APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Malik DeWayne Hardin, appeals the denial of his motion for resentencing
for his guilty-pleaded conviction of possession with the intent to sell less than .5 grams of
cocaine in a drug free school zone, which resulted in a sentence of twelve years at 100%
as a Range II offender. The Defendant asserts that the trial court issued a fundamentally
illegal ruling and palpably abused its discretion by comparing the sentence the Defendant
received pursuant to his negotiated plea agreement to the sentence he faced if convicted of
the greater charged offense and concluding that he would not receive a lesser sentence
under the 2022 amendment to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. The Defendant therefore
requests that this court, in the interest of justice, convert his improperly filed Rule 3 appeal
into a common law writ of certiorari and reverse the ruling of the trial court. Because the
Defendant has not shown that his case warrants review pursuant to a writ of certiorari, we
dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Carlos Stokes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifty-four years. He contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and requests that this court appoint a special judge to preside over this case on remand. We conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations. As a result, the judgment of the coram nobis court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. We decline to appoint a special judge for subsequent proceedings.

Petitioner, Larry B. Sexton, appeals as of right from the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for aggravated statutory rape, for which he received a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, Petitioner contends that, during trial, his right to due process of law was violated when the trial court permitted the State to reopen proof following his motion for judgment of acquittal. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to: (1) communicate the State’s plea offer to him; (2) request a trial continuance following the issuance of an amended indictment; (3) prepare a mistake of fact defense and interview potential witnesses to support this defense; (4) request a jury instruction on mistake of fact; (5) argue at sentencing and on direct appeal that NCIC entries are not “reliable hearsay” for purposes of sentencing; (6) object during sentencing when the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-106(b)(5) and raise the issue on appeal; and (7) adequately argue during trial and on appeal the issue of the reopening of proof. Following a thorough review, we affirm.

The defendant, Brittany Linda Lou Davis, appeals her Lincoln County Circuit Court jury convictions of delivering and selling .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting a recording of the controlled buy, that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, and that the trial court erred by sentencing her as a Range III offender. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Torrian Seantel Bishop, pleaded guilty in the Obion County Circuit Court to the unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class B felony, and theft of property, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1) (Supp. 2023) (unlawful possession of a weapon), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twelve-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the search of his car. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Quartes Williams, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for first degree murder during the perpetration of a robbery and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Marcus Terrell Bradford, was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal Court Jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of 11 months, 29 days for the assault conviction and 30 days for the disorderly conduct conviction, to be served at 75% in the county jail. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentences for the offenses, by ordering that the sentences run consecutively, and by not allowing any alternative sentencing options. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Benson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claim alleging that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to meaningfully present the Petitioner’s self-defense claim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony Lynn Taylor, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he absconded from probation and that the trial court failed to place sufficient findings on the record to justify placing his sentence into effect. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County Jury convicted DaShawn Patrick Slone¹ and Demetrius Trevon Higgins, Defendants, of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse. The trial court imposed effective sentences of life plus six years for Defendant Slone and life plus four years for Defendant Higgins. On appeal, Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for access to the sealed Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) juvenile records relating to the victim’s mother’s records which were sealed to public inspection but provided to the parties prior to the defendant’s trial. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude the defendant does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of his motion. Additionally, the defendant has failed to establish review as a petition for writ of certiorari is appropriate. Therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Timothy Whitby, guilty of:
vandalism under $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class C
misdemeanor; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days on each count,
suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting his assault conviction, and the trial court’s sentence of eleven
months and twenty-nine days for his disorderly conduct conviction. After review, we
conclude that the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and
twenty-nine days for his Class C misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction. Thus, we
remand for entry of a sentence within the appropriate sentencing range. We affirm the
judgments in all other respects.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Phennix Givens, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective forty-six-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Terry L. Gragg, appeals his conviction of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of four years’ probation.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Albert Bohannon, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  After review, we affirm the dismissal because the Petitioner is no longer imprisoned or restrained of his liberty and the petition fails to comply with the statutory requirements.

Petitioner, Larry J. Bradley, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for evading arrest, attempted carjacking, aggravated burglary, and assault.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel argued that Petitioner was guilty of attempted carjacking without consulting with Petitioner and (2) trial counsel failed to properly determine the felony classification for Petitioner’s Indiana convictions for purposes of sentencing.  He also argues the “Circuit Court erred in denying [Petitioner’s] petition to set aside the sentence on the attempted carjacking conviction due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.”  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Bruce Dorsett, II, Petitioner, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief after the entry of a guilty plea to several offenses.  Petitioner requested equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  The post-conviction court determined Petitioner was entitled to neither statutory nor equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and, consequently, denied relief and dismissed the petition.  Petitioner then filed an untimely notice of appeal.  On appeal, Petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without allowing Petitioner to amend it.  We waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal but affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner, Lavino Horne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court correctly determined that the statute of limitations should be tolled for his untimely petition because he diligently pursued his petition after being abandoned by trial counsel. He further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The State responds that the post-conviction court erred by finding that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from timely filing his petition and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The State further argues that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we conclude that Petitioner failed to show that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. Accordingly, Petitioner’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred by the statute of limitations and we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.

An Obion County jury convicted the Appellant of second degree murder of Decora Alexander, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ confinement. At the time of the offense, the Appellant was serving a four-year probation sentence for an offense involving the same victim, which was subsequently violated and ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-nine years’ confinement. The Appellant argues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in not charging the jury with self-defense; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the Appellant’s probation officer at trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting photographs from the crime scene and a life-in-being photograph into evidence; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without consideration of the Appellant’s mitigation proof; and (7) the trial court’s cumulative errors necessitate a new trial.  Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua W. Gabehart, of the unlawful sale of fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he knew he was selling fentanyl instead of heroin. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony Eugene Barnett, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court conviction of theft of services, arguing that his judgment of conviction contains a clerical error by listing the incorrect statute for his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to continue his case, made the day of his trial.  Upon review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the defendant’s conviction for theft of services.  Because the record includes neither a transcript of the defendant’s oral motion to continue his case, the trial court’s ruling thereupon, nor a transcript of the trial, we conclude that the issue is waived and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Andre Anthony, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct a clerical mistake pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The Defendant contends that his two consecutive sentences at issue were originally ordered to run in a specific order but that the challenged corrected judgment forms indicate that each sentence runs consecutively to the other, in no particular order, and should once again be corrected. The State responds that the trial court correctly denied the Rule 36 motion because the order of the consecutive sentences is immaterial and because the corrected judgments accurately reflect the Defendant’s sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jamieum Alvin Reid, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for
possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 grams or
more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of methamphetamine. Defendant
pled guilty as charged and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence, with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve
his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying alternative sentencing because he was already approved by a
community based program, and the State failed to present evidence that an alternative
sentence was inappropriate. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Tipton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for especially aggravated kidnapping,
especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault by strangulation. Prior to trial,
counts one and two of the indictment were amended to aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated burglary. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated assault by strangulation, and aggravated criminal trespass. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective eight-year sentence. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated assault by strangulation. Following our review of the entire
record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Gause, was convicted by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury of two counts of first degree felony murder under alternate theories; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and accessory after the fact, a Class E felony. After merging the felony murder convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction, twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and two years for the accessory after the fact conviction, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.