APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Chris M. Jones, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition filed
pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, wherein he sought DNA
testing of evidence related to his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted
second-degree murder. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Jaquan Gathing, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the
petition.

Defendant, Wayne Daryl Potee, pleaded guilty in case numbers 2015-CR-185 and 2015- CR-186 to one count of selling 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine in a Drug-Free School Zone (“DFSZ”) and one count of selling less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine in a DFSZ. Defendant received an effective 15-year sentence to serve at 100 percent for his convictions. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h)(1), which the trial court denied following two evidentiary hearings. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision. In his brief to this Court, Defendant acknowledges that he has no right of appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, see State v. Bobo, 672 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023). He nonetheless asserts that the trial court’s ruling was fundamentally illegal and asks this Court to grant a writ of certiorari. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we deny Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Smith County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Ralph Edward Overstreet, Jr., for burglary, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction. Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the prosecutor’s previous representation of Defendant created an actual conflict of interest that required disqualification and a new trial; (2) the State violated its discovery obligations by introducing evidence that the State allegedly did not disclose of a prior domestic incident between Defendant and his girlfriend; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of any other conviction. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Floyd, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking postconviction
relief from his convictions of driving under the influence (two counts) and
reckless driving. He received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days,
which was suspended after service of seven days. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call his ex-girlfriend as a witness at trial and claims
she would have established that the Petitioner was not the driver at the time of the offense.
The Petitioner also argues the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because the
court initially “advised [the Petitioner] that it would accept an affidavit of [his exgirlfriend]
as a substitute for live testimony” and later denied the Petitioner relief for failure
to produce witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.1 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

A Henry County jury found Defendant, Justin Daniel Barker, guilty of two counts of rape (under alternate theories) and one count of aggravated statutory rape. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight and a half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting testimony related to Defendant’s pending criminal proceedings in another jurisdiction, and he contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdicts. After review, we conclude the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the pending criminal proceedings, but such error was harmless. We also conclude the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Farris Lamont Kidd, pleaded guilty to five separate charges, and received an effective fourteen-year sentence. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael White, of five counts of rape in 2005, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-five years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because, among other things, the original affidavit of complaint was invalid and that his charges were not supported by probable cause. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the application, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief and that he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for requesting the writ. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In 2005, the Defendant, Ruben D. Pimentel, pled guilty to the offense of first degree murder and accepted a negotiated sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. Thereafter, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. He alleged that his sentence was illegal because it violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(2), as amended in 2020, which provides that a defendant may be released from a life sentence after sixty years. The trial court summarily denied the motion, finding that the Defendant’s sentence was not illegal. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree with the Defendant and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Karla Marie Clausell, appeals as of right from her conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant
contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from Snapchat in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(a) and by admitting Snapchat and Facebook messages in
violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). She also contends that the cumulative
effect of these errors entitles her to a new trial. After a thorough review of the evidence
and applicable case law, we affirm.

Eric Tyre Patton, Defendant, was convicted of two Class A felony drug offenses committed within the 1000-foot prohibited zone of an elementary school and was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty-five years at 100% service. Defendant filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-432(h). The trial court found that granting a shorter sentence was not in the interests of justice and denied the motion. Defendant filed a petition seeking certiorari and/or extraordinary review. This court denied extraordinary review but granted the petition seeking certiorari and ordered the record to be assembled and transmitted for this court to conduct a review of the trial court’s ruling. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Misty Paul, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and
ordering her to serve her modified six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of
the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the revocation and disposition
of the defendant’s probation, but remand for the sole determination by the trial court as to
whether to credit the defendant with time successfully spent in compliance with probation
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-310(a).

Brandon R. Richardson, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of two counts of vehicular assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, evading arrest, driving under the influence, driving without a license, and a violation of the open container law. In a motion for new trial, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge to multiple members of the jury pool for cause. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. Defendant sought an untimely appeal; this Court waived the timeliness requirement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to deny Defendant’s challenge for cause to members of the jury pool. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Edward Parnell Porter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Torius Saville Russell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance
of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Vicky L. Smith, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness, and the
trial judge imposed a ten-year sentence of incarceration with the Tennessee Department of
Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her request
to serve her sentence on probation. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael M. Cook, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape and two
counts of aggravated kidnapping for which he received an effective term of twenty-five
years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) police contamination of the
condom that yielded the defendant’s DNA profile resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial
under State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (2) the trial court erred in not
requiring chain of custody after the police mispackaged the condom in a way that degrades
DNA; (3) the identification of the defendant’s voice based on his testimony at the Momon
hearing resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial; (4) the prosecution commented on the
defendant’s silence by arguing the defendant’s rights prevented a non-suggestive voice
identification; (5) improper argument by the State throughout trial affected the verdict; (6)
the trial court failed to give a full and complete charge of the law by not instructing the
jury on identification and other instructions requested by the defendant; and (7) the
cumulative errors in the case warrant reversal. Following a thorough review of the record,
the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Charles Timothy Rowden, of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated arson. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not instruct the jury that the Defendant’s girlfriend was an accomplice as a matter of law; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) his attorney was ineffective. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments and remand for entry of an additional judgment form.

Petitioner, Larry Johnson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that he received an illegal sentence. We conclude Petitioner has failed to timely appeal or to follow procedural requirements, and the interest of justice does not require waiver of the requirements. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Keenan A. Murphy, of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-six years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the proof is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to prove premeditation. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to cross-examine the defense expert about a second shooting the Defendant committed nine days after the offenses in this case. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, William Flynn, of first degree
premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated assault in concert. For
these convictions, the trial court imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions. After
review, we affirm the judgments.

The defendant, David Parr, appeals the Stewart County Circuit Court’s imposition of a fully-incarcerative sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of methamphetamine and fentanyl with intent to sell or deliver, asking this court to remand to the trial court for consideration of Community Corrections under Code section 40-36- 106(2)(c). Because the superseding indictments violated the principles of double jeopardy and because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold the plea submission hearing, the judgments entered on the superseding indictments are void, and we dismiss the appeal.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Christopher Bolden, of especially aggravated
robbery, for which he received a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal,
Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
indictment for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for
severance of his case from that of his co-defendant; (3) the trial court erred in “curtailing
[Defendant’s] questions in jury selection”; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s
request to cross-examine the victim about “potential bias” related to cases that the State
dismissed against the victim while Defendant awaited trial; (5) the trial court erred in
admitting Defendant’s prior conviction for robbery “without engaging in the required
analysis”; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask questions about “an irrelevant
and prejudicial rap music video”; (7) the trial court erred by refusing to fully bifurcate a
charged count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm from all other counts; and (8)
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following a thorough review, we
affirm Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Ginny Elizabeth Parker, was convicted following a bench trial of five counts of forgery, for which she received an effective six-year sentence to serve. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her forgery convictions, specifically regarding whether she acted without authorization; (2) the trial court shifted the burden of service of medical records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-122(c) from the State to the Defendant; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted proof of a PayPal account that was linked to the victims’ bank account; (4) she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) her sentence is grossly disproportionate to her offenses, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jimmiko Driskell, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction
relief from her second degree murder conviction, arguing that she received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and was denied due process of law because she lacked the
knowledge to enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea. Based on our review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.