APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Eliot Russell, was convicted of one count of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed twelve-year sentences for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted rape of a child and that the trial court erred in imposing a twenty-four year sentence. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Andre Bernard Easley, appeals his Benton County Circuit Court jury conviction of introduction into or possession of drugs in a penal institution, claiming that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kristy L. Poland (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at over $500 and was sentenced to one year suspended to supervised probation with restitution to be set by the trial court. After a hearing on the issue of restitution, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $8,100 in monthly installments of $75. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider her current financial resources and future ability to pay restitution. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we modify the trial court‟s restitution order and remand the case for entry of a new restitution order.

Petitioner, James Mitchell Smith, is seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving on a suspended or canceled license, reckless endangerment, and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. When establishing the proper amount in restitution owed, the trial court should base the figure on the victim’s pecuniary loss as well as the defendant’s financial resources and future ability to pay or perform. T.C.A. § 40-35-304(b), (d)-(e) (2010); State v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Furthermore, the payment schedule is not to exceed the term of the sentence imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-304(c), (g)(2); see also State v. Daniel Lee Cook, No. M2004-02099-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1931401, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2005) (concluding that there was no way the appellant could pay $9,000 in restitution at a rate of $150 per month during a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days). Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously stated that the trial court “simply should [] set the restitution at an amount it believe[s] [the defendant] can pay” rather than attempting to “facilitate payment of its order of restitution.” See State v. Mathes, 115 S.W.3d 915, 919 (2003).

The Appellant, Bertin DeJesus Jimenez, pled guilty to stalking and received a sentence of ninety days in the workhouse. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, contending that the arrest warrant was void ab initio because it failed to allege all of the elements of the offense. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant appealed. Upon review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

Defendant, Christopher Loyd Davis, was indicted for theft of property valued over $10,000. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft. The jury verdict form reflects a conviction for theft of property valued over $1000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The judgment form reflects a Class C felony theft conviction with a sentence of twelve years in incarceration as a Career Offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, that the State failed to prove the value of the property, that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, that the trial court erred in denying a jury instruction on ignorance or mistake of fact, and that the trial court erred by having extrajudicial communication with the jury. After our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the judgments do not properly reflect the jury's verdict. Therefore, we affirm the conviction and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment.

Appellant, Marlon Yarbro, appeals from his convictions for drug offenses, arguing that the State introduced improper evidence of previous misconduct and violated his right to compulsory process and also argues that the trial court improperly applied the drug free school zone enhancement to his conviction for simple possession. After a thorough review, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on the judgments for selling a controlled substance within a school zone and possession of drug paraphernalia. However, because the school zone enhancement was improperly applied to the simple possession conviction, we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brandon Leon Forbes, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -403, -408. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire; (3) that juror misconduct occurred during the course of his trial; (4) that the trial court erred in determining the length of his sentences; and (5) that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his petition stated cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief because it alleged numerous violations of his constitutional rights, ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel, “pervasive governmental misconduct,” and insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand the case for treatment of the petition as one for post-conviction relief and further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

In 1998, the Petitioner, Deshaun Fly Smith, was convicted along with three co-defendants of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court imposed upon the Petitioner an effective life sentence plus twenty-five years. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Smith, No. M1997-00087-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1210813, at *14-20 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 1999), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 denied (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2000). In 2001, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed. This court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on appeal. Deshaun Fly Smith v. State, No. M2004-00719-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 468308, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 15, 2004), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 denied (Tenn. Nov. 7, 2005). In 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he presented multiple claims, including that the prosecutor intentionally withheld evidence in the form of the State’s primary witness’s criminal history. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely and held that the Petitioner had not established that his grounds for relief arose after the limitations period. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

Jason Lee Fisher (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of four counts of burglary, four counts of theft of property, and three counts of vandalism. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel and co-counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence found during the inventory search of the Petitioner’s vehicle. Following a hearing where only the Petitioner, trial counsel, and co-counsel testified, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsels’ alleged deficiencies. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove that impounding the Petitioner’s car was necessary and, therefore, the inventory search was invalid. Accordingly, he contends that, had trial counsel and co-counsel filed a motion to suppress, it would have been successful, and all the evidence against the Petitioner would have been excluded. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Terry Lynn Priest, pled guilty to theft in an amount more than $1,000 and less than $10,000. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Danny Santarone, was convicted of possession of dihydrocodeinone, oxycodone, cocaine, and heroin within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that application of the school zone enhancement violates public policy. Based upon a thorough review of the record, authorities, and arguments, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions and that his argument regarding the public policy behind the school zone enhancement is without merit. We therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Richard Herrera, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery and his effective one-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Terrance Wilks, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition requesting deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing pursuant to the 2001 Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-301 to -309. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that he had not proven the statutory prerequisites for DNA analysis set forth in the Act. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.

The Defendant, Donald Biggs, alias, appeals as of right from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of theft by shoplifting, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-402, -14-103, -14-105, -14-146. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years each on two aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve these two sentences consecutively. The Defendant’s remaining sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of forty-four years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred when it imposed partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed partial consecutive sentences, and the judgments of the trial court are, therefore, reversed.

I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case, and therefore I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I want to make it clear that I do not dissent for the reason the sentence imposed by the trial court is the most appropriate sentence for the Defendant. In fact, had I been the trial judge, I would have been persuaded by the logic set forth in Judge Thomas' opinion to sentence the Defendant to an effective sentence of 22 years.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-one years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it required that he be represented by counsel at trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

In this procedurally complex case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Norris, of second degree murder in 1999, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-one years of incarceration. After several proceedings and filings, discussed in detail below, the U.S. Sixth Circuit granted the Defendant habeas corpus relief unless the State allowed the Defendant to reopen his original direct appeal and raise an issue regarding whether his confession should have been suppressed pursuant to County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). The State allowed the Defendant to reopen his appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession to police because he gave his confession after being held for more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause hearing. This Court addressed the issue pursuant to plain error review. State v. Terry Norris, No. W2000-00707-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 6482823 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 18, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2015). The Defendant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for plenary review. The State filed a petition to rehear, which the Tennessee Supreme Court denied on May 15, 2015. After our plenary review, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

The Petitioner, Robert Winters, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court granted judicial diversion for the Defendant, Ashley Marie Pretzer, on several drug-related charges in an eighteen-count indictment. The Defendant agreed to be on supervised probation for a period of eight years. Two years later, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit with the trial court alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms of her probation by failing a drug screen. The trial court issued a probation violation warrant, and, thereafter, the police arrested the Defendant for driving under the influence, failing to prove financial responsibility, and possessing drug paraphernalia. The Defendant’s probation officer amended his affidavit to include these new charges. The trial court held a hearing on the Defendant’s alleged probation violations during which she admitted to the violations. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion and sentenced her to serve a sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, she contends that the trial court improperly required her to serve the balance of her sentence rather than reinstate her sentence of probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Perry L. McCrobey, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State concedes that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing Defendant’s motion. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the motion and remand for appointment of counsel if Defendant is indigent and for other proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.

The Petitioner, Lionel R. Lindsey, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dennis Allen Rayfield, was convicted of first degree murder by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2014). He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to call a witness for the sole purpose of impeaching him, (3) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the alternate jurors at the close of the proof, and (4) the trial court erred in permitting the sequestered jurors to have their cell phones in their possession during the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.