APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On appeal, the defendant, Anne Elizabeth Cushing, has presented a certified question of law for our review. Following the denial of her motion to suppress, the defendant entered a guilty plea to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) but reserved a certified question. In the question, she challenges the denial of the motion to suppress because, according to the defendant, the results of the field sobriety tests should be inadmissible because she was entitled to be Mirandized when she was placed in the backseat of the police officer's patrol car while he conducted an investigation at the accident scene. She contends she was not free to leave and that, as such, the right to Miranda warnings had attached. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the question, as presented, is not dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Charles Speed, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct what he alleges is an illegal sentence. He argues that his sentence is illegal because the State never filed a noticed to seek an enhanced sentence within ten days of the entry of his guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Derek Burgess, committed new criminal offenses while on probation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. The defendant appeals the trial court’s order sentencing him to serve his sentence in incarceration, arguing that the trial court incorrectly calculated the length of his remaining sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Kentavis Jones, of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The State contends that the Petitioner's appeal is untimely and that he is not entitled to post-conviction relief. After review, we conclude there exists no error. We affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The defendant, Hester Croy, was convicted of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by ruling that her prior convictions for theft of property would be admissible for impeachment purposes if she testified. Following our review, we conclude that this issue is waived due to the defendant‟s failure to file a motion for new trial and that plain error review is not warranted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Kinsler, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel elicited inadmissible hearsay testimony on cross-examination and then failed to object to the testimony. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, John David Luther, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and reckless aggravated assault, and resulting effective seventeen-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Adam Moates, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, and five counts of employing a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective twenty-six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder convictions because it fails to show premeditation. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrance Heard, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his August 2001 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Because the petitioner failed to prepare an adequate record for our review, we presume the ruling of the post-conviction court is correct and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Reggie Carnell James, was convicted in 2007 of first degree murder and tampering with evidence. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and ten years for the tampering with evidence conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Reggie Carnell James, No. W2007-00775-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 636726, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). In April 2010, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel had been ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a statement the petitioner had made to police officers. Following a hearing on April 11, 2011, the post-conviction court entered an order on January 31, 2012, denying the petition. The notice of appeal for this decision was not filed until August 27, 2015. The State argues on appeal that the notice of appeal was untimely and that, as a result, the appeal should be dismissed. We conclude that the interest of justice does not require our waiving the late filing of the notice of appeal and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Deangelo Key, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to nine years at 85% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, LaKeith Moody, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of the victim, with whom Defendant had a long-time romantic relationship. He received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by admitting acts of prior domestic violence committed by Defendant against the victim; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the trial court failed to merge Defendant's convictions for premeditated and felony murder into one judgment for first degree murder. After a thorough review, we affirm the convictions for first degree premeditated murder and felony murder and remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms noting merger of the two convictions as set forth herein.

The appellant, Brenda Haynes Jackson Claughton, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to two counts of felony theft and received concurrent, four-year sentences to be served on supervised probation.  The trial court also ordered that she pay $36,000 restitution.  On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation for her failure to pay restitution when the evidence shows that she had no ability to pay it.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Flamingo Brown, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence.  Because the grounds for relief raised by the defendant have been previously determined and because the defendant failed to state cognizable grounds for relief under Rule 36.1, the interests of justice do not require the waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Ann Dodd, appeals the Williamson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition to expunge the record of her 2009 Williamson County General Sessions Court guilty-pleaded conviction of simple possession of cocaine.  Because we conclude that the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(g), we affirm the trial court’s order.

The petitioner, Huston Foley Lloyd, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, and the State concedes that summary dismissal was improper.  Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition.  Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner’s claims.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Roy Thomas Rogers, was convicted of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-301, -17-425, -17-433, -17-435. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from a garbage bag found near his residence and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. However, the Defendant failed to timely file his motion for new trial, and, subsequently, his notice of appeal. Because we conclude that the interest of justice does not require us to hear the appeal, we dismiss it as untimely.

The defendant, Charles Owens, filed an unsuccessful Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, the alleged illegality being that he was not present, either in person or by video, at his sentencing.  He asks that his conviction and sentence be declared illegal and void.  The trial court concluded, without a hearing, that the motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief, and this appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the motion, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, Tyler Fitzgerald Raybon-Tate, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more; two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less; one count of carjacking; one count of kidnapping; two counts of felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle; and one count of driving on a suspended license.  The defendant had agreed to be sentenced as a Range II offender, and the court was to determine the alignment of the sentences.  Subsequently, the court imposed eight-year sentences for each of the five counts of aggravated burglary; seven years for the theft of property over $10,000; eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two counts of theft of property $500 or less; seventeen years for carjacking; nine years for kidnapping; three years for one evading arrest charge and six years for the other; and six months for driving on a suspended license.  Concluding that the defendant had an extensive record of criminal behavior and was a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that the sentences for the carjacking conviction and for two aggravated burglaries be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years.  The defendant appealed, arguing that consecutive sentences should not have been imposed, for he was not a dangerous offender.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tiffany Clegg, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a sentence of full confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dana N. Yearwood, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective five-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine day sentence in the Department of Correction.  In this appeal, Yearwood argues that the trial court improperly reinstated a sentence of confinement without consideration of her presentence report and improperly revoked her probation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Holmes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) (2014) (first degree murder), 39-13-202(b) (2014) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt), 39-13-404 (2014) (carjacking), 39-17-1324(i)(1) (2014) (dangerous felony), 39-17-1324(b) (2014) (employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a felony). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of the judgments.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, John Russell Giles, Jr., was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred “in refusing to fashion a remedy” for alleged discovery violations made by the State; (3) that the trial court admitted in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence that, the day before the murder, the Defendant had conducted internet searches for and visited pornographic websites depicting women being raped; (4) that one of the State's witnesses “perjured himself,” and the trial court did not allow the witness to be recalled for further cross-examination; and (5) that the State was allowed to argue a time of death that differed from the time of death provided in the bill of particulars. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Orlando Freeman, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; aggravated assault by infliction of serious bodily injury; and attempted aggravated rape by use of a deadly weapon. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -13-102, -13-502. He was acquitted of especially aggravated kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender with release eligibility at thirty percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support each of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to preserve evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (3) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, which prejudiced the outcome of his trial; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant's issues are without merit, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all respects.

The Defendant, Bobby Lynch, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of third offense simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to six years' confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.