No. M2000-00760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1050259, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 24, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2002).  In 2003, the Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief.  James Robert Wilson v. State, M2004-00933-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 1378770, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 10, 2005), perm. app. denied (Oct. 31, 2005).  In 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief contending that the trial court “constructively amended the indictment in this case” when it charged the jury using language that did not fully comport with the language used by the grand jury when it indicted him.  The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

Defendant, Quincy Terrell Sharpe, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury, along with his co-defendant DeAndre D. Rucker, for premeditated first degree murder.  Defendant and Rucker were tried jointly, and both were convicted as charged.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment.  In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct by the State during closing argument.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Lamonez Deshaun Thaxton, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of reckless endangerment and attempted especially aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to exclude evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Gregory Scott Barnum, was convicted of Class E felony indecent exposure and received a sentence of two years’ incarceration.  On appeal from his conviction, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously found that he was a “sexual offender” based on his 1998 Kentucky convictions for indecent exposure and thus subject to enhanced punishment under Tennessee’s indecent exposure statute. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cephus D. Spicer, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm on a college campus, claiming that his due process rights were violated by the State’s reading of the indictment to the jury without proper instructions, that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant, Bridget Bondurant Shirer, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to five counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; seven counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; one count of failure to appear, a Class D felony; and one count of forgery in the amount of $500 or less, a Class E felony.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served as eight years in confinement followed by six years on community corrections.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the length and manner of service of her effective fourteen-year sentence is excessive.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Lewis, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his second degree murder conviction and resulting fifteen-year sentence.  On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition due to various deficiencies in the petition.  Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief without first providing the petitioner with the opportunity to correct the deficiencies.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings.

I unenthusiastically agree with the conclusion reached by the majority.  The legal soundness and logical result reached by the post-conviction court effectively delivers a wound to Petitioner by the hand of his out-of-state post-conviction attorney.  Such a wound is a mortal shot to Petitioner’s chances of post-conviction review.

This is a custody case involving two children.2 C.W.H. (Father) and L.A.S. (Mother) modified, by an agreed order, an existing parenting plan for their children, P.H. and V.H. The modification continued Mother as the children's primary residential parent. Soon thereafter, Father learned that Mother worked in Nevada as a prostitute. He filed a motion seeking an emergency temporary custody order and a temporary restraining order. The juvenile court magistrate found that a material change in circumstances had occurred. It changed the identity of the children's primary residential parent from Mother to Father. Mother appealed to the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court (1) confirmed the magistrate's decision and (2) designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed to this Court. In the first appeal, we held that the trial court's order lacked a “best interest” analysis. As a result, we vacated that order and directed the trial court to (1) make a best interest analysis and thereafter (2) enter a new permanent parenting plan. On remand, the trial court (1) incorporated its past findings, (2) conducted a best interest analysis, and (3) held in Father's favor. Mother again appeals. We reverse because we hold that the evidence preponderates, in part but significantly, against the trial court's factual findings supporting its judgment.

The Appellant, Antonio Clifton, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Rule 36.1 relief was not available because his illegal sentence had long ago expired. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion.